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ABSTRACT!
 
Article 9 of the 1946 Japanese Constitution is one of the few constitutional laws that 
“forever renounces war as the sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as 
means of settling international dispute” (the first clause). What makes the article even more 
progressive is the second clause, which further renounces the right to maintain “land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential” and the right of belligerency of the state. Famous for this 
“peace clause”, the Japanese constitution has remained contested ever since its establishment, but 
has resisted challenges in the National Diet and the courts for seventy years. After the massive 
protest cycles of the 1960s to early 1970s, protest activity in Japan declined, and there was no 
major protest mobilization over this issue for several decades. Suddenly in 2004, however, a new 
movement called the Article 9 Association (Kyūjō no kai) emerged, and grew rapidly to 
encompass over 7,500 chapters across Japan and abroad. What led to this new social movement 
and how and why did it grow so rapidly after such a long period of quiescence? This dissertation 
examines these puzzles using social movement concepts and theories. 
The study accepts as its foundation McAdam’s political process framework (1982) to 
understand how the longstanding contentious issue re-emerged as a new social movement under 
new political and social conditions in the 2000s. This is a movement that re-emerged after a long 
period of abeyance (Whittier 1997; Crossley and Taylor 2015), and to understand the 
movement’s emergence and rapid rise under these new conditions, it uses the perspective that 
social movements are network structures (Diani and McAdam 2003).  
In examining closely how the Article 9 Association re-mobilized old networks and 
created new ones, the study not only demonstrates that the life of social movements may 
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continue across protest cycles through network practices, but also contributes a more relational 
understanding to social movement theories of movement continuity. It thus proposes what is 
understood as ‘continuity’ through certain actors’ maintenance efforts may be understood as 
infinite processes of network formation and reorganization of social movements-as-networks.
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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Article 9 of the 1946 Constitution of Japan is one of the few constitutional laws in the 
world that “forever renounces war as the sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling international dispute” (the first clause). What makes the article even 
more progressive is the second clause, which further renounces the right to maintain “land, sea, 
and air forces, as well as other war potential” and the right of belligerency of the state. The 
Japanese constitution famous for this special “peace clause” has remained contested ever since 
its establishment, but resisted challenges in the National Diet and in the courts for seventy years. 
After the massive protest cycles of the 1960s to early 1970s, protest activity in Japan declined, 
and there was no major protest mobilization over this issue for several decades. Suddenly in 
2004, however, a new movement called the Article 9 Association (Kyūjō no kai) emerged, and 
grew very rapidly to encompass over 7,500 chapters across Japan and abroad. What led to this 
new social movement and how and why did it grow so rapidly after such a long period of 
quiescence? This dissertation examines these puzzles using social movement theories. 
 
The Initial Appeal 
On June 10, 2004, a group of seven men and two women, all prominent intellectuals in 
Japan, held a press conference to announce the establishment of “the Article 9 Association 
(Kyūjō no kai).” “An appeal from the Article 9 Association” stated: 
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The Japanese constitution now faces a great challenge. 
Through the use of weapons reaching the cruelty of the atomic bombs of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Second World War claimed over fifty million lives. 
As a result, the citizens of the world learned the lesson that resorting to force 
should never be an option, even for the purpose of resolving international 
disputes. 
Bearing an enormous responsibility for having continuously pursued a war 
of invasion, Japan decided to work towards realizing this global vision, and thus 
established a constitution including Article Nine which stipulated the renunciation 
of war and of military force. 
Yet today, half a century later, the movement to “revise” the Japanese 
constitution, and Article Nine in particular, has risen to the forefront with an 
unprecedented scale and intensity. The proponents of that movement intend for 
Japan to follow the United States and change into a “war-waging country.” For 
that reason, they [want to] authorize the use of the right to collective self-defense, 
dispatch the Japanese Self Defense Forces overseas, allow their use of force, and 
commit other such actions that, for all intents and purposes, violate the restrictions 
of the constitution. Moreover, they are trying to do away with such important 
measures and policies as the three non-nuclear principles and the ban on arms 
exports. Finally, in order to raise children to become leaders of a “war-waging 
country,” they are trying to change the Fundamental Law of Education. This 
essentially alters the state of the nation that the Japanese constitution has aimed to 
achieve, threatening to convert Japan from a country that strives to resolve 
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conflicts without military force to a nation that prioritizes military action above all 
else. We cannot allow that conversion to occur. 
The United States’ attack on Iraq and the morass of the occupation that 
followed makes it clearer to us day by day that the resolution of conflict through 
force is unrealistic. The use of force only results in robbing a country and its 
people of their livelihood and of their happiness. Since the 1990s, armed 
interventions by major nations into regional conflicts have also failed to result in 
effective resolutions. That is why, in such places as Europe and Southeast Asia, 
efforts are being strengthened to create regional frameworks that can help to 
resolve conflicts through diplomacy and dialogue. 
Today, as we question our path in the 21st century based on the lessons of 
the 20th, the importance of grounding diplomacy on Article Nine emerges with 
renewed clarity. To call the dispatch of Self Defense Forces into countries that do 
not welcome it an “international contribution” is nothing more than arrogance. 
Based on Article Nine, Japan needs to develop ties of friendship and 
cooperation with the peoples of Asia and other regions, and change a diplomatic 
stance that only prioritizes a military alliance with the United States. Japan must 
play an active role in the tide of world history by exercising its autonomy and 
acting in a pragmatic manner. It is precisely because of Article Nine that Japan 
can engage its partner nations in peaceful diplomacy while respecting their 
various positions, and collaborate with them in the fields of economy, culture, 
science and technology. 
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In order to join hands with all peace-seeking citizens of the globe, we feel that we 
must strive to shine the light of Article Nine upon this turbulent world. To that 
end, each and every citizen, as sovereign members of this country, needs to 
personally adopt the Japanese constitution, with its Article Nine, and reaffirm 
their belief in it through their daily actions. This is a responsibility that the 
sovereign members share for the future state of their country. Thus, in the interest 
of a peaceful future for Japan and the world, we would like to appeal to each and 
every citizen to come together for the protection of the Japanese constitution: You 
must begin making every possible effort to thwart these attempts at 
“constitutional revision,” and you must begin today. 
  
The appeal was signed by Inoue Hisashi (author), Umebara Takeshi (philosopher), Ōe 
Kenzaburō (author), Okudaira Yasuhiro (constitution scholar), Oda Makoto (author), Katō 
Shūichi (critic), Sawachi Hisae (author), Tsurumi Shunsuke (philosopher), and Miki Mutsuko 
(UN Women’s Society) (last names are placed first as it is customary in Japan).  
 As soon as the appeal was published, it created a great sensation, resulting in voluntary 
formation of more than 3,000 grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association across the country 
within the first year. The number then reached 7,528 in the next several years and remains 
constant up to this day. While this phenomenon exhibits the high level of significance of the 
Japanese constitution Article 9 to the people in Japan, those who are unfamiliar with the article 
and its true worth would naturally wonder why so many Japanese people want to mount such a 
movement to fight against the revision attempt.  
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 Together with the preamble, Article 9 represents the spirit of the current constitution of 
Japan, which was established in 1946 based on the people’s sincere reflection upon wartime 
atrocities. Article 9 was not a result of a temporary swell of emotion or a simple brand pushed by 
the Occupation, but a fruit of the more general efforts of the human race to establish world 
peace, which has continued since Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1795) (Yamamuro 2007). Numerous 
historical accounts have made evident that the pacifist thoughts that yielded Article 9 also existed 
previously in Japan (Horio 2016, Yamamuro 2007, Kawakami 2006, Kawai 2004, Takemae 
2002, Sasaki 1997, Ienaga 1974, MacArthur 1964, Shidehara 1951, Nakae 1887). 
 Despite the global significance of the article that renounced war as a sovereign right of 
the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international dispute, it has also been 
the source of domestic conflicts between those who claimed the necessity of force to maintain 
peace and who believed that the reality is quite otherwise and that peace is eventually achievable 
only by abolishing the military. The 2004 appeal of the Article 9 Association is clearly written 
from the perspective of those who believe peace can only be maintained by renouncing military 
force, in the face of the political steps taken by the Japanese government, which promoted the 
revision of Article 9 based on their already bankrupt (yet still popular) claim that the constitution 
was forced on Japan by the Allied Occupation. 
 Domestically in Japan, there is a great deal of debate among constitutional scholars 
about whether or not Japan’s  maintenance of the Self-Defense Forces (hereafter “the SDF”) 
infringes Article 9 (Yanase 2016). Yamauchi Toshihiro, representing the view of most Japanese 
constitutional scholars of the previous generation, maintains that this constitutional article 
pursues absolute pacifism without a military (Yamauchi 1992). Many scholars in the field of law 
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proposes the idea of constitutional pacifism and argues that Article 9 requires complete 
demilitarization and permits only an unarmed defense. He continues to criticize not only the 
recent decision of the Japanese government but also its interpretation that allows the existence of 
the SDF (Yamauchi 2015). A majority of scholars still interprets Japan’s decision to maintain the 
SDF under Article 9 as unconstitutional (Nihon hōdō kenshō kikō 2016). On the other hand, 
Hasebe Yasuo, a leading constitutional scholar who views the SDF as constitutional, explains 
that there are two types of legal norms: ‘rules’ that provide answers to specific problems and 
‘principles’ that operate to guide solutions in a certain direction. In Hasebe’s view, Article 9 is 
not a rule but a principle, and that “maintaining the minimum force necessary for self-defense is 
thought to be permissible under the present constitution, and moreover, consistent with the 
fundamental idea of constitutionalism” (Hasebe 2006:4). Even Hasebe, however, holds that the 
right to collective defense is impossible to be interpreted as constitutional. 
 Aside from constitutional scholars, some Japanese experts in the field of national 
security and international relations suggest that discussion over constitutional amendment should 
consider more practical consequences of operating the SDF under Article 9. The constitutionality 
of the SDF is an important question; however, it is equally urgent to look more seriously at the 
reality of SDF operations. Moreover, the meaning of “self-defense” has changed since the end of 
the Cold War. Isezaki, for instance, explains that it is unlikely that the world’s most powerful 
countries (i.e. the permanent members of the United Nations (hereafter the “UN”) Security 
Council, including the United States, England, France, Russia, and China) would fight a war in 
the traditional sense, because international law has developed to the extent that the world does 
not support any invasive war. A nation under the UN regulation could conduct an armed attack 
on other nation only for self-defense. Indeed, as the former Prime Minister of Japan Yoshida 
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Shigeru once stated, “All war is self-defense,” and a country can commit offensive acts of war as 
long as it can justify the action (Isezaki 2015:647). In any rate, an offensive country must justify 
that its use of force was for self-defense. Moreover, the so-called “enemy” of the international 
society today is increasingly non-state, and borderless in many senses—for instance, the Islamic 
State, a militant group that follows a fundamentalist doctrine of Sunni Islam and has committed a 
number of terrorist attacks, has been successful in recruiting internationally through the Internet, 
and participants gather under their title of ‘justice’ beyond religion. Furthermore, Japan is still an 
“enemy country” by the UN Security Council decision. The UN charter allows members of the 
UN and its regional security council to impose military sanctions when an “enemy country” 
reacted against decisions made after the war or moved to reestablish an invasive policy (Chapter 
VIII, Article 53). Could any war of “self-defense” be an option for Japan under such a condition? 
In this context, for Japan to name China an “enemy” at the national level discussion is nothing 
more than nonsense.  
 As many have also pointed out, if one seriously considers Japan’s national security, the 
existence of fifty-four nuclear reactors all along its coastal line should be the most pressing 
concern, and prevention of terrorist attacks on them must be the priority. Thus, from the 
viewpoint of national security and conflict resolution experts, the mainstream discussion lacks a 
serious sense of crisis. This line of discussion suggests more effective utilization of the SDF to 
play a mediator role in resolving international conflicts (Isezaki 2015). On the other hand, 
Yanagisawa Kyōji, a former top officer of the Ministry of Defense who decided to send the SDF 
to Iraq, has reflected on that decision since. He reports that he was unable to think beyond the 
option to send the SDF abroad at that time, and proposes that we could think more seriously of 
the option not to send the SDF outside Japan and contribute to international society with 
! 8!
something other than military force (Yanagisawa 2015). Thus, more grounded discussion about 
the role of the SDF in relation to the constitution is seeking a new perspective for the future, 
where Japan could take a more active, peaceful leadership in the global society.   
 From the outsider’s perspective, American popular writer Ian Buruma asserts that the 
Occupation’s legacy had some “profound defects” on Japan: Buruma views that the Japanese 
pacifist constitution as one of such defects, which left Japan with “a total dependency on others 
to defend [itself]” (2004:152). He claims that this is the cause that kept right-wing revanchism 
alive and polarized opinion on the constitution, where there should have been consensus. 
Buruma seems to underestimate, however, the extent of Japanese involvement in the process of 
drawing up the constitution. The process involved a number of Japanese citizens, including not 
only experts of constitutional law, but also citizens groups who compiled their own constitutional 
drafts to be publicly presented and considered in the national discussion (Yamamuro 2007). 
Politicians and bureaucrats were also heavily invested in the process and were quite proud of the 
final outcome (Satō 2016). In fact, moreover, as we will see in the following chapters, Japanese 
public opinion about the constitution is not as polarized as Buruma seems to think. At a 
minimum, the Japanese including the revisionists accepted the constitution, and even the contest 
over interpretation of Article 9 does not always mean an objection to its high ideal of pacifism. If 
there is a sharp disagreement over the constitution, it is between the Japanese people and the 
central government. “Right-wing revanchism” was kept alive because the view is actually shared 
by the central government, which in turn gives those right wing groups a voice, while 
downplaying the demand for better compensation for both domestic and foreign victims of the 
country’s wartime aggression, and even the basic rights of the Japanese people that are stipulated 
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in the current constitution. This position of the central government under the Liberal Democratic 
Party is clear in the party’s draft amendment of the constitution published in 2012.  
      In fact, from the viewpoint of comparative constitutions, McElwain and Winkler (2015) 
found that the LDP’s 2012 draft reduced civil rights in comparison to the current Japanese 
Constitution, while introducing no significant change to political institutions. Using the full data 
set housed by the Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009), the 
study has shown that the LDP draft does not fix the issue that is making the current Japanese 
Constitution an international outlier (institutional vagueness), but reduces its progressive 
character that is on a par with today’s standard. This suggests that the LDP draft, despite its 
ostensible reason for the need of constitutional revision that the constitution is outdated, does not 
even “update” the constitution. Clearly, the true aim of the LDP draft is to eliminate Article 9 
and to make Japan once again a “normal,” militarized country.  
 Views like Buruma’s suggest affinity with the so-called “normal country” framework 
that basically assumes that a military is necessary for maintaining national security (and even 
world peace) and that a country is independent (therefore “normal”) only if it has a military. 
However, the idea of Article 9, and the sensibility of the Japanese people who have deeply 
adopted the constitutional article by their own choosing, poses a fundamental question to such 
assumptions.  
 Discussions regarding Article 9 are political. They tend to be ideological, but also need 
to be more practical and grounded in reality, for truly peaceful purposes. In this sense, the 
dispute surrounding Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is a microcosm of the global struggle 
about war and peace. It is clear in the above appeal that the movement of the Article 9 
Association is mounted consciously on the realization that their movement means more than a 
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domestic political fight. Moreover, as this dissertation will make clear, those who responded 
enthusiastically to the appeal were also aware of the historical significance of this struggle to 
protect Article 9.  
 
Purposes of the Study  
Today, over a decade after the formation of the Article 9 Association in 2004, Japan has 
come closer than ever before to actually revising the constitution for the first time in 70 years. To 
join forces with the Article 9 Association, new opposition movements have been mounted to 
fight this attempt. Given that the issue at hand concerns the Japanese military, the result of the 
present struggle will also impact heavily on the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.  
More importantly for the dissertation, the movement of the Article 9 Association is also a 
suitable subject for a sociological study of social movements, because it provides a theoretical 
platform to improve sociological understanding of social movement continuity from the 
perspective of social networks. It accepts as its foundation the political process approach to 
social movements (McAdam 1982), which views social movements as arising out of 
longstanding grievances that only come to the fore when changing social, economic, and 
political conditions present a new political opportunity or threat that in turn becomes the basis 
for social movement mobilization. Most students of social movements would agree that networks 
are important in social movements, and that social movements are likely to be rooted in existing 
social networks. Through more recent studies in which networks have become the very focus of 
analysis, many social movement scholars now regard network processes as the very core of 
social movements (Diani and McAdam 2003, Diani and Bison 2004). In that sense, this study of 
how the network structure of the Article 9 Association developed is also a contribution to the 
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basic sociological study of social organization and the creation of social institutions, which often 
begin as social movements and then may become more institutionalized.  
The Article 9 Association is a vast network, and it is rooted in social networks created 
through previous mobilizations. However, the Article 9 Association would not have been able to 
create such a large-scale movement if it was simply rooted in existing social networks, especially 
in the case of Japan where social movements were historically divided into two or more factions. 
Moreover, contentious social movements were in abeyance (Taylor 1989, Whittier 1997) for 
three decades in the country, staying virtually “invisible” (Steinhoff 2015) to the general public 
despite their continuous activity. Given this context, it is important to ask not only what kind of 
social networks the Article 9 Association is rooted in, but also how these social networks have 
created the present form of the Article 9 Association. To answer these questions, the dissertation 
studies the Article 9 Association as a large and complex horizontal network. It investigates the 
processes through which the Article 9 Association was created, the ways in which grassroots 
chapters were organized and maintained, and how different chapters were connected to each 
other as well as to the original Article 9 Association.  
The dissertation will reveal that the Article 9 Association is rooted in the social networks 
accumulated by the 1960s political generation that emerged in the opposition movement against 
the US-Japan Security Treaty. Surviving the abeyance period that followed the original protest 
cycle, many of these activists have been playing leadership roles in various social movements in 
Japan. These activists also have borne the consequences of the serious schisms that afflicted their 
past movements. When the nine figures announced their “Appeal from the Article 9 Association” 
to the Japanese public in 2004, constitutional revision was felt as an impending crisis, much as it 
is today in the mid-2010s. The 1946 Constitution of Japan remains the most fundamental legal 
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foothold for democratic citizenship for all people in Japan. The constitution that requires 
approval of the super majority of both Houses, as well as achieving a majority of the national 
referendum for its amendment, as stated in Article 96. Hence, gaining majority support for its 
cause was a practical goal for the Article 9 Association. For this purpose, overcoming the major 
conflicts that remain within the 1960s political generation, which still is the major force of 
Japanese social movements today, was an urgent problem for the movement.  
Therefore, the present study will first find out about past conflicts within the 1960s 
political generation, and the ways in which participants in the Article 9 Association would 
overcome these conflicts. In so doing, the study shows the concrete ways in which the Article 9 
Association has achieved its present form of a vast and horizontal network, and explains why this 
was essential for reactivating the entire sector of social movements of the country.  
Given the significance of Article 9 that marked a milestone in the global efforts toward 
outlawing of war, and that only the Japanese people are able to protect the article, reactivation 
and continuation of social movements in Japan has a general importance in order to continue the 
historical process toward world peace. Indeed, it was eventually the power of American citizens 
movements that actualized the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or officially General Treaty for 
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Yamamuro 2007:184-194). Clearly, 
the present struggle to protect Article 9 of the Japanese constitution is a descendant of such 
previous movements in the United States and elsewhere. Thus, the present study is based on the 
conviction that social movements do make differences in reality, and their continuation is 
essentially important for the healthy development of our society. 
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Composition of the Study 
For these purposes, the dissertation delivers the following chapters: building on the social 
movement literature about protest cycles and social networks, Chapter II sets the theoretical 
framework of the study, and lays out a set of research questions the dissertation will address. In 
so doing, it explains why the study needs to look at the Article 9 Association. It also describes 
the research design. 
Chapter III presents the historical backdrop of the emergence and development of the 
Article 9 Association. Building on a historical overview of the effect that Cold War politics had 
on the Japanese left and its peace movements, the chapter focuses on the political process in 
Japan since the 1960s, through which contentious social movements were divided in the country, 
and how this resulted in the long period of abeyance that followed. In so doing, it also explains 
why Article 9 came to have additional symbolic significance as the linchpin of the peace 
constitution when a new political threat to Article 9 led to the creation of the association to 
mobilize opposition to its revision. It then introduces the rise of the new generation of social 
movements in the 2010s, which emerged after the Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami in March 
2011, and how this new generation began to be engaged in positive discussion about the 
constitution and democracy. 
Chapter IV describes the processes of formation of the Article 9 Association in detail. It 
will show how the original Article 9 Association was formed; how so many citizen groups had 
come to become grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association; and how quickly the original 
Article 9 Association became the “headquarters” of the nationwide network of the several 
thousands of Article 9 Associations. In other words, it will show the processes through which 
local leadership groups took shape, how these local networks expanded to become local 
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grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association, and how these chapters attached themselves to 
the original group of nine intellectuals. Similar processes will be observed with other types of 
grassroots chapters, such as occupation-based and workplace-based chapters, reflecting the 
innovative ways that the association expanded its network by building on existing social ties of 
various types. The chapter also describes the major types of activities these grassroots chapters 
conduct, and explains how these chapters get connected to each other to compose the grassroots-
level networks of the Article 9 Association. 
Chapter V discusses the “clearinghouse chapters” of the Article 9 Association. 
“Clearinghouse chapters” are chapters that facilitate and maintain networks of grassroots 
chapters (Steinhoff 2003). They often regard themselves as independent chapters as well. 
Clearinghouse chapters now exist in the majority of prefectures of Japan, and major industries 
such as mass media also have them. This chapter looks at six prefectural clearinghouse chapters 
chosen by theoretical sampling. Each of these clearinghouse chapters strives to overcome a 
different type of the conflicts that were created in the course of past movements such as the 
student movements in the 1960s and 1970s and the labor movements in the 1980s, all of which 
are part of the historical legacy of the 1960s political generation. My analyses are focused on the 
ways in which each chapter overcomes these conflicts, and in so doing, the chapter underscores 
that participants in the Article 9 Association movement are consciously creating a massive new 
network beyond the existing groups by bridging the cleavages between them. In this sense, the 
clearinghouse chapters are an innovative device for the Article 9 Association movement to 
successfully transform the old, divided movements into a new unified network. The objectives 
and activities of clearinghouse chapters are embedded in unique histories, local social movement 
organizations, and other resources available in their respective local areas. Thus, the participants 
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concentrated their energy to bridge the past gaps and expand their networks in their respective 
locations. Together, these six cases draw the framework of the network built by the 1960s 
political generation in Japan today. Moreover, this analysis contributes to theoretical and 
empirical understanding of the role of such clearinghouse groups, which are widely used in 
Japanese social movements and also occur in other countries but have rarely been studied in 
depth. 
Chapter VI analyzes the major functions of the headquarters of the Article 9 Association 
in the first few years of its activity. The headquarters constitutes the symbolic and charismatic 
leadership, and is the intelligence of the movement. While representing the entire network of the 
Article 9 Association at the national level, the headquarters provides the movement slogans and 
goals, as well as the latest information and analytical tools to make sense of ongoing changes in 
politics in relation to their activities. The headquarters hosts the national exchange meetings and 
publishes newsletters and digital mail magazines in order to encourage communications among 
grassroots chapters and strengthen their horizontal connections. It also publishes booklets that 
recorded its constitutional seminar series to promote constitutional literacy among the general 
public. As will be shown in the way in which it dealt with the 2011 triple disaster in northeastern 
Japan, the headquarters responds quickly to salient issues that arise occasionally and keeps the 
movement relevant to the changing circumstances, each time through serious reflection on its 
roles and purposes in relation to social reality. This character of the headquarters, as well as the 
adaptability of grassroots chapters that compose the network of the Article 9 Association, has 
been essential for the movement to make new connections to create a broader coalition in recent 
years. 
Chapter VII begins with highlighting the first achievement of the Article 9 Association. 
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Drawing on the political process framework, the chapter describes how the development of the 
Article 9 Association network coincided with the reversal of public opinion on Article 9, which 
led to the resignation of Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet in 2007, and eventually the fall of 
the LDP government in 2009. The chapter then explains how the Article 9 Association dealt with 
the new political threat caused by the 2011 triple disaster and resultant comeback of the LDP 
government under Abe, who has been insisting on revising Article 9. The chapter also shows that 
the headquarters is a coalition of some of the most connected leaders: each of the nine founders 
possesses unique personal and professional backgrounds and the group does not necessarily 
share views on matters other than Article 9 and the constitution. The secretariat, moreover, is 
composed of not only socially and politically active university professors with different 
expertise, but also the leaders of two different social movement groups that had kept their 
distance before joining the Article 9 Association. As much as its adaptability, this character of 
the headquarters was also essential in the Association’s development, not only for it to reactivate 
social movements in Japan, but also for it to claim high centrality within the broader movement 
in later years, thereby laying the foundation for its constitutional movement to continue beyond 
its original cycle of protest.  
Chapter VIII discusses the new political process after the triple disaster in March 2011 
destabilized the society and led to the emergence of a new generation of activists. In so doing, 
the chapter deals with a remaining question: ‘continuity’ of the Article 9 Association in the new 
generation. While the Article 9 Association has created its vast network with real impact in 
politics, the movement has been missing younger participants. Those who became active in the 
new anti-nuclear movements did not automatically connect to the Article 9 Association that deals 
with the constitution and Article 9. It did not take too long, however, for these younger activists 
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to realize that the issues they faced are interrelated, and in fact derive from the same root cause: 
violation of the constitution by the government. As they stood together in front of the Diet 
building for a shared purpose, the old and new generations started to develop mutual trust, and to 
collaborate in creating events and establishing new groups and organizations. 
In conclusion, Chapter IX revisits the major arguments this dissertation makes, 
summarizes its theoretical contributions, and discusses its further implications. Based on the 
close investigation of the processes through which the Article 9 Association was created, 
organized, maintained, and expanded, the dissertation explicates how a large scale social 
movement with a real impact in politics could be mounted even after a long period of abeyance. 
The dissertation contributes to sociological study of social movements as it expands our 
understanding of social movement continuity by demonstrating that social movements can 
continue beyond cycles of protest, even without direct successors: as the Article 9 Association 
substantiates, social movements are network processes, which can ‘continue’ not only by 
maintaining their vigor and by leaving resources, but also through laying the foundation (i.e. 
overcoming carried-on problems and strengthening connections between different actors to 
increase impact) upon which  future movements can develop.  
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CHAPTER II.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Life of Social Movements: Political Process, Cycles of Protest, and Abeyance Structure 
In his classic study, Doug McAdam has shown that “any complete model of social 
insurgency should offer the researcher a framework for analyzing the entire process of 
movement development rather than a particular phase (e.g., the emergence of social protest) of 
that process” (1982:36). Some studies have since been conducted to look at the dynamics of 
social movements after their initial emergence, and concluded that most social movements have 
a cyclical life rather than a simple linear life, with clear points of birth and death (Isserman 1987; 
Rupp and Taylor 1987; McAdam 1988; Tarrow 1989, 1994; Taylor 1989; Koopmans 1993; 
Meyer 1993; Tilly 1995; Whittier 1995). Verta Taylor in her study of social movement 
continuity, for example, explained, “movements do not die, but scale down and retrench to adapt 
to changes in the political climate” (1989:772). Taylor concluded that the survival of the first 
wave women’s movement during the unfavorable political climate that followed was due mainly 
to the strong long-term commitment of individual members. Its survivors were re-discovered by 
second wave feminists a generation later. Similarly, Nancy Whittier (1997) analyzed the 
women’s movement, and proposed generational processes that interact with organizational 
factors and political opportunity structures to shape movement continuity and change. Drawing 
on sociological theories about political generations and cohort replacement (Mannheim [1928] 
1952; Braungart and Braungart 1984; DeMartini 1985, 1992; Schneider 1988), Whittier’s study 
found that social movements change in part through the entry of new recruits, while collective 
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identity maintained by the long-time participants was the most significant internal factor for 
movement continuity.  
These studies, however, do not specify what they mean by “continuity” of social 
movements. The traditional view of social movements assumes a movement to have a single or 
multiple fixed subjects who conduct the given movement. If maintenance of collective identity 
were the most important factor for movement continuity, moreover, it would be natural to 
assume that “continuity” of social movement through protest “cycles” and “waves” would hardly 
be sustained when the long-term committed members of a particular movement reach an 
advanced age and become incapable of carrying on their movement. Therefore, for continuation 
of social movements, it is presumed necessary for movements to recruit new members into given 
social movement organizations, and this demands tremendous efforts and resources on the part of 
recruiters, as shown by the vast literature on movement recruitment (Snow et al. 1980; McAdam 
1988). Studies also have found, however, that different political generations are unlikely to share 
the same collective identity due to their different socio-political and historical experience, which 
makes recruiting participants from a younger generation much more difficult than recruitment 
within the same generation—In fact, Whittier (1997) documented that generations can differ by 
just a couple of years. 
Crossley and Taylor (2015) recently extended Taylor’s original framework of abeyance 
structure and explained how the existence of “free spaces” such as educational institutions, 
expanded collective identity, and new elements in the tactical repertoire (i.e. use of the Internet) 
signal the abeyance status of a given movement that might otherwise be regarded as having 
already ended. Examining feminist mobilizations among college students in the United States in 
recent years, the study found that feminist collective identity has diffused widely to other areas 
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of contention. While cohesive collective identity was still found among movement participants, 
the study also noted that feminist collective identity was expanded through the abeyance 
structure. This made the new generation of feminist mobilization more inclusive, and helped the 
feminist movement to continue after the original waves of protest.  
This dissertation does not dispute the significance of collective identity to the general 
development of social movements. Instead, it looks at the life of social movements from the 
perspective that social movements are fundamentally organized as network processes, which 
emphasizes the changing nature of social movements. Frame alignment theory (Snow et al. 1986, 
Snow and Benford 1988) that emphasizes interactive and communicative processes of movement 
participation, helps in understanding these concrete processes. Thus, the present study sheds new 
light on the processes of social movement continuity and recruitment.  
 
The Roles of Networks in Social Movements 
Networks as Independent and Dependent Variables for Mobilization 
Social movement studies traditionally looked at networks as an important resource for 
mobilization. Since the 1970s, scholars have examined a number of cases to identify recruitment 
strategies employed by different types of movements, and found that movement participants are 
often recruited through activists’ social network ties that are both private and public, such as 
personal friends, relatives, colleagues, and neighbors. One of the most important studies in this 
line of scholarship is Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson’s 1980 study. Building on the previously 
established assumption that recruitment cannot occur without prior contact between a 
recruitment agent and a potential participant, Snow et al. examined the microstructural process of 
recruitment to identify “the conditions under which various recruitment techniques are more or 
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less successful” (Snow et al. 1980:787). They reemphasized the salience of social networks as a 
recruitment avenue, and argued that “the reason why some rather than other individuals join a 
movement once they have been introduced to it can be explained in large part by their structural 
availability” (1980:792). That is to say,  
 
[I]ndividuals who join social movements share the kinds of demographic and 
social characteristics that allow them to follow their interests and/or engage in 
exploratory behavior to greater extent than individuals who are bound to existing 
lines of action by such extraneous commitment as spouse, children, debts, job, 
and occupational reputation (1980:794).  
 
Consequently, the extent of participation required for movements explains the venue of 
recruitment: “Movements which do not require exclusive participation by their members in 
movement activities will attract members primarily from among extra-movement interpersonal 
associations and networks, rather than from public places (1980:796). The study thus showed 
that “the mobilization process in general and the recruitment process in particular are likely to 
vary significantly with changes in organizational structure” of social movements. Snow et al. 
thus concluded, “microstructural variables are of equal, and perhaps greater, importance than 
dispositional susceptibilities in the determination of differential recruitment” (1980:798). As 
such, studies of recruitment strategies helped us to understand the role of networks as an 
important independent variable in mobilization of social movements.  
Since the 1990s, scholars have begun to pay attention to networks as an outcome of 
mobilization activities, regarding networks as a dependent variable of social movements. In 
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dialogue with the scholarship on social movement outcomes that has been struggling to identify 
and measure movements’ ‘success’ due largely to its focus on macro-level changes in values, 
beliefs, and lifestyles, Mario Diani proposed to adopt a meso-level perspective to assess social 
movement outcomes and focus on “changes in the structural location of movement actors 
(individuals and/or organizations) in broader social networks”(1997:129). As the position that an 
actor occupies in social networks is related to the level of impact that the actor could exercise, 
the impact of a movement can be assessed by the relative centrality of its components in given 
social networks. More importantly, in Diani’s conception, network ties that are counted as social 
capital do not necessarily imply the presence of collective identity; they are, however, based on 
sentiments of mutual trust and recognition among the actors involved (1997:130). This 
conceptualization of network is important because it expands our scope for the identification of 
network ties present in social movements that are often looser than what we normally 
conceptualize as collective identity. The concept of collective identity (Melucci 1995, Whittier 
1997) is a very important aspect of our theoretical understanding of social movements. It refers 
to the social and emotional level of personal commitment that is created through social 
movement activity and motivates continued participation. Hence, when existing low-level social 
ties are mobilized through the creation of a specific social movement network that carries out 
collective activities, those shared activities develop and display evidence of collective identity. 
 
Networks at Different Levels of Mobilization 
In more recent years, social networks have finally become the very focus of social 
movement studies, and social movements are reconceived as “complex and highly heterogeneous 
network structures” (Diani and McAdam 2003:1). To examine networks as the process central to 
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social movement dynamics rather than ‘playing a role’ in mobilization, it is worth paying 
attention to the function of networks at different levels. For the sake of clarity, I follow Diani’s 
categorization and present my understanding of the working of networks at three theoretical 
levels at which networks may form: individuals, organizations, and collectivities and events), 
although the actual dynamics of network formation may occur across these levels. 
 
Working of Networks at the Individual Level 
Individual actors in social movements can be categorized into activists, protagonists, 
antagonists, and audiences (potential constituencies) (Hunt et al. 1994), and these actors are 
typically linked through both private and public ties well before collective actions develop. 
Individuals may also be connected through indirect ties without direct, face-to-face interaction, 
through their joint involvement in activities and events (Diani 2003:7). The extent to which such 
indirect ties as “exposure to the same media (whether ‘traditional’ or ‘computer-based’) may 
represent a social network link,” and the extent to which “shared cognitive and cultural spaces” 
can be regarded as sources of links is much debated in the current scholarship of social networks 
analysis. Whether these different kinds of ties operate differently, and what kinds of ties such as 
strong or weak, direct or indirect, should matter more than others are also being debated. 
Although much of these discussions are currently ongoing, most studies that looked at the 
individual level of mobilization were interested in the ways in which involvement in networks 
affects individual behavior. For example, in her study of Swiss political organizations, Florence 
Passy (2003) examined network mechanism at the individual level and distinguished the 
functions of social networks in the individual participation process as socialization functions 
(which create an initial disposition to participate), structural-connection functions (which 
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generate structural and practical opportunities for involvement), and decision-shaping functions 
(which affect the ultimate decision to take part in movements) (Passy 2003:30-41). Helmut 
Anheier’s study on early Nazi activists revealed that the community embeddedness of actors 
positively influenced their chances of becoming active in promoting collective action and 
organizational growth (Anheier 2003). In these studies, networks were mainly treated as 
independent variables, although they paid more attention to the network dynamics compared 
with the conventional recruitment literature. 
 
Working of Networks at the Organizational Level 
 Between the levels of individual and collectivities and events, the function of networks at 
the organizational level is quite ambiguous. Clearly, the function of networks at the 
organizational level is closely intertwined with the individual level dynamics, because in reality 
organizations are linked by individual members. It is important to note, however, that these 
individuals who connect different organizations are often leaders (e.g. corporate managers, 
CEOs, union representatives, local elites/bosses etc.) of organizations. Unlike individual non-
leader members of organizations, leaders are not only responsible for their own behavior but are 
responsible for the behavior of their organizations, and therefore tend to act differently from non-
leader individuals.  
Nevertheless, the social network ties possessed by leaders are an important resource for 
their organizations, and those leaders who are high in social capital are more likely to be able to 
bring their organizations toward the central position within the network in which the 
organization find itself. Thus, treating networks as both independent and dependent variables, 
scholars in the field asked questions such as “what are the traits of nodes that account for 
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individual SMOs’ centrality or marginality in a network? How do preexisting ties—both 
organizational and between leaders…affect chances of new alliances to develop, or the location 
of specific organizations in a broader organizational field?” According to Diani, “Answers to 
these questions also predict influence in the larger political system and attitudes towards 
collaboration with external actors” (Diani 2003:11).  
 
Working of Networks at the Collectives and Events Level 
 The function of networks at the collectives and events level is a relatively new terrain in 
the field. Although networks at the collectives and events level also involve both individual and 
organizational actors as the organizational level does, it is conceptually and empirically 
important to distinguish this level from other two levels of analysis, because events are dynamic 
places of interactions between two or more actors of any level, thus irreducible to the behaviors 
of individuals or organizations. The application of a network perspective at the level of 
collectives and events could generate important insights on the processes of identity 
construction. Diani argued: 
 
Events are linked to each other through innumerable mechanisms. Organizations 
operate as ties by promoting and/or participating in multiple events; individual 
activities operate in the same way; thirdly, events may be linked through symbolic 
means, that is, by representations that underline continuity between what could 
otherwise be largely independent and disconnected events (2003:12). 
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Because events are the place of interactions, they are at the same time generative and 
transformative. Through interactions with other participants, actors can enhance and reproduce 
pre-existing networks and at the same time experience transformative situations, thus 
constructing new identities and connections that potentially lead to new movements. At this level 
of observation and analysis, it is possible to reformulate networks as “multiple, cross-cutting sets 
of relations sustained by conversational dynamics within social settings” (Mische 2003:259). In 
this formulation, networks allow movement actors to go beyond the local boundaries and “break 
the limits of densely knit groups and relate to much broader sets of prospective allies” (Diani 
2003:17).  
The precise mechanisms that characterize the process of network construction and 
reproduction in social movements have only begun to be explored by a handful of researchers 
(Mische and Pattison 2000; Mische 2003, 2008) who have been in dialogue with more formal 
social network analyses as well as the cultural approach to both network analysis and social 
movement studies. Diani argued that “viewing movements as a distinctive type of social 
networks may reorient social movement analysis and help better specifying the relation between 
movements and related phenomena such as coalitions, solidarity campaigns, and political 
organizations” (2003:17). In doing so, looking at the function of networks at the level of 
collectives and events may be the most fruitful endeavor, mainly because it allows researchers to 
transcend the heavily organization-centered current scholarship of social movements.  
Finally, Diani called for more attention to the following points for the development of an 
integrated approach: 1) recognition of the duality of network processes as a precondition to 
appropriate multilevel investigations; 2) attention to the network processes connecting events, 
activities, and ideas, and not only to those linking individuals or organizations; 3) recognition of 
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the multiplicity of networks potentially linking different actors or events; 4) attention to the time 
dimension in network processes; 5) recognition of the value of current approaches to social 
movements in the investigation of homophily processes (2003:318). Thinking in terms of 
networks has become routine for students of social movements in more recent years, partly due 
to the universal usage of Internet communication technologies. In fact, two international peer-
reviewed journals that specialize in social movement studies published special issues on 
networks in 2014, showing the high level of interest on the topic in the field.  
 
Research Questions: Social Networks and Social Movement Continuity 
Drawing on the theories and concepts discussed above, this dissertation explores the 
emergence and development of the Article 9 Association as a social movement network, and 
answers the following research questions: First, how and why did the initial Article 9 
Association emerge, and the appeal published by this particular group bring about such a quick 
expansion of the network of a constitutional movement in the early 2000s (three decades after 
the end of the “political season” in the 1960s and 1970s); and who created these several thousand 
grassroots chapters and how?—In other words, what kind of social networks is the Article 9 
Association rooted in, and how have these social networks created the present form of the Article 
9 Association? Second, how did the Article 9 Association develop as a movement and a network, 
during and after the initial years of its explosive expansion? To put it more concretely, what were 
the processes through which grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association were created, 
organized, and maintained; and how are different chapters connected to each other as well as to 
the original Article 9 Association? Lastly, what role does this network play in the new coalition 
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for constitutional government in the 2010s, and what does the answer to this question suggest 
about social movement continuity?
 
Research Methods: Participant Observation and Interviews 
Ethnographic field research is widely regarded as an appropriate method to conduct a 
process-based study of social movements (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, 2008; Diani and 
McAdam 2003; Staggenborg 2008; McAdam and Tarrow 2011). My field research involved 
participant observation and semi-structured in-depth interviews in selected local chapters and the 
headquarters of the Article 9 Association. The main research was conducted between September 
2011 and May 2012 in Japan, and follow-up research between November 2012 and October 
2016.  
 My primary field site was in the Tokyo metropolitan area, where over 2,000 grassroots 
chapters are located. For participant observation, I attended various activities initiated by the 
Article 9 Association’s headquarter and various grassroots chapters in different local areas 
including Tokyo, Kanagawa, Fukushima, Miyagi, Hiroshima, Kyoto, and Okinawa. The local 
areas were selected for specific reasons: Tokyo metropolitan area, including Kanagawa, is the 
center of Japanese politics and Tokyo alone has over nine hundred grassroots chapters of the 
Article 9 Association; Fukushima and Miyagi are the areas most devastated by the 3.11 disaster; 
Miyagi and Kyoto have unique histories of social activism and are strongholds of the progressive 
camp in Japan; Hiroshima is one of the two cities where atomic bombs were dropped at the end 
of the World War II, and the location where national peace rallies are held in every August; and 
finally, in Okinawa there also is a strong tradition of peace movements due to its unique 
history—the island experienced very tragic land fighting during the WWII and was under 
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American occupation until its reversion to Japan in1972, and today it still bears most of the 
burden caused by the large presence of American military bases.  
For my interviews, I used a snowball sampling method, beginning with a key informant 
in each location who was introduced either by someone from the headquarters or by another 
interviewee. Semi-structured in-depth interviews (Silverman and Marvasti 2008) were conducted 
with sixty-five participants from at least twenty-five different chapters (“at least” because many 
of the interviewees have multiple memberships). The method of semi-structured in-depth 
interviews is suited to my purpose, because the method allows my interviews to be focused and 
open-ended at the same time. The length of each interview was between one and a half to two 
hours. The interview guide and the list of interviews are in the Appendix. 
 
Data Analysis 
 The primary forms of my data are field notes, interview transcripts, and publications by 
the Article 9 Association (from both the headquarters and grassroots chapters) including the 
newsletters. For data analysis, I used NVivo primarily for narrative analyses, and adopt the 
frameworks of network analysis in making causal claims. I used Gephi for graphic presentation 
of the network of the Article 9 Association. These approaches are particularly suited in order to 
look at the transformative processes of social movement continuity. 
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CHAPTER III.  
POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE 1960S GENERATION IN JAPANESE SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 
 
This dissertation argues that the Article 9 Association movement was built on the 
contentious activism in the 1960s and 1970s in Japan, which was mounted to oppose the US-
Japan Security Treaty, and on the networks built by the survivors of these movements during the 
abeyance period that followed. These old networks, however, needed to transform, in order to 
create a new movement called the Article 9 Association, mainly because of their divided origin. 
Therefore, to appreciate the significance of the Article 9 Association requires understanding the 
historical backdrop of the emergence and development of the movement, and the changes in 
Japanese politics since the 1960s in particular. 
Following an overview of the historical processes through which three competing groups 
within the Japanese Left (the communists, the socialists, and non-partisan actors) were generated 
in the 1950s, this chapter presents the political process (McAdam 1982) through which 
contentious social movements were divided, and how this resulted in the long period of abeyance 
that followed. In so doing, it also explains why the focal point of the attempts to change the 
constitution always centered on Article 9, which thus came to have additional symbolic 
significance as the linchpin of the peace constitution. It then introduces the rise of the new 
generation of social movements in the 2010s, which emerged after the Tōhoku Earthquake and 
Tsunami in March 2011, and how this new generation has begun to be engaged in the positive 
discussion about the constitution and democracy. 
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The Cold War Politics and the Japanese Left 
 As the Cold War tensions spread from Europe to East Asia in the early 1950s, a mass-
based peace movement also started to develop in Japan. The outbreak of war on the Korean 
peninsula in June 1950 triggered an important change in the occupation policy that had 
previously been aiming to democratize and demilitarize Japan. To make Japan useful to its Cold 
War efforts, the US-led occupation forces ordered the creation of a de fact Japanese military 
under the title of National Police Reserve in July 1951, which subsequently became the Self-
Defense Forces. Four months later, the Japanese government signed a bilateral security treaty 
with the United States, and thereby committed the country formally to supporting the US Cold 
War effort in East Asia.  
 Although this development placed Japan in a similar position in the international 
system to that of its Western European counterparts, according to Carlile (2005), what was 
distinctive about the Japanese situation was the balance of forces within the labor movement: 
 
In contrast to the continuing centrality of the communists in France and Italy, the 
JCP [Japanese Communist Party] had lost by the middle of 1950 its capacity to 
influence mainstream politics, thereby clearing a “space” for some other political 
force to mobilize protests of Japan’s incorporation into the US containment 
framework. In the Japanese context, it was the left socialists who took on this 
role. The prominence of the left socialists and the left-socialist viewpoint during 
this critical period left a long-lasting stamp on the organizational characteristics, 
the balance of ideological orientation, and the political and economic roles of the 
Japanese movement for decades to come (Carlile 2005:173). 
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 Although it was also the communists and prominent communist and noncommunist 
intellectuals who provided the initial impetus for peace movement activism in Japan as in 
Western Europe, the Japanese Communist Party (hereafter “the JCP”) was going through a fierce 
internal struggle in the 1950s over the party line. As the “mainstream” faction at that time led by 
Tokuda Kyūichi forced the disastrous violent revolutionary line and many rank-and-file 
members followed what was supposed to be a legitimate central decision, the party suffered a 
tremendous loss of popular support. The internal struggle continued for several years until the 
“anti-mainstream” faction led by Miyamoto Kenji finally restored order and the cornered 
“mainstream” faction fled to Beijing, where it had built a foothold previously. The JCP under 
Miyamoto, who initiated the self-independent (jishu dokuritsu) line, gradually recovered some 
popular support and legitimacy in Japanese society. Nonetheless, this series of events in the 
1950s impacted negatively on the party’s public image, leaving the source of trouble for the 
future. Much later in the 1990s,  the former Soviet Union’s newly released secret documents 
revealed that Tokuda and his aides had been maintaining secret communication with Moscow 
that tried to control the JCP (Fuwa 1993). This, combined with the Red Purge sweeping the 
whole country in the early 1950s, left the JCP incapable of taking any important role within the 
Japanese left, even when the international communist movement was gearing up for its World 
Peace Congress in Paris.  
 This created an opening for the Japan Socialist Party (hereafter “the JSP”) to become 
“the ostensible political voice of the working masses” (Carlile 2005:176) and there was keen 
interest in what position the JSP would take. Prior to the Cold War militarization in East Asia, 
the JSP, despite the fierce infighting between the left and right factions, was united on its “three 
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principles of peace”: an “all around” peace treaty (with agreement of all parties, including the 
Communists); a policy of permanent neutrality; and opposition to the maintenance of foreign 
bases on Japanese soil. However, the Korean War changed the situation. At its 1951 convention, 
the left faction proposed “four principles of peace,” which added opposition to the new issue of 
rearmament to the original three principles. Against this, the right faction proposed to accept a 
partial peace treaty, a limited rearmament for defensive purposes, and through this an alignment 
of the party with the forces supporting the US-led anti-communist alliance internationally. 
Eventually, the four principles of peace were adopted by a majority vote. The left faction gained 
a plurality in the executive committee, and the left-socialist Suzuki Mosaburō was elected to be 
party chairman. 
 The left faction of the labor federation Sōhyō, the largest organizational supporter of 
the JSP, played an active role in this contest, thereby inviting the same conflict into own 
organization. Following the contest over adoption of the JSP’s four principles of peace, the 
federation was split over its affiliation with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(hereafter “the ICFTU”), which had declared unqualified support for the United States in the 
Korean conflict and for the partial peace treaty. Although the left faction managed to avoid the 
ICFTU membership bid to gain the required two-thirds majority, the bitter conflict escalated 
thereafter, and reached a climax in the JSP extraordinary convention held on October 23 and 24, 
1951. In the convention where the JSP aimed to iron out a compromise in order to form the 
party’s policy for the upcoming Diet vote on the ratification of the peace and security treaties, 
these two factions generated overt conflict. As the result, the JSP was split into two separate 
organizations, the Right Socialist Party and the Left Socialist Party. The party remained divided 
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until 1955. Sōhyō, in which the left faction maintained the majority, retained close ties to the 
Left Socialist Party (Carlile 2005: 176-180).  
 Virtually all left socialists in Sōhyō and the Left Socialist Party were supportive of the 
notion that they were part of a neutralist third force independent of the Cold War’s two camps. 
Therefore, it was extremely controversial when Takano Minoru, a prominent leader of Sōhyō’s 
left socialists, put forward the idea that on the international scene advancing “peace forces” were 
reversing the trend toward bipolar conflict and included the Soviet Union and the People’s 
Republic of China among these forces. Takano justified his intention that “It is my view that 
those who make an effort toward peace at a given point in time are a peace force at that point of 
time. To the extent that the Soviet Union is advocating an armistice in Korea, it is a peace force” 
(quoted in Carlile 2005:189). This was, however, hard to stomach even for the left socialists, 
whose priority was to maintain neutrality. Nevertheless, Carlile (2005:195) analyzes,  
 
One of the most important legacies of the Takano years was infusion of the values 
and modalities of positive neutralism into the ethos of the Japanese labor 
movement…The somewhat differing nuance of the Cold War conflict in the 
Asian region when compared to that in Europe meant that the neutralist appeal 
resonated more widely and deeply in Japan. Furthermore, the peace issue became 
salient in Japan when the Communist Party and its affiliated wing of labor 
movement had virtually disappeared from the scene. Peace and neutrality thus 
became a socialist rather than a communist cause and, as a consequence, was free 
(relatively but not completely) of the antinationalist baggage that association with 
the Communists had in Western Europe. 
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 Thus, in spite of the JCP’s peaceful self-image as the only political party in Japan 
overtly opposed against the Japanese imperialism and its invasive wars, due mainly to its own 
past missteps and dictatorial dominance of the international communist movement by the USSR 
and PRC, the party had to tolerate its marginal position in the Japanese left for decades to come. 
The JCP nonetheless maintained absolute minimum support even under repeated crises, and 
gradually expanded its influence within the Japanese left and social movement sector.  
 Along with the Socialists and the Communists, non-partisan actors have also been an 
important part of the postwar Japanese social movements. Distinguishing themselves from 
partisan actors, they had come to call themselves “citizens” and their activism “citizens 
movements.” The group was not, of course, monolithic or homogeneous. It included many of 
those who walked away from political parties and labor unions due to ideological disagreements, 
but also those who were disillusioned by repeated infighting over issues that did not seem to be 
critical for the ultimate purpose to be achieved. Indeed, strategic moves of parties and labor 
unions to increase their political influence could seem to be a long detour, especially for peace 
movements. For those who could not care less about ideological and formal organizational 
competition but wanted to do something about problems they could see, moreover, it was 
necessary to organize their spontaneity into actions for the given end. These groups included a 
wide range of groups from work place cultural circles to local women’s groups (Sasaki-Uemura 
2001). The emergence of these hundreds of autonomous and heterogeneous “citizen” groups in 
the 1950s was critical for the massive protest mobilization against the US-Japan Security Treaty 
in the 1960s, but also for the postwar Japanese social movements in general.  
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 The use of the term “citizen” (shimin in Japanese) in social movement context was a 
new and innovative development at that time, when social movements were often associated with 
senseless “mass” and “proletariats” and “people” who were to be led by more able elites. 
“Citizen” therefore was a new identity for the Japanese people who were no longer “subjects” as 
they had been in imperial Japan. Intellectuals also provided theoretical debate through which the 
ethos of citizenship was instilled into these new political actors. The historian Wesley Sasaki-
Uemura (2001:32) noted: 
 
…the debates over subjectivity throughout the 1950s show that many progressive 
writers and intellectuals were dissatisfied with the constraints of Marxist 
orthodoxy, both as far as their own cultural production was concerned and in 
terms of social actions needed to produce a democratic revolution. The 
subjectivity theorists wanted to move away from a notion of class as absolutely 
determinate and to give more weight to the individual as the agent of history. 
They also focused on instilling the heart or spirit of democracy in people’s lives, 
because Japan had already gained the superficial external forms, the formal 
institutions of democracy, while retaining prewar figures and prewar lines of 
authority within those forms...Ironically, citizen movement theorists gained a 
wide audience because of their higher social status at the same time that they, in 
effect, sought to demote their own elite authority by advocating everyone’s 
equivalence as citizens. 
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Given these intellectual backdrops, along with their antipathy to the left political parties’ central 
control, citizen movement groups tended toward egalitarian organization and consensus 
decision-making. As these groups also saw democracy as an active process, they constantly 
adapted their theory to actual political praxis. Thus, the notion of the citizen was always 
indeterminate to a certain degree. This indeterminacy, however, was what made citizen 
movements a viable alternative for those who could not identify with the industrial working class 
or Marxist ideology (Sasaki-Uemura 2001: 32-34). 
 Students were also an important part of this generation of activists. They were 
significant, among other reasons, because they took the most direct (sometimes violent) actions 
in the anti Security Treaty protest demonstrations, and this had come to compose a major part of 
public image about the protest movement. As we have discussed above, the protest movement in 
the 1960s and on was a nationwide movement with many different actors, and student groups 
were part of it.  
 It is important to note, however, in contrast to the more reasonable early 1960s student 
protests, the late 1960s protests became much more violent. The late 1960s protests were initially 
mobilized to prepare for 1970 revision of the Security Treaty, but also incorporated a wide range 
of other issues, from opposition to the Vietnam War to environmental pollution. Fierce factional 
competitions among student activists throughout the process eventually gave birth to so-called 
Zenkyōtō movement that paralyzed college campuses in 1968-1969. As the result, while leaders 
of the earlier movement were accepted as social leaders—hired by government and major 
corporations, and went on to careers as leading intellectuals, the later generation was excluded 
from mainstream society and totally marginalized. It was the late 1960s when the New Left 
movements cloned the old left organizational model and produced numerous different 
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hierarchical organizations that competed with each other, and also battled the police (Steinhoff 
2012).  
 Due mainly to these latter groups’ dramatic actions and high exposure to mass media, 
an impression was generated that the protest movement is about militant student activists. Along 
with the public discourse repeatedly emphasized by the central government that the anti-Security 
Treaty protestors were a violent mob controlled by the Communist Party and Moscow, it further 
impressed the ordinary Japanese that social movements are dangerous and that the Communists 
are violent. More importantly to the present study, those who experienced this era of massive 
mobilization as students compose a large part of the Article 9 Association movement. For this 
generation, political participation has thus become a significant part of their identity. 
 Nevertheless, despite their clear ideological differences, the Communists, the 
Socialists, and non-partisan citizen and student activists in Japan shared serious concern for the 
fate of their newly gained constitutional democracy, and wanted to protect the rights it provided 
them. No one in these groups wanted to repeat the same mistake that led to the war. From their 
viewpoint, the repressive central government was violating their new rights by forcing the 
Security Treaty without democratic procedure, as though bringing the prewar authoritarian state 
back in Japan. Thus, the both practical and symbolic pivot for their struggles against the 
reactionary government was the Japanese Constitution, and in particular, Article 9. 
 
The 1960s Generation and History of the Divided Movements 
Postwar Japanese history was essentially characterized by the so-called “Peace 
Constitution” with its peace clause Article 9, and its contradiction to the real state of the 
country’s military capacity developed under the US-Japan Security Treaty. Article 9 reads:  
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(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 
(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.  
 
Despite this constitutional restriction, Japan’s de-facto military, the Self-Defense Force 
(hereafter “the SDF”) has grown to have the third biggest budget for any nation to spend on its 
military (Port 2010). Nevertheless, despite its massive destructive potential, the SDF has been 
put to use only for peaceful operations for more than sixty years since its establishment in 1954, 
because Article 9 limits its operational capacity. 
The United States and the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) that 
occupied Japan from 1945 to 1952 was also the source of the peace constitution since its 
Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur supported the idea of Article 9 submitted by Prime 
Minister Shidehara Kijūrō (Horio 2016). Nevertheless, the Joint Japan-US Security Treaty, 
which specified the mutual military defense obligations of the two nations and institutionalized 
the stationing of U.S. military forces on Japanese territory for such military defense, has always 
been prioritized. When the Security Treaty was going to be signed in 1960, the issue at stake was 
whether Japan would have a treaty above the supreme law of the land and accept the semi-
permanent presence of a foreign military, or stay on track to become a truly peaceful state 
without war potential. No matter the extent to which the people were informed of the concrete 
! 40!
articles of the treaty, the massive anti-Security Treaty demonstrations with tens of thousands of 
participants were clear evidence that the Japanese people did not want to accept such a treaty. 
Eventually, the treaty was signed by the Japanese Diet in the absence of boycotting minority 
parties, and has been enforced ever since (Packard 1966). As the result, the majority of 
prefectures of Japan have facilities of the US forces. In Okinawa, moreover, the American 
occupation continued until 1972, and even today, about ten percent of its area is used for the 
American bases. As the anti-Security Treaty movement developed into an unprecedented scale of 
anti-government and anti-United States movement, it gave birth to a great number of activists 
who would remain active even after the end of the “political season” in early 1970s.  In social 
movement terms, this long decade of the 1960s can be described as a major protest cycle. 
 While this generation of activists has maintained its contentious character since, the 
political soil of Japan was particularly divisive for social movements to grow. This was due not 
only to the vertical structure of the entire Japanese society (Nakane 1967), which prevented more 
formal organizations (i.e. labor unions and political parties) from cooperating and facilitated 
divisions along political alignment when schisms occurred (Aspinall 2003, Wang 2008), but also 
that the ruling government had learned a serious lesson from the previous movements. Changes 
in political alignment since the 1960s tell a lot about how the ruling power brought divisions into 
threatening movements by dividing opposition parties, making full use of the vertical structure of 
the society. 
 The massive political contention supported strong opposition parties in the 1960s 
through the 1970s. During this period, the Japanese Socialist Party (hereafter “the JSP”) and the 
Japanese Communist Party (hereafter “the JCP”) presented a united front called Shakyō kyōtō. 
Although hardly imaginable from its unity with the Liberal Democratic Party (hereafter “the 
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LDP”) in the government today, the Clean Government Party (hereafter “the CGP”) was also a 
part of the progressive alignment at that time. As a result, a majority of local communities in 
Japan were under progressive governments.  
 This started to change in the late 1970s as the JSP started to pursue the new line to 
cooperate with the CGP and the Democratic Socialist Party (hereafter “the DSP”). Concurrently, 
the labor federation Sōhyō, which was the largest supporter of the JSP at that time, was turning 
to corporatism, further changing the situation within the JSP. Eventually, the loss of the 
candidate supported by the JSP and JCP in the Tokyo governor election in 1979 triggered the 
change of the situation also in local politics, leading to the cancellation of the united front 
between the two parties. The JSP and CGP then made a new arrangement called Shakō gōi (the 
JSP-CGP Agreement), which clearly excluded the JCP from the new agreement (The Japanese 
Socialist Party 1980, Shinbun Akahata 2007). 
  Although the purpose of the new agreement was to counter the LDP, the loss of the 
new united front in the general election in 1980 deepened the disagreement between the JSP and 
the DSP, while the CGP had started to approach to the LDP. This led eventually to the 
cooperation among the LDP, CGP, and DSP in later years.  
 Along with these developments, labor movements were reorganizing to create a new 
federation in the late 1980s, leading to the dissolution of Sōhyō and creation of Rengō in 1989. 
As Rengō explicitly excluded the communists from its new “united front,” the communists were 
forced to form their own federation called Zenrōren. This resulted in schisms within the entire 
labor movement sector in Japan (Wang 2008). These political fights directly affected more 
formal social movement organizations in the country as well.  
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 As the disagreement between the JSP and CGP over Japan’s participation in the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operation became irreconcilable, the Shakō Agreement collapsed in 1992. 
The JSP lost again in the general election in the following year; however, the LDP and other 
opposition parties did not gain a majority either. The Japanese Socialist Party, Clean 
Government Party, and Democratic Socialist Party thus joined forces with new parties formed by 
those who broke away from the LDP such as Japan New Party and Sakigake, and formed the 
non-LDP government in 1994 with Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro, for the first time since 
1955.  
 
Transformation of the Socialist Party and the Loss of the Largest Opposition Party 
 This government did not last even for a year, however. Although the JSP was part of 
the coalition government at first, it broke away from it as the other parties in the government 
formed a faction unfavorable to the JSP. Utilizing this opportunity, the LDP approached the JSP, 
inviting socialist Murayama Tomiichi to become Prime Minister. As the LDP succeeded to win 
over the JSP and Sakigake, the three parties made a coalition government. While Prime Minister 
Murayama became famous for his speech on Japan’s wartime aggressions in Asia in which he 
made an official apology to the victims, the JSP transformed its fundamental character during his 
term: The JSP changed its attitude toward the US-Japan Security Treaty from opposition to 
acceptance, and toward the SDF from unconstitutional to constitutional. This meant the practical 
disappearance of the largest opposition party. 
 Naturally, the transformation of the JSP was not welcomed by the supporters of its 
previous line. In 1996, the JSP fell apart, although a small part of it remained as the Social 
Democratic Party (hereafter the SDP). The rest of the original JSP and breakaways from too 
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many short-lived parties, including major figures like Hatoyama Yukio and Ozawa Ichirō 
eventually came together to form the new largest opposition party called the Democratic Party of 
Japan (hereafter “the DPJ”). Nevertheless, combined with the exclusion of the JCP from the 
alignment within the left, the decline of the largest opposition party that had maintained the 
political equilibrium to the ruling LDP impacted heavily on the direction of Japanese politics, 
allowing it to move sharply toward the right.  
 
Divided Social Movements in Abeyance 
 Casting a sideway glance at the political fights among political parties and labor 
unions, citizens movements were largely in abeyance from the 1980s to 1990s. It did not mean, 
however, that there was no civil society in Japan except the neighborhood associations 
(Pekkanen 2006), nor that contentious social movements were all domesticated (Avenell 2009). 
Contentious movements were embedded deeply in the Japanese civil society, and became 
“invisible” to the general public (Steinhoff 2014), while staying active throughout these years. 
Meanwhile, these groups and individual activists were producing countless publications about 
social movements and activism that they were part of. Yet social movements were sort of taboo 
subject for Japanese academics, and virtually no university had such course as “seminar in social 
movements” until recently (Nishikido 2008, Tanaka 2014, Yamada 2014, Takahashi and 
SEALDs 2015, Nakano 2016). The Ohara Institute for Social Research is an academic institution 
that has continued to research mainly labor issues since 1919. It is still hard to find a sociology 
program in Japan where students learn Marx even as a very basic of the classical theory of the 
field, although it is normally taught in economics. To my knowledge, there is just one Japanese 
scholar who recently started to teach a graduate seminar on social movements at Tokyo 
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University, and he is a former student of Charles Tilly at Columbia (and he studies Latin 
American movements, not Japanese movements). Indeed, there are a number of Japanese social 
movement scholars. However, they tend to study environmental movements which remained a 
relatively safe topic during the abeyance period. Thus, social movements in Japan were also in 
abeyance as an academic subject. As a result, studying social movements requires a researcher to 
rely heavily on the literature written in English. 
 The divided nature brought about another characteristic to Japanese social movements: 
extensive overlap in membership in social movement groups and organizations. As studies have 
shown, presenting a united front is the only way for the opposition to counter the power. 
Therefore, social movement actors must find a way to be united. Given the divided political 
parties and labor unions, more grounded social movements in Japan inevitably sought ways to be 
connected. To go around the divided parties and unions, citizen activists formed numerous small 
groups to tackle each of the many different yet related issues. These groups tended to be small, 
because it was possible to form such a group when there was a point on which people could 
agree to work together. Naturally, these groups looked also for a single issue on which many 
could agree in spite of their differences. Through working out different plans based on lessons 
learned on the way, they continued creating more groups with new ideas, while modifying 
existing groups to suit new circumstances. As the result, in Japanese civil society there are 
countless citizens groups with very long names that reflect exactly what issues they deal with. 
Many activists who have been active since the 1960s have thus come to belong to several 
different groups. 
 Regardless of the size of group or issue it deals with, all these groups, including 
political parties and labor unions in the left, owe their existence to the 1946 Constitution of 
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Japan, as the right of organization was written into it to provide previously illegal groups a legal 
ground. The constitution also provided clear, strong protection for all these groups that had 
previously been subject to repression. The groups included new religious groups and Christian 
groups, since religious freedom was constitutionally protected, along with academics, since 
academic freedom was similarly protected. The legal rights of women, along with the right to 
assembly, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and the right to be represented by a defense 
attorney in a court of law, were also written into the constitution.  
 Consequently, although these groups and different opposition parties did not hold the 
majority in the Japanese Diet either individually or collectively, for more than half a century they 
had regularly come together to resist any political efforts to revise the constitution, fearing that 
any revision would open the door to the removal of the protection their own group enjoyed. 
Under the LDP rule which continued since 1955, the focal point of the attempts to change the 
constitution always centered on Article 9. Revising the constitution requires two-thirds approval 
in the Diet, followed by further ratification. Despite their differences, minority parties always 
came together to oppose efforts to change Article 9 and prevented the LDP from obtaining a two-
thirds vote that would set the revision process in motion. Thus, Article 9 came to have additional 
symbolic significance as the linchpin of the peace constitution. 
   
New Challenges to the Constitution since the 2000s 
Despite the continuous revision attempts led by the successive LDP governments, the 
Japanese constitution remained untouched for seventy years. Although the Gulf War in the 1990s 
reactivated the discussions on national security, there was little movement with actual impact 
until the Research Commission on the Constitution was established in both houses of the 
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National Diet of Japan in 2000. During the 1990s, in the aftermath of reorganization of labor 
movements in the late 1980s, there were changes also in the political parties, which created a 
political opportunity for new efforts to revise various aspects of the Japanese government. This 
commission was the result of these changed political circumstances. The situation has changed 
drastically since: In the following year, a month after the United States had suffered the 9.11 
terrorist attacks, the Diet passed the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law which allowed Japan to 
offer logistical support to the United States’ “war against terrorism.” Enforcement of a series of 
emergency defense laws such as the Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Law followed it.  
The early 2000s thus became a time for reflection for many Japanese, especially for those 
who perceived these new developments to be unconstitutional under Article 9. Utilizing their 
accumulated resources, long-standing activists were gathering forces to fight the new challenge 
while still in abeyance. Then, in 2004, they got the news that a new group called the Article 9 
Association was formed by the nine respected intellectuals whose name any Japanese activist, 
left or right, would have known. The initial appeal by the founders did not specify any action to 
be taken by a particular group of people. Nonetheless, as we will see in the following chapters, 
the Article 9 Association became a vast network within a few years.
Concurrent with the development of the Article 9 Association movement, the discussion 
regarding national security was heating up. In 2006, the ruling LDP elected Abe Shinzō, 
grandson of the former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke who signed the US-Japan Security 
Treaty in 1960, as the 90th Prime Minister. A leading member of the so-called “textbook caucus” 
(or the Diet Members to Discuss Japanese Future and History Education) within the LDP, with 
close ties to an ultra-nationalist social movement organization Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference), 
Abe was known for his persistent revisionist position toward the constitution. Although Abe 
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made a pledge of constitutional revision explicitly aimed at Article 9 in his term as expected, 
within a year after the inauguration of his government, he suddenly resigned saying that he was 
seriously ill. Many had pointed out that his resignation was due to the drastic decline of support 
for a constitutional amendment in the 2007 opinion polls. This shift in public opinion was 
directly reflected in the change of power balance between the ruling and opposition parties: The 
LDP fell from power in the 2009 national election, and the DPJ with SDP and People’s New 
Party formed a coalition government. 
 
The 3.11 Triple Disaster and Rise of the New Generation of Social Movements 
Two years later, on March 11, 2011, an earthquake of magnitude 9 with massive tsunami 
hit the coast of northeastern Japan, followed by an explosion of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Station located in a small coastal town in Fukushima prefecture. The earthquake and 
Tsunami took tens of thousands of lives. More lost their families and homes. The nuclear 
accident also forced tens of thousands of people to evacuate their home area, without knowing 
when they could ever return. Evacuated farmers had to leave their livestock and pets to go wild 
(some were even ordered to kill their cattle). Fishermen were unable to catch fish because of the 
loss of the marine facilities, but also because the ocean was contaminated with radioactive 
substances. Such a terrible destruction of livelihood caused many otherwise unnecessary deaths 
including suicides. The DPJ-led coalition government had to deal with this unprecedented scale 
of disaster while struggling to maintain its position in the Diet. In the face of the major 
catastrophe, and the fear of nuclear contamination spreading across the country in particular, the 
government and the Tokyo Electronic Power Company (TEPCO) that runs the Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station were unable to satisfy the needs of those affected.  
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This once again reversed the course in politics, leading to a shift back to the LDP under 
Abe in the 2012 election. However, the return of the LDP government did not solve the problem. 
Far from embarking on settling the situation, the LDP government was busy trying to remove 
people’s attention from the reality. To invite the next Olympic games to Tokyo, Prime Minister 
Abe in his presentation even claimed that the outflow of contaminated water from the Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station was “under control,” when the newspapers were reporting the 
opposite situation day after day. The LDP and CGP still won the House of Councillors election 
in 2013, thereby controlling the majority of both Houses. The government then passed a new 
series of national security bills that further strengthen the US-Japan Security Treaty and 
demanded a “reinterpretation of the constitution” that is a clear violation of Article 9.  
Meanwhile, however, the situation surrounding social movements underwent a sea 
change: the disaster and the fallout from it had made Japan once again a seedbed of grassroots 
activism. While the public discourse emphasized the significance of national unity and voluntary 
rescue efforts, the fear of nuclear contamination along with anger against the irresponsibility of 
TEPCO and the government triggered a huge increase of anti-nuclear activism nationwide. This 
revitalized the old anti-nuclear movements among established organizations with existing 
divisions, but also gave rise to the new generation of activists without fetters.  
The 3.11 triple disaster awakened activism in the younger generation. That impact then 
spread to other areas of social problems, as those new activists began to realize that the issues 
they now face as their own problems are interrelated, and in fact derive from the same root 
cause: violation of the constitution by the government. The more recent swell of public opinion 
against these unpopular national security bills would have been less salient without that 
precondition.  
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These recent movements are clearly contentious and, moreover, are engaging the new 
generation of activists in positive discussion about the constitution and democracy. This, too, 
was unexpected from the previous situation where social movements were largely associated 
with “old men with flags.” In the process that followed, these separated generations of social 
movements finally started to merge. Nevertheless, as the following chapters will discuss, this 
recent achievement would have hardly been possible without the foundation built through the 
activities of the Article 9 Association.  
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CHAPTER IV. 
THE ARTICLE 9 ASSOCIATION: EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
MOVEMENT AND ITS NETWORK 
 
This chapter describes the processes of formation of the Article 9 Association and its 
network in detail. It shows how so many grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association were 
created in a very short period of time, and how quickly the original Article 9 Association became 
the “headquarters” of the nationwide network of the thousands of Article 9 Associations. In other 
words, it will show the processes through which local leadership groups took shape, how these 
local networks expanded to become local grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association, and 
how these chapters attach themselves to the original group of nine intellectuals. Similar 
processes will also be observed about other types of grassroots chapters, such as occupation-
based and workplace-based chapters. The chapter also describes major types of activities these 
grassroots chapters conduct, and explains how these chapters get connected to each other to 
compose the grassroots-level networks of the Article 9 Association. 
 
The Original Article 9 Association, the Core Group  
 The Article 9 Association announced its establishment to the Japanese public with a press 
conference by the nine members in conjunction with the publication of their signed “appeal” in 
June 2004, calling for the people’s support for “protecting Article 9 and the constitution.” 
The nine members of the Article 9 Association were: Inoue Hisashi (author, 1934-2010), Katō 
Shūichi (critic, 1919-2008), Miki Mutsuko (UN Women’s Society and wife of the former Prime 
Minister Miki Takeo 1917-2012), Oda Makoto (author, 1932-2007), Ōe Kenzaburō (author, 
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1935-), Okudaira Yasuhiro (constitution scholar, 1929-2015), Sawachi Hisae (author, 1930-), 
Tsurumi Shunsuke (philosopher1922-2015), and Umebara Takeshi (philosopher, 1925-) (listed 
alphabetically). To support their activities, a secretariat was also organized, staffed by Komori 
Yōichi (professor of modern Japanese literature at Tokyo University), Watanabe Osamu 
(professor emeritus of political science at Hitotsubashi University), Takada Ken (one of the most 
well-connected leaders of Japanese citizen movements), Kawamura Toshio (leader of Kenpō 
Kaigi, or Cross-fields Council for the Prevention of Constitutional Revision, an advocacy 
organization for promoting the 1946 Constitution of Japan), and an office staff that carries out 
the organizational tasks for the Article 9 Association. According to the proceedings of the initial 
press conference held in June 2004, Katō brought the idea to form the Article 9 Association to 
Komori in early spring of the year. Komori then communicated the idea to Ōe. Katō and Ōe then 
co-wrote the appeal, with which they invited the rest of the members to join (The Article 9 
Association 2004). Many of them, however, had previous connections.  
The nine founders and the members of the secretariat, with their unique backgrounds and 
expertise, brought varying yet partly overlapping personal networks into the Article 9 
Association. Broadly speaking, all the nine founders are recognized as leading intellectuals in 
Japan, and many have also been renowned internationally. Tsurumi, for instance, was the 
founder of a journal called “Shisō no Kagaku (Science of Thoughts),” which continued from 
1946 to 1996, together with his sister Tsurumi Kazuko (a former professor of sociology at 
Sophia University), as well as equally famous scholars such as Maruyama Masao (political 
scientist) and Tsuru Shigeto (economist). Tsurumi called Oda, a writer and the founder of an 
anti-war movement called Beheiren (Citizens’ Coalition for Peace to Vietnam) to join the Article 
9 Association, as he had been sympathetic to Oda’s work. The groups for which Tsurumi and 
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Oda were leaders, moreover, were among the largest and most influential of the citizen 
movements developed since the 1950s (see Sasaki-Uemura (2001) for detailed accounts on this 
subject). Katō, Ōe, and Sawachi were loosely connected through their publications as writers, 
and each of them had a large audience. Katō, perhaps the most widely read author even among 
these nine eminent intellectual leaders due partly to his long run serial essays for Asahi Shinbun 
“Yūmōyōgo,” was also close to Komori Yōichi, sharing not only keen interests in literature, but 
also firsthand experiences in the Czech Incident in 1968. Inoue, a former chair of the Japan 
P.E.N. Club and a very popular playwright with his large audience, had also worked together 
with Komori sometimes prior to the formation of the Article 9 Association, for instance in a 
radio program on the works of Natsume Sōseki (Komori 2012, personal conversation). 
Involvement of Miki was important to broaden the Association’s capacity, as she was the wife of 
Miki Takeo, a former Prime Minister elected from the LDP. She had worked with Ōe in 
opposition to the history textbook published by the Japanese Society for History Textbook 
Reform in 2001, a movement in which Komori also took part (Komori 2016, personal 
conversation). Umebara’s participation was also significant to make the association accessible to 
those who were suspicious of the other founders who were perceived to be sympathetic to 
Marxist thought. Like Inoue, Umebara also was a former chair of the Japan P.E.N. Club and also 
had a long list of co-writers as well as his own large audience. Finally, Okudaira was a 
preeminent scholar on the law of free expression, whose works inspired several generations of 
Japanese scholars as well as eminent foreign scholars such as John Dower. He was also a 
councilor of the Japan Civil Liberties Union. Thus, nine prominent intellectuals gathered under 
the name of Article 9 Association through various quality of “weak ties” (Granovetter 1973) in 
order to protect Article 9 and the 1946 Constitution of Japan (Diagram 1): 
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Diagram 1. Formation of the Article 9 Association headquarters 
*Node colors show roles. Blue: founders, Light blue: secretariat, Violet: groups and 
organizations to which each member had tie since before 2004. 
**Edge colors show types of ties. Orange: personal, Pink: occupational, Green: organizational, 
Light blue: direct invitation to join the Article 9 Association. 
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The members of the secretariat also brought in the different movement organizations they 
had been a member of, by cooperating to establish this new Association: The chief secretary, 
Komori Yōichi is a literary man who enjoys a high level of admiration as a writer as well as a 
scholar. He is a professor of Tokyo University, a multi-lingual who grew up in Prague, the 
capital of the Czech Republic, and thus is fluent in Czech, Russian, English, and Japanese. His 
most famous works are on Natsume Sōseki. As the son of a mother who was a poet and a father 
who was an executive member of the JCP, he has also been a politically progressive man taking 
the leadership role in many peaceful and educational citizens movements. Like Komori, 
Watanabe Osamu is a professor emeritus of Hitotsubashi University who specializes in political 
economy. A former chief director of Japan Democratic Lawyer’s Association (hereafter the 
“JDLA”), he is also politically progressive and associated with the JCP. Takada Ken has been a 
so-called neutral citizen activist, who avoided association with any political party and especially 
the JCP. However, he cooperated closely with Komori particularly in the opposition movement 
against the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education in the early 2000s. He also plays a 
central role in organizing protest rallies against recent national security policies. Kawamura 
Toshio’s Kenpō Kaigi, on the other hand, is literally a council for preventing constitutional 
revision, which has a tie to the JCP. 
Thus, for the creation of the Article 9 Association, these leaders of respective fields came 
together to mount a single-issue movement, across the previous border that separated partisan 
and non-partisan movements. This was the first step for the movement of the Article 9 
Association to involve a wide range of constituencies which had been protected by the Japanese 
constitution, as we will see in the following. In this light, the headquarters of the Article 9 
Association is an achievement in its own right, as it was successful in assembling different 
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groups and individuals who had previously been active separately despite their shared concerns. 
This alone already shows the strong centripetal force of Article 9 and how intense the threat to 
the article may be felt by the Japanese people in the early 2000s.
 
Formation of the Intellectuals’ Network around the Original Article 9 Association 
 Strong support from various individuals and groups began to gather around this core 
group of the Article 9 Association. Within the first year of their activity, the newsletter of the 
Article 9 Association listed the names of over a thousand individuals who expressed their 
support for the Association’s cause. Some of them were groups such as “eighteen religious 
leaders of Kyoto” with a list of individual names, but most of these were individuals who occupy 
highly respected positions in the Japanese social context, such as university professors, 
physicians, authors, scientists, artists, actors, a chairperson of a religious establishment and so 
on. Clearly, the initial appeal that framed the movement’s purpose specifically to combat the 
political threat to Article 9 effected strong resonance among their wide audience.  
 These published names alone do not show the connection between these individuals and 
groups, but they show the formation of the network ties between the headquarters of the Article 9 
Association and these individuals and groups. The immediate support these intellectuals offered 
to the Article 9 Association suggests the strong sympathy they felt toward the Association’s 
cause. The nine founders’ leadership was a timely stimulant to the previously silent 
constituencies to finally take action and this created many new network ties. In the terminology 
of social network studies, the ties formed between the headquarters and these supporters of the 
Article 9 Association composed a “wheel structure”—that is, around the core group of the 
headquarters of the Article 9 Association, a wheel-shaped network of the intellectual strata of the 
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pro-Constitution population in Japan was created as shown in Diagram 2: 
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Diagram 2. The wheel-shaped network composed of the headquarters and first set of supporters 
(Report#1, N=188) 
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 This indicates, moreover, the formation of many more clusters and wheels of potential 
sponsors (local leaders) surrounding the original core group, which became the “headquarter” of 
the Article 9 Association as the result. As this process unfolds, grassroots chapters began to be 
created across the country. 
  
Formation of the Grassroots Chapters of the Article 9 Association 
 Many of those who participated in the creation of their own chapters of the Article 9 
Association have claimed that the alliance around the single issue of “protecting Article 9 and 
the Japanese constitution” was exactly what they were going to do even without the 
establishment of the Article 9 Association. Many were on the alert already for the government’s 
attempt to push a constitutional revision, and were preparing to fight. Right at the moment, the 
initial appeal of the Article 9 Association was published, and it perfectly aligned with their 
sentiment. Thus, the publication of the initial appeal opened the new opportunity for these 
existing groups to act. The quick expansion of the network of the Article 9 Association was 
therefore a spontaneous development, rather than a top-down force. The voluntary formation of 
more than 3,000 grassroots chapters in the first year of the movement is evidence for this claim. 
By the time I arrived in Japan for field research in 2011, the number of grassroots chapters had 
reached 7,528 as shown in Table 1: 
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Table 1. The increase of grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association 
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 This development was a surprise even to the members of the original Article 9 
Association. According to Komori Yōichi, the chief of the secretariat of the Article 9 
Association, “it was not a plan nor did we expect such a reaction from the public” (Komori 
2012). The initiators of this movement did not anticipate that a large number of people would 
take such voluntary actions. It is also noteworthy that these grassroots chapter were created at 
various levels and units of the Japanese society—in local communities, workplaces, and in 
hobby circles as well as in university campuses. Within those chapters based on local 
communities, moreover, there are chapters at the levels of neighborhood, district, ward, city, and 
prefecture. This section describes the typical ways in which such chapters took shape, and shows 
that many of these chapters were created based on pre-existing social networks. 
 
Local Chapters 
 Concurrent with the time period when the intellectuals’ network was forming, in many 
local communities people began to create their own chapters of the Article 9 Association. In any 
Japanese community, there are always some “local celebrities” who are well known locally for 
their relatively prestigious social status and continuous dedication to community organizing 
activities. Most of them are often acquaintances with one another. Such a circle can initiate local 
activity and attract participants from their community, and this was also how grassroots chapters 
of the Article 9 Association were formed in many local communities. 
 An organizer of the Omuro Article 9 Association in Kyoto, a local grassroots chapter in a 
community with about 3,800 households, explained in our interview how their chapter was 
created: 
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At the beginning Mrs. Iwai, who was the wife of Iwai Tadakuma who was a professor of 
Ritsumeikan University, asked me if I wanted to join her to be a sponsor to create our 
chapter, and I agreed. There were only eight of us at the beginning. Since we thought that 
eight is too small a number, we asked around and eventually one hundred and seventy 
people agreed to be sponsors. Then we announced our chapter’s establishment and held 
an inaugural event (Sato 2012). 
 
This is a typical process for local grassroots chapter formation: at first a local celebrity who 
wanted to support the original Article 9 Association’s cause took the initiative and gathered 
support from other well-known figures in their community. Then the members of this core group 
reached out to other like-minded people in their respective social networks. In Omuro’s case, 
Ms. Sato was a former schoolteacher and an acquaintance of Professor Iwai, as they lived nearby 
and had worked together on other community activities previously. Their initial membership also 
included a physician, a master of a traditional craft, and a few more former schoolteachers. 
Retired teachers of public primary and middle schools tend to be well rooted in their local 
community, and their social circle also includes more ordinary residents in the neighborhood 
with various professions and resources. 
 Another local grassroots chapter called the Fujisawa Article 9 Association in Fujisawa 
City, Kanagawa prefecture, was also formed through a similar process. When the nine public 
intellectuals introduced above held their inaugural announcements in June 2004, some Fujisawa 
citizen’s groups were preparing for an amateur theater production of “The Pearl Necklace,” the 
story of Beate Shirota Gordon, who was a member of the Constitutional Committee of the GHQ 
and is credited with writing the women’s rights articles in the current Constitution of Japan. The 
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purpose of the play was to “think about peace in order to protect it” (Shida 2012). With the 
establishment of the Article 9 Association, they felt that it might be possible to create their own 
Article 9 Association based on the relationships built through the theater project. While working 
for the theater project, Shida and other central members of this activity asked those who 
supported the project if they would also like to work on the new project together. Half a year 
after the theater project was successfully completed, the Fujisawa Article 9 Association was 
established. In Fujisawa, the core members also included local celebrities such as a well-
published essayist and a former politician, but also locally active members of peace movement 
groups. These groups had been working together on many local issues in the past, campaigning 
against industrial pollution and mayoral and assembly elections for instance. Thus, in Fujisawa, 
there was a previously existing citizens group that played the organizer’s role, and in turn 
expanded its network as a chapter of the Article 9 Association. 
 The Nishisakae-machi Article 9 Association in Aizu-wakamatsu City, Fukushima 
prefecture, was created by a group of women who became friends through PTA activity when 
their children were in school. One of the core members was the wife of the pastor of the local 
Christian church and was also born in the church as a daughter of the former pastor. She and her 
friends had been concerned about issues such as the dispatch of the SDF abroad, and felt uneasy 
about the first Abe Cabinet’s attempt to revise the constitution. They asked a teacher of social 
studies in their children’s’ school to give them lectures on these problems. When the original 
Article 9 Association held its inaugural press conference, they thought that their group should 
also be a part of this new Association, and named their group the Nishisakae-machi Article 9 
Association (Katano 2012). In a small neighborhood community like Nishisakae-machi, a 
traditional Christian church may play a socially central role, and this Wakamatsu Sakae-machi 
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Church was a rather special example even among such churches. Both the former and present 
pastors were actively involved in community activities, taking care of children from the 
neighboring high school by offering them a space for their rock band to practice and hold 
concerts. The church also offered English lessons and Katano, who is fluent in English, taught 
the class. The chapter holds its monthly meetings and study groups in the church. As a Christian 
church, the congregation views the teaching of peace as their basic purpose and their activities 
influence the local residents. Thus, Nishisakae-machi Article 9 Association was a local 
grassroots chapter with a special facility.  
 These three local cases demonstrate that in Japan there certainly are numerous tight-knit 
groups of people who have continuously engaged in community activities and that they may be 
readily available for mobilization when an opportunity arises. Here, too, we can expect the 
working of the lasting legacy of the numerous small movements that have proliferated since the 
1950s. This is not a given, however, but an achievement of daily efforts to maintain such 
relationships, because movement participation is specific to the context and networks in which 
the rationales are developed and embellished and demands constant renewal of the motivations 
for participation (Snow et al. 1986:467). 
 While these three local grassroots chapters were created through social ties that existed 
prior to the Article 9 Association, there are chapters based partly on the ties generated by the 
Article 9 Association. A small grassroots chapter of the Article 9 Association in a local 
community called Ōfuna in Kanagawa prefecture is one such case. The Ōfuna Article 9 
Association is one of many grassroots chapters in Kamakura City, a traditional town with many 
temples and historical sites. The chapter was formed after some participants in the Kamakura 
Article 9 Association, which was formed earlier, decided that they would like to create another 
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chapter on a smaller scale. A few local celebrities who live in and around the district called 
Ōfuna (where there is the largest terminal station in Kamakura City), such as a retired TV 
producer and a retired schoolteacher, as well as a few other citizen activists, who were also 
leaders of labor unions before retirement, took the first action. As several nationally renowned 
writers and scholars resided in Kamakura, the Kamakura Article 9 Association took advantage of 
their support and listed these figures as its sponsors. Inoue Hisashi from the headquarters was 
also among them.  
 The case of Ōfuna offers another important aspect of the grassroots chapter formation: 
disagreements within a chapter can generate one or more new grassroots chapters. According to 
a founding member of the Ōfuna chapter, the basic motivation for those who formed this local 
chapter was to actively promote the intention of the Article 9 Association to create chapters “all 
over the country” (zenkoku tsutsu uraura). However, it was on this very fundamental tenet of the 
movement where the Ōfuna group disagreed with the Kamakura chapter’s leadership, who 
tended to assert their prestige and dominate chapter activity and even claimed that it is enough to 
have one Kamakura chapter in the city (Iijima 2012). Nonetheless, the Article 9 Association is a 
voluntary movement without central control. All the Ōfuna group had to do was to form a new 
chapter on their own without formally breaking away from the Kamakura chapter. Thus, many 
more grassroots chapters took shape within smaller communities in the city and they were able to 
find the resources to create their own activities. 
 These examples show that grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association took shape in 
various places in the society based on different kinds of, both weak and strong, ties. Ties that 
connect members of these chapters vary in their strength, but also in their origin. In most cases, 
actors who had previously been active in other social settings took the initiative to create a 
! 65!
chapter of the Article 9 Association. These leaders, in other words, decided to reformulate their 
social ties into grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association. I will discuss this point more at 
the end of this section. 
 Once created, chapters developed in varying ways depending on their respective 
conditions: membership, their backgrounds, and their social, cultural, and political environments. 
What was emphasized commonly in most chapters’ activities, however, was “democratic 
operation of all activity.” A typical meeting of a chapter was open to anyone who wished to take 
part, including non-members, and it tended to continue longer than an hour, depending on the 
size of the membership. This is because an open discussion on the floor “until everyone feels 
right about the consensus” was an unwritten rule for the participants, a retired union leader who 
is now taking part in the Article 9 Association movement as a volunteer explained to me after a 
meeting (Asai 2012). A democratic open-floor discussion had become common in Japanese 
social movement activities through the past lessons that those movement actors had learned 
when they were active players in their respective fields, such as labor union activities in 
particular, but also in the “invisible civil society” (Steinhoff 2014) of the country composed of 
numerous small citizen movements, which try to operate on consensus through such discussion.  
 Activities of local chapters of the Article 9 Association include elements of the traditional 
social movement repertoire such as petitions and rallies, as well as a practice called “gaitō 
senden” (street advocating), where people stand in front of the train station or elsewhere with a 
microphone to publicize particular causes, passing out fliers and encouraging people to sign a 
petition. One activity adopted by many chapters is the “Kyū no-hi senden” (9th-day-advocacy) in 
which members of a chapter would stand in front of a local train station on the days with number 
nine (some do this only on the 9th, but others would also do it on 19th and 29th days of the month) 
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with signs and posters to appeal the significance of Article 9. Most times local chapters 
independently decide on their activities and fit them around their members’ schedules. If the 
‘democratic operation’ of a chapter is a strategy to build solidarity among participants, street 
demonstrations and petition drives are types of outreach activity (and participation in such 
activities further promotes group solidarity). 
 For instance, the Omuro Chapter in Kyoto, the local chapter introduced above, focused 
on petitions while participating in many different activities in the city. First they started to gather 
petition signatures by standing in front of a supermarket where many people walk by. But then 
they realized after a while that they see the same people repeatedly in one place. So they decided 
to visit each household in the district of Omuro, collecting petition signatures from all the 
residents of their district. All in all there are 3,800 households in Omuro. Every weekend the 
chapter members visited around hundred households, and it took them about two and half years 
to visit all of them (Sato 2012).   
 While gathering petitions and visiting the households in the district of Omuro, the chapter 
also increased the number of supporters from 170 to 250 by asking the people who signed the 
petition to join. Sato also explained that when they started their door-to-door petition gathering 
they just visited each house without any advance notice. As some households were never home, 
they utilized the method they had heard about at the larger events where different chapters report 
about their activities. One of the local chapters doing door-to-door petition gathering posts a 
flyer before they visit the household. Then even if they could not meet the resident in person, the 
resident could at least read the flyer. Thus, local chapter activities adopt useful methods from 
other chapters’ activities to improve theirs. 
 After accomplishing their goal to visit all the households in their neighborhood, Omuro 
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Chapter continued their petition activity in a different way: 
 
We did not think that we could ever do such a thing, but once we started, even 
though we rested on rainy days, we were able to continue and it was done one and 
half years ago…so then we have started a new activity—standing by those famous 
temples like Ninna-Ji and talking to people who come to sightsee and also 
students who are on study trips. Sometimes we get 50 petitions in an hour and 
other times just 12…something like that. Some students say, “What was Article 
9?” But once we explain its meaning, they always sign the petition. Some teachers 
tell us that they are studying, then I say this is also part of study (Sato 2012). 
 
 Besides petitions, holding lecture series is a popular activity among local chapters. Local 
chapters often invite people with a professional expertise to give a lecture about topics around 
Article 9, such as war and peace, constitutional law, and recent social issues. For instance, 
Omuro Chapter also hosted an event called “reading the constitution (kenpo wo yomu kai)” and 
invited a young lawyer who edited “The Handbook for Children’s Rights (kodomo no kenri 
techō).” At first Sato did not know whether this person was part of the Article 9 Association, but 
knew that the young lawyer, collaborating with a doctor and others, had created this handbook. 
Thus, the activities of local chapter can bring people in related fields together and create new 
network ties.
 The Nishi-sakaemachi Chapter in Aizu-wakamatsu held a continuing “peace exhibition” 
where they invited various forms of work, such as photography, to be exhibited at the church. 
This was one of the chapter’s main activities, together with its regular study sessions. However, 
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unexpected events could impact chapter activities. After the nuclear disaster in March 2011 
occurred in their own prefecture, the small historic town of Aizu-Wakamatsu had quickly 
become a shelter for evacuees from the danger zone. Especially, the Nishi-sakaemachi church 
was soon filled with those evacuees. The chapter also became the center for those residents of 
the neighborhood concerned with the spread of the radioactive substances and soon started anti-
nuclear plants activities by informing many others about the reality of Fukushima.  
 More broadly, the network created by the local Article 9 Associations helped evacuees 
who moved from disaster-affected area to other regions in Japan. An interviewee from the Nishi-
sakaemachi Chapter who sought shelter in Wakayama prefecture after the nuclear disaster found 
many helping hands coming from the local Article 9 Association chapter in the area when she 
was most devastated and lonely. The local chapter invited her to a talk event to share her 
experience in Fukushima after the disaster, thus creating an opportunity for her to reflect on her 
personal experience and at the same time making an important connection between the activity 
of the Article 9 Association and the anti-nuclear movement at the grassroots level. 
 All these chapter activities with attention to small details may seem rather tedious 
especially from the perspective that takes activity-oriented and processual character of 
movement mobilization for granted. This is however what it takes for grassroots social 
movement groups to maintain their activities. Indeed, continuous participation in social 
movements requires continuous conversations and encouragement, both internal and external, 
and daily activities to stay involved, both emotionally and theoretically.  
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Occupation- and Workplace-Based Chapters  
 Besides local grassroots chapters, there are grassroots chapters based on occupational 
identity. In Kyoto, a chapter was formed around a religious community of Buddhist temples. The 
Higashi-Honganji Temple called for participation of the entire Otani School of Shinshu 
Buddhism (of which it is the head temple) in their chapter, the Buddhist Prayers for the Article 9 
Association. As there are many different schools of Buddhist temples in Kyoto, it is perhaps not 
the only chapter of the Article 9 Association created by religious leaders. Indeed, the famous 
priest Arima Raitei of the Kinkakuji and Ginkakuji temples has been representing the 
prefectural-level chapter of the Article 9 Association in Kyoto, one of the “clearinghouse 
chapters” we will discuss in Chapter IV. As Arima Raitei was one of the eighteen religious 
leaders who sponsored the Article 9 Association upon its initial appeal in 2004, it is most likely 
that each of the eighteen leaders has also been working with at least one chapter of the Article 9 
Association.  
 In our interview, a priest from the Higashi-Honganji Temple recalled that their first step 
was to have all priests of the Ōtani School agree to announce a clear position on Article 9 as a 
religious establishment. As much as each priest’s taking an individual position, the 
organizational will to reflect on the role of religion for peace was significant for the Ōtani 
School’s decision to take this action. The existence of the Ōtani School as a Buddhist 
organization was the foundation for this chapter; yet having such an organizational foundation 
did not automatically mean the formation of the chapter of the Article 9 Association: The leaders 
of the organization had to decide to take political action in the name of the entire Ōtani School. 
Similarly, for most chapters of the Article 9 Association that were formed based on previously 
existing organizations and groups, deciding to form a chapter means to reconfigure their original 
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identity, and is a great leap forward in its own right. 
 The Film-People’s Article 9 Association is a chapter composed of people who work in 
the film industry. The Film and Theater Workers’ Union is the foundational organization of this 
chapter. The chapter members also include several famous film and animation directors. Their 
chapter events usually show a film related to peace and other social issues, and discuss it 
together with the audience. The members of the union who are skilled and experienced in 
organizational works often take initiative in creating these events. 
 Schoolteachers also formed chapters of the Article 9 Association in many schools. Many 
of these chapters were formed across the existing boundary between the two major teachers’ 
unions in Japan with different political affiliation. Furthermore, these chapters also involved 
teachers who were non-union members. Like other labor unions in Japan, Japanese teachers’ 
unions were split into two following the schism of the national labor federation in 1989 (Aspinal 
2001). However, in the local settings teachers who formally belonged to different unions worked 
together to overcome issues that had immediate impact on their daily life as schoolteachers 
(Wang 2008). From these experiences, teachers built the basis on which they could mount 
collaborative activities, and this became the foundation for them to form the workplace-based 
chapters of the Article 9 Association. These teachers’ grassroots chapters in schools in turn 
consists a network of teachers’ Article 9 Associations at city and prefectural levels as well. As 
such, organizational level of network processes are inseparable and at the same time distinctive 
from individual level processes. 
 How did they manage to put aside many conflicts in order to create a chapter beyond 
existing boundaries? What motivates these members of organizations to participate in the Article 
9 Association, when many of them probably had other conflicting interests or responsibilities? 
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These are the examples where we can clearly see the success of the association’s initial appeal 
that framed its issue explicitly focused only to Article 9 without linking it to other issues that 
created divisions in the past. As we will see in the following chapter, the initial appeal also called 
for personal participation from individual Japanese as the sovereign who is entrusted to protect 
Article 9. This further guaranteed participation without fetters that were caused in the past (and 
would have caused in the future) by affiliations to particular groups or parties. Participation from 
every level of the society shows clearly that these framing efforts did pay off. 
 
University Chapters 
 Chapters of the Article 9 Association also exist on university campuses. In some cases 
professors took an initiative then their students found the activity interesting, and they worked 
together, but in other cases students created their own chapter independently. There also were 
universities where separate chapters of professors and students coexist. In the case of Chūō 
University, for instance, the reason why there were separate chapters was that professors were 
reluctant to work together with students: An interviewee who teaches at the university explained 
that some professors did not wish to get involved in student activism, which “tended to get 
overly heated up” (Konno 2012), a comment that stems from the legacy of the 1960s student 
movement. At Keiō University, on the other hand, there was only a student chapter called TAP 
(Talk About Peace) 9. As of 2012, thirteen students from Keiō University, but also four from 
other universities such as Waseda and Yokohama City Universities were participating in TAP9. 
This example shows that students who want to participate in the Article 9 Association could take 
part in a chapter in other universities than their own.  
 Creating a student chapter on university campuses could face challenges and it is not so 
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easy for students to do so. Often, such a challenge comes from the university itself: A member of 
TAP9 explained that the authorities of Keiō University were not quite friendly to their activities: 
 
We must be officially recognized by the University as a “circle” to get a 
permission to post flyers on bulletins on campus, and to use classrooms for our 
activities such as meetings and events like lectures. Since our chapter is not 
approved as a circle yet, we cannot post our flyers. We ask some of our professors 
who are sympathetic to our cause when we want to use classrooms (Fujita 2012). 
 
At the International Christian University (ICU), there was also a student chapter. Although there 
was no professor’s chapter at the ICU, the student chapter invited some professors to be sponsors 
(Shima 2011). A founding member of this chapter explained that they decided to create their own 
chapter after participating in an event called Peace Night Nine, which was organized by the 
Tokyo Students’ Article 9 Association, a clearinghouse chapter with students from several 
different universities in Tokyo.  
 According to a member of TAP9 at Keiō University, there also were student chapters at 
Waseda, Meiji, Aoyama, Wakō, Tōyō, and Tokyo Universities, and members of these chapters 
take part in the Tokyo Students’ Article 9 Association. There was also a chapter at the ward 
level, such as Chiyoda Students’ Article 9 Association in Chiyoda Ward in central Tokyo, with 
students from Nihon University and the college of science and engineering at Chūō University. 
Thus, students take part in the Article 9 Association fluidly, some by creating their own chapters 
on campuses, and others by participating in another university’s chapter, or by simply jumping in 
to a clearinghouse chapter as a student without particular chapter membership when they do not 
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have enough resources to do otherwise.  
 Through my interviews, it also became evident that most students who take leadership in 
creating chapters of the Article 9 Association on their campuses have been active in other social 
activities. Six out of nine student interviewees were members of Minsei, or the Democratic 
Youth League of Japan, a youth organization affiliated with the JCP. Nonetheless, according to 
one of them, “Minsei is not just a group of good friends” and being part of Minsei is not the only 
reason why they are actively participating in the Article 9 Association. A trigger for this student 
to take part in the Article 9 Association was the words of an atomic bomb survivor, whom she 
met through the World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, who told her that hers 
was the last generation who would be listening to their experiences in person. This made her 
think about how her generation could continue to tell their stories to the next generation (Iseki 
2012). A professor at Chūō University, who was also active in Minsei when he was younger, 
also commented “not all Minsei members would be interested in the Article 9 Association” 
(Konno 2012).  
 A student interviewee who was not a member of Minsei, on the other hand, reflected that 
what got her interested in social problems was an English essay class at her cram school for 
university entrance examinations. In this class, she had the chance to watch documentary films 
on various social problems such as wars, nuclear power plants, and poverty. In teaching how to 
assemble thoughts into an English essay, her teacher taught her that she must be critical of things 
that she sees and hears. Once she was accepted to university, she met her upperclassman who 
had attended the same clam school, and who was taking charge of the Article 9 Association 
chapter on campus at that time. Soon she became active in the chapter and organized events that 
“would be attractive to students.” Her chapter invited lecturers such as Takatō Naoko, a 
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humanitarian activist specializes in Iraq, through whom she and her colleagues became keenly 
interested in human rights problems in Iraq. With Takatō’s assistance, they held a Skype meeting 
with university students in Iraq, thus befriending “real people in Iraq who lived in war, which 
totally changed [their] perspectives on the matter” (Fujita 2012). After the 2011 nuclear accident 
in Fukushima, their chapter invited Iida Tetsunari, the director of the Institute for Sustainable 
Energy Policies, to discuss the issue of the nuclear plant. She felt that the Article 9 Association 
was the reason for the development of her network: 
 
Without being active in the Article 9 Association, I would not have acquired so 
many personal connections, or been interested in so many social problems…I feel 
the responsibility to work on these issues as a person who had the chance to know 
about them. As for our chapter of the Article 9 Association, I think its existence is 
meaningful in its own right. I’m graduating soon, so am telling my underclass 
students “don’t let it disappear at least.” (Fujita 2012) 
 
 This shows that being active in a social activities or being a member of a pre-existing 
organization are not necessary preconditions for younger people to take part in the Article 9 
Association, although those who have previous experiences and resources are better situated to 
get connected to a new activity through existing ties. Nevertheless, to take part in a new 
movement, an individual with existing ties to social movements must decide at one point 
whether she wants to reconfigure the ties and her position, and reformulate them to be suited to 
the new opportunity.

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Hobby-Based Chapters 
 There are also chapters of the Article 9 Association created based on hobbies. According 
to the Article 9 Association’s newsletter, there are hobby-based chapters such as the Article 9 
Association for People Who Enjoy Mountain Climbing and the Article 9 Association for Fishing 
Lovers. I also met a member of a chapter called Quilt for Article 9, who is also a member of a 
local grassroots chapter in her neighborhood and also a volunteer member of the clearinghouse 
chapter in Kanagawa prefecture. In my fieldwork, I interviewed a member of a chapter based on 
the members’ common interest in film. Most members of this chapter lived in one local area, but 
it was clearly a hobby-based chapter and the main activity of the chapter is to watch movies the 
members like, as an entrance to think about peace.  
 Another hobby-based chapter was formed among a group of friends. My interviewee 
from one of such chapters explained how their group created a chapter of the Article 9 
Association: 
 
We were a group of old friends, who used to talk about random things about the 
past. In about 25 or 26 years ago, however, we decided to talk about much more 
meaningful things, like our experiences during the wartime, or problems we 
would encounter as retirees…and what we can do about it. So we first started a 
study group called Yamaneko-ken Shinpojium (Symposium at the Mountain Cat’s 
House) with about 20 to 30 friends. Later, when we got to know about the appeal 
of the Article 9 Association, we decided to form K9MP (Kenpō 9jo Message 
Project). (Mabuchi 2012) 
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In this statement, it is clear that existing groups of friends and hobby buddies were consciously 
turned into chapters of the Article 9 Association. 
 Thus, the multilayered and sometimes overlapping construction of grassroots chapters 
presents a web-like structure that cuts across Japanese society. The seemingly sudden 
mobilization at every level of the society is a curious phenomenon and one would ask why, and 
also how, this sort of explosive development could be possible at all. The key to answer this 
question is the preexisting citizens groups and their personal networks that had dotted the 
country yet were embedded deeply inside the civil society. Many such groups of people decided 
to turn their personal networks at different levels into chapters of the Article 9 Association. In 
local communities, socially active members reconfigured their personal networks and took the 
initiative to form a chapter; religious leaders reflected on the role of religion in the society and 
expressed their support for the peace constitution with Article 9 by creating chapters of the 
Article 9 Association under the name of their denominations; labor unions decided to re-
pronounce their support for the constitution and the Article 9 and create a new collectivity 
beyond their union boundaries to form a chapter; in universities, professors and students 
reorganized their colleagues into chapters of the Article 9 Association; and groups of friends and 
hobby buddies decided to extend the purpose of their groups and form a place for social and 
political discussions, calling it a chapter of the Article 9 Association. Participants’ reconfiguring 
existing ties is therefore a key process through which the very extensive network of the Article 9 
Association was created in such a short span of time. Active decision made by leaders of existing 
groups and organizations was the very first step in this process. 


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Formation of the Ties between Chapters through Events 
 Once formed, these grassroots chapters gradually extended their network ties, starting 
from neighboring chapters and then to more distant chapters. The Article 9 Association expanded 
its network primarily through the participants’ social networks. In Japan as well as elsewhere, 
those who are active in social activities tend to belong to more than one social group or 
organization. Since this has been especially true within the left in Japan, a person who has 
become a member of a chapter of the Article 9 Association is very likely to get involved in more 
chapters, and ends up belonging to chapters with different styles and membership backgrounds. 
Such a person who moves between different chapters, moreover, becomes a broker between 
these chapters (Burt 2005). That is to say, regardless of the level of the individual’s awareness, 
by participating in different chapters, she provides information about the other chapters and plays 
the role of a carrier of outside resources. Thus, grassroots chapters naturally form network ties 
through shared personnel.  
 Grassroots chapters also form network ties by cooperating to organize events, and by 
participating in other chapters’ activities as guests. Sometimes, neighboring chapters try to use 
each other’s resources to hold a larger action, for instance, to host a film-screening event. As 
compared with more convenient activities such as petitions a chapter could do with a few people 
in any given place, events like film-screening require more time and resources for preparation: 
they need to reserve a reasonably sized hall which meets their limited budget, advertise it, sell 
tickets, and organize the screening event itself, such as the front desk, spaces for fund-raising 
goods, seating for the audience, and volunteers to staff each table. Japanese activists are 
generally experienced in this kind of activities (see Steinhoff 2015 for a similar setting). 
 To realize these larger events, local chapters exchange their resources. Some activities 
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require extended connection to a specialist. A chapter may or may not have such a connection. In 
such cases, they try to reach out to necessary resources by themselves if possible, but otherwise 
they could utilize the resources that another chapter may have. Of course, for this, they need to 
know someone from other chapter who has such a connection. Sometimes, even when they did 
not know about anyone with the resource they wanted, another chapter’s event announcement 
could alert them to exactly what they wanted. If they participate in these events hosted by 
another chapter, they can make new connections and thus their network can be expanded. Such 
opportunity allows the chapter the chance in the future to make their own event utilizing the 
newly gained resources.  
 For example, a grassroots chapter called the Article 9 Association Along the Enoden 
Railway, held a film-screening event working together with neighboring chapters with 
overlapping membership. In another time, this chapter also realized a tour to the war heritage 
sites in their neighborhood. To do the latter event, the chapter found someone from another 
chapter who is knowledgeable about war heritage in the region to guide their tour. Ōfuna 
Chapter, which is located in Kamakura-city where there is an Enoden Railway terminal, 
participated in the film-screening event that the Enoden Railway Chapter hosted by helping them 
to sell tickets but also joining the screening as part of the audience. In turn, when the Ōfuna 
chapter hosted another film-screening event, the members of the Enoden Railway Chapter came 
to help. This type of collaborative relationship develops between local chapters over time, and it 
sometimes gives birth to a new chapter, as some participants in these events hope to create their 
own chapter in their neighborhood. Such a collaborative relationship is also a channel through 
which ideas are transmitted: the idea to create a chapter along a particular railway came 
originally from the Article 9 Association Along Inokashira Line in Tokyo. Further, some 
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members of Ōfuna chapter decided to form the Article 9 Association Along Negishi Line after 
they had collaborated with the Enoden Railway chapter, in which members of several different 
grassroots chapters who live along the JR Negishi Line assembled as a chapter. 
 They also form ties with geographically more distant chapters through participating in 
larger events such as the prefectural level events hosted by clearinghouse chapters in their area 
(see Chapter IV), as well as the national-level conferences hosted by the headquarters of the 
Article 9 Association, which will be discussed in more details in Chapter V. The national 
exchange meetings held by the headquarter serves as a platform where grassroots chapters share 
their experiences and encourage one another to create a more vigorous movement. Through this 
event, countless ties between grassroots chapters and the headquarters are formed, and more 
interactions take place after the event.
 They also find lecturers for their study group on different problems, who is usually 
invited through a personal tie to a member of the particular chapter, and this lecturer could be a 
channel for a new connection with an otherwise distant chapter and other resources. Local 
chapters that are geographically close by and workplace-based chapters with shared interests are 
likely to communicate directly and more closely, often co-hosting events with a related theme. 
As the headquarters created a list of “guest lecturers” who could offer professional guidance on 
their respective fields such as constitutional law, political economy, peace literature, and so on, 
grassroots chapters can request the headquarters to dispatch a lecturer they wish to have for their 
particular events. The headquarters then contacts the requested lecturer to schedule the event. 
Once the deal is made, the chapter would reserve a location and start advertising for the lecture, 
making flyers and distributing it through their unique channels. The chapter normally can use 
this service with a relatively small honorarium and transportation fee paid directly for the 
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lecturer, as this is a service for which the lecturers have volunteered their time. 
 It is also noteworthy that, in the cases of the Omuro chapter in Kyoto and the Enoden 
Railway and Ōfuna chapters in Kanagawa, retired schoolteachers were active participants. In 
fact, many local chapters of the Article 9 Association have former schoolteachers among their 
core membership. Retired primary and middle school teachers especially possess more local ties 
as compared with those who worked for corporations who tend not to have developed close 
connections in their neighborhood while they were working. The locally embedded networks of 
former schoolteachers who are often leaders of grassroots chapters are helpful for the purpose of 
local chapters, which is to spread the support for Article 9 and the Japanese constitution at the 
grassroots level. 
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Diagram 3. A local network of grassroots chapters in Kanagawa prefecture 
*Node colors show types of chapters. Green: grassroots chapter, Purple: clearinghouse chapter. 
Edge colors show types of ties. Red: events, Blue: membership overlap (brokerage). 
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 Thus, grassroots chapters get connected with one another through ties between persons, 
through shared organizational resources prepared by the headquarters, as well as through events. 
These processes, which are happening at different analytical levels, are in reality overlapped and 
intertwined. By closely looking at the courses of tie formation among grassroots chapters, this 
chapter showed the processes in which the Article 9 Association expanded as an entity, and what 
kinds of groups and organizations served as the foundations for this Association to create more 
than 7,500 grassroots chapters across Japan. The chapter also showed that a grassroots chapter of 
the Article 9 Association might be a new face of a preexisting group, which turned itself into a 
chapter of the Article 9 Association by reconfiguring its existing network ties and highlighting a 
specific one of many identities held by the group members. Nevertheless, these outcomes are the 
result of continuous emotional as well as theoretical exchanges among movement participants, 
for most cases since before the formation of the Article 9 Association. 










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CHAPTER V.  
THE CLEARINGHOUSE CHAPTERS 
 
Within the movement of the Article 9 Association, once chapters are created at a given 
level or unit of community, regardless of the type of chapters, more chapters are created both in 
smaller and larger units of the society around the first chapters. That is, when grassroots chapters 
are created in many cities of a prefecture, members of these chapters tend to start exchanging 
information and organizing activities. To make communication more effective, then, they create 
a chapter at the prefectural level. The primary role of this prefectural level chapter is to facilitate 
communication among grassroots chapters in their prefecture; in so doing, it also helps the 
activities of the Article 9 Association to reach the smallest unit of the society to the districts and 
neighborhood levels. It is also important to note that prefectural level chapters do not ‘unify’ 
grassroots chapters; rather, they try to maintain horizontal relationships between grassroots 
chapters. Prefectural level chapters have functions of “clearinghouse organizations” (Steinhoff 
2003); however, many of these chapters also have their own activities and budget like grassroots 
chapters. Nevertheless, since the main function of prefectural level chapters is to facilitate 
communications and collaborations among grassroots chapters in their respective prefectures, 
this dissertation calls them “clearinghouse chapters.” 
There were clearinghouse chapters in all the local areas where I conducted my field 
research. When I went to a new place, I generally went through the organizers of these 
clearinghouse chapters, to whom I was referred by Komori Yōichi at the headquarters secretariat. 
Then, these organizers were able to refer me to persons who lead grassroots chapters. At times 
members of grassroots chapters whom I interviewed also referred me to an organizer of a 
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clearinghouse chapter. In the similar way to local grassroots chapters and clearinghouse chapters, 
occupation-based chapters in particular industries, such as mass media (including television, 
newspapers, advertising, and movie and theater), education, and civil engineering and 
construction industries, also created their own chapters at both local and prefectural levels. 
This chapter looks at six concrete cases of these clearinghouse chapters. Each of the six 
cases presents the operation of a particular clearinghouse chapter, and the purpose of their unique 
activities as a part of Article 9 Association movements. The objectives and activities of each 
clearinghouse chapter are embedded in unique histories, social movement organizations, and 
other resources available in their respective geographical and professional areas. Cases to be 
presented here were chosen theoretically based on such backgrounds. Nonetheless, these 
different chapters are fundamentally rooted in the common history of Japanese social movements 
that had been particularly divisive.  
I argue that overcoming this negative legacy that still haunts the development of social 
movements in Japan today is an unspoken yet clear objective, especially for those who 
participate in the Article 9 Association movement. The analytical focus of the present chapter is 
therefore the disagreements found in Japanese social movements to be overcome: Virtually all 
these disagreements were generated in social movements to which the political generation that 
now engages in the Article 9 Association were once committed. Moreover, the Japanese 
constitution requires a national referendum and the majority of voters to approve its amendment. 
Overcoming such past conflicts among the supporters of the constitution therefore becomes a 
practical and even necessary an aim for this movement, in order to thwart the revision attempt. 
Thus, in this chapter, the analytical focus is not only on the past conflicts, but also on the 
mediating actions that different clearinghouse chapters carry out. 
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The Kanagawa Network 
The core members of Kanagawa Association for Article 9 (hereafter the “Kanagawa 
Network) are lawyers and former union leaders who live and work in Kanagawa prefecture. 
However, the lawyers who work together in this chapter possess different political orientations—
some are more supportive of the JCP, and others the former JSP, which has already been 
dissolved yet its supporters still sympathize with the smaller SDP. This composition of the core 
membership shows that the Kanagawa Network aims to overcome the traditional boundary 
between the communists and the socialists, which has been dividing Japanese social movements 
since the immediate post World War period. The lawyers who take initiative for this chapter are 
well aware of their differences, and purposefully work together in order to overcome this 
historical gap. The core members including volunteer staff also share this common purpose 
(Iijima 2012, personal conversation). Because of their experience with organizational work, 
previous leaders of labor unions tend to volunteer for the secretariat positions of the chapter. 
Those former union leaders who have chosen to take part in citizens’ movements after retirement 
are well trained not only in negotiating personnel matters, but also in treating different political 
orientations and preferences fairly, so that they do not collide in any fatal way. The case of 
Kanagawa exhibits most typically the goal of this generation of activists, and perhaps of the 
Article 9 Association—that is, to bridge the division between the socialist and communist camps 
within the left. This is indeed the major problem that former union leaders and lawyers who 
worked together with these unionists have been facing continuously throughout their careers, and 
they believe that this is one of the most critical causes that prevented their movements from 
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having a real impact in politics. They believe that resolving this problem would promote social 
change.  
The Kanagawa Network has relatively younger lawyers. Among them are a fifty year old 
and another in his late thirties. Both joined the Article 9 Association through Japan Lawyers 
Association for Freedom—an association of lawyers that has strong ties not only with the Japan 
Federation of Bar Associations, but also with various democratic citizens groups in Japan. 
Lawyers from this organization initiate most of the clearinghouse chapters of the Article 9 
Association, which suggests the effectiveness of organizational ties in recruitment and 
intergenerational continuity of social movements. More generally, however, the younger 
generation does not differentiate these camps as clearly as the older generation does. Rather, a 
younger Japanese would not appreciate any of these factions. To their sensibility these groups 
are just the same kind of people: “professional citizens” (Mori 2012, personal conversation). 
Nevertheless, the conflict between the socialist and communist camps remains the main gap for 
the 1960s generation that now engages in the Article 9 Association movement, and this gap is 
still the main factor that prevents the Japanese progressives from conducting unified political 
movements. 
Aside from these lawyers and former union leaders, the volunteer members of the 
Kanagawa Network secretariat also include more “ordinary citizens with no political affiliation” 
(Nakano 2011). When I attended the Kanagawa Network’s monthly meeting that was open to 
public, Nakano, who is a housewife and a volunteer member of the chapter’s secretariat, invited 
me to join a group going for dinner after the meeting. Besides Nakano, a young man (in his late 
twenties) who works for a law firm, and myself, others at the dinner were lawyers and former 
union leaders who are core members of the chapter. At the dinner, Nakano sat next to me and 
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mentioned a few times that she is an “ordinary housewife” and that it is important for people like 
her to be part of such activity as the Article 9 Association. In our interview on the later day, 
Nakano explained that one of the reasons she decided to participate in the Article 9 Association 
was that she “did not want people to think the Article 9 Association was organized by a 
particular political party” (Nakano 2011). Negishi, another volunteer member whom I 
interviewed, also commented in our interview that she sometimes felt uneasy to work with these 
“bengoshi sensei” (literal translation is “lawyer-teachers,” “sensei” after a proper noun is often 
used to lightly ridicule someone with authority and to emphasize one’s humble status as 
compared to the other side) and other “experienced people,” because she herself is just an 
“ordinary participant without much experience in social activity, although [she] did have a 
membership to the union at [her] former workplace” (Negishi 2012). It was unclear in Negishi’s 
statement whether she had any party affiliation, but it was clear that the organizational character 
of the chapter made her feel slight discomfort. She took part in the Kanagawa Network because 
the local grassroots chapter she first participated was too small to continue regular activity and 
she wanted to work with more people. Besides the local chapter and the network, she also sewed 
the clause of Article 9 into huge quilts in various languages as a part of the activity of another 
grassroots chapter, Quilt for Article 9.  
Thus, the Kanagawa Network chapter involved participants with somewhat different 
backgrounds, and the leaders of the chapter were well aware of it. A former union leader who 
now volunteers as a secretariat member of the Kanagawa Network, emphasized the importance 
of “taking time to discuss until everyone feels right about the final consensus” (Asai 2012). Still, 
participants like Negishi may not feel completely at home. This example helps to understand 
how much care it takes to organize a chapter of the Article 9 Association. This example makes it 
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clear, moreover, that these participants decided to participate in the Article 9 Association 
because of their strong conviction that this movement matters, and that their personal 
contribution is essential for the movement to succeed. These two cases above were clear 
instances where the association’s framing that appealed to the worth of individuals as the proud 
sovereign who is entrusted to protect Article 9 that in turn promote world peace paid off. And by 
“taking time to discuss until everyone feels right about the final consensus” in their 
organizational procedures, chapters of the association strive to embody the democratic spirit of 
the initial appeal published in 2004. 
At the organizational level, participants’ different interpretations of the association’s 
approach to create a horizontal network caused some conflicts. When forming the Kanagawa 
Network was being discussed, there was a heated debate and even strong opposition against the 
plan. It was objection to creating a prefectural level chapter, based on concern about creating an 
“upper level organization” above the existing grassroots chapters. The concern was 
understandable given the past experiences of Japanese social movements, where most social 
organizations maintained a vertical structure that discouraged horizontal cooperation between 
social groups with similar status. However, the supporters of the plan to create a prefectural level 
chapter argued that the purpose of creating a prefectural level chapter was just the opposite: it 
was not to oversee or to unify them, but to facilitate communications between grassroots 
chapters. Eventually, the opinion that regards this clearinghouse chapter as beneficial gained 
more support and, as we see today, this strategy has also been used in many other areas across 
Japan. 
As described in Chapter III, neighboring grassroots chapters cooperate through shared 
resources. The clearinghouse chapter provides grassroots chapters with information about more 
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distant chapters through email news and monthly open meetings. Further, the clearinghouse 
chapter organizes larger event with the cooperation of grassroots chapters, such as summer 
festivals in public parks and lectures in a big prefectural hall inviting eminent speakers. These 
larger scale events are also more visible to the general public than smaller events that grassroots 
chapters alone could organize, and thus serve as a bigger opportunity to reach out to broader 
audiences. 
A clearinghouse chapter like this also functions as a channel between the grassroots 
chapters and the headquarters. When the headquarters hold the annual national conferences, the 
headquarters advertises the event through their email newsletter, but also through the 
clearinghouse chapters. In turn, each chapter (either grassroots or clearinghouse) collects the list 
of participants and applies to the headquarters directly. Without such a facility as a clearinghouse 
chapter, the headquarters would need to assemble numerous applications that comes from 
individual participants separately each time when it tries to organize a national level meeting. 
This system also functions as a safety measure for national level events, as accepting 
applications only through a chapter of the Article 9 Association screens out potential threats to 
the events. Clearinghouse chapters therefore seem to be a practical facility for better organizing a 
nationwide movement like the Article 9 Association. So far there seems to be no complaint filed 
about a clearinghouse chapter trying to control grassroots chapters. 
 
The Hiroshima Network 
 Similar to the case of Kanagawa and many others, a lawyer from Japan Lawyers 
Association for Freedom plays the role of the secretary general for the networking chapter of 
Hiroshima, the Article 9 Association Hiroshima Network (hereafter “the Hiroshima Network”). 
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As of August 2011, the Hiroshima Network is composed of a total of 87 grassroots chapters, 
which includes three “area center” chapters, 26 occupation-based chapters, 38 local chapters, 15 
workplace chapters, 4 hobby-based chapters, and the Hiroshima Network itself as a chapter. 
What is most unique about this network is that it includes another constitutional 
movement called the “Association for Article Number 9” (Dai-kyūjō no kai), which is said to be 
associated with Chūkaku-ha, a rather controversial faction in the Japanese social movement 
sector with origins in the radical new left of the 1960s. However, Dai-kyūjō no kai in Hiroshima 
seemed to have been rather neutral in terms of political orientation, and willing to cooperate with 
different groups that shared common purposes. In my interview, the secretary general of the 
Hiroshima Network clearly pointed out about this aspect of Hiroshima’s peace movement 
including the Article 9 Association, and stated that “the Communists, the Socialists, and the New 
Socialists work together in Hiroshima” (Iguchi 2012). Each of these parties and also individual 
participants involved in this network have long-standing careers in social activism in their 
respective fields, such as education and union activities in big-name media companies and 
newspapers, as well as citizens movements. These actors eventually brought their experiences 
and resources into the movement of the Article 9 Association through creating different 
grassroots chapters.  
Prior to the formation of the Hiroshima Network in April 2007, and even before 
September 2004 when the first grassroots chapter of the Article 9 Association was created in 
Hiroshima, there was a history of constitutional movements with collaboration among various 
peace movement organizations in the prefecture. The establishment of the Research Commission 
on the Constitution in 2000 in the National Diet triggered this collaborative movement and the 
“Hiroshima Watch” was formed in November 2001. This group sent representatives to the 
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Committee’s public hearings in Nagoya and Hiroshima in the following few years, and 
advocated for the cause to support the constitution in various ways. Once the current 
headquarters of the Article 9 Association held its inaugural press conference, these movements 
begun to gather under the name of the Article 9 Association, and the first grassroots chapter in 
Hiroshima, the Asa-minami Ward Pensioners’ Article 9 Association, was created in September 
2004. This chapter also has a tie to the Pensioners’ Union with its own nationwide network. 
Within the following year, 16 grassroots chapters were formed in Hiroshima, and as noted above, 
the number of grassroots chapters in the prefecture had increased to 87 by 2011 and remains 
more or less the same since then. 
When I attended the Hiroshima Network’s committee meeting in April 2012, several 
participants commented personally to me that they could put various differences aside and act 
collectively because Lawyer Iguchi is at the center of this network. As we will see in the cases of 
other prefectures, lawyers tend to play a mediating role between previously conflicting groups. 
Sasaki, a long-standing member of the Dai-kyūjō no kai who is also a well-connected citizen 
activist, whispered to me about another core member of the Hiroshima network chapter Ishino, 
saying that she is a communist party member, a clear indication that Sasaki herself is not a 
communist party member. Also in our interview she spoke highly of Takada Ken, a member of 
the Article 9 Association headquarters secretariat, who is also a long-standing leader of citizens’ 
movements in Japan without any party affiliation. Clearly, this shows her preference and pride in 
being a citizen activist who does not affiliate with any political party, and has slight distrust 
toward political parties and those who affiliate with them. This is an identity strongly held by 
many citizen activists who participate in the Article 9 Association, and the Association deals 
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with this sentiment with special care. This sensitivity makes the Article 9 Association capable of 
mounting such a large scale “single-issue coalition” in Japan. 
As much as it is organizational effort, it is also participants’ personal effort to work 
together with others who come from different areas of activities. Sasaki, who whispered to me 
about Ishino that she is a communist party member, has actually been working with her as 
participants of the Hiroshima Network, and came to dinner after the meeting, sharing a bottle of 
shōchu (Japanese liquour distilled from wheat) named “Kyūjō” (Article 9) with other people 
including Ishino. When I asked Sasaki if she would also be available for an interview before I 
leave town, she was first hesitant because Ishino has agreed to meet with me before her and 
suggested that they could meet at the same coffee shop to save my time. However, she eventually 
decided to meet with me and came rather early to the meeting place. When she arrived, I was still 
interviewing Ishino and the topic was about her personal story about how she moved to 
Hiroshima and started working as a preschool teacher. As she listened to Ishino’s story, she 
looked as though she was feeling differently about Ishino and commented in a sympathetic tone 
that she did not know at all that Ishino had such a background. Ishino brought many materials to 
show me her activities as the head of a preschool where there is also a chapter of the Article 9 
Association, and shared many episodes with me while Sasaki was also listening. It was clear that 
Ishino has been doing everything to pass on peaceful society to children, while working together 
with their parents and her younger colleagues. When Ishino’s interview ended, our interview 
smoothly turned to Sasaki, and Ishino stayed until the end. Ishino was also listening carefully to 
Sasaki’s story, and was commenting sympathetically whenever she was surprised by Sasaki’s 
personal experiences as a former elementary school teacher and a citizen activist, and how she 
has recently been concentrating her energy to create a new network. It seemed clear to me that 
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they did not know about each other so well before this. Nonetheless, they had been working 
together, and the interview was perhaps an opportunity for them to develop a connection beyond 
their different backgrounds. 
After their interviews ended, as she walked with me to the station, Sasaki told me that the 
day I attended their meeting was the first time the only young member (in his thirties) of the 
Hiroshima Network joined their dinner after the meeting. Sasaki said to me, “it was your power. 
I wonder if there is anyone like you in Hiroshima,” and handed me her business card. Sasaki’s 
comment shows that the longstanding activists are anxious about having few young participants 
in their activity, and that they are uncertain of why this has been the case. In both the Article 9 
Association and the Association for Article Number 9, a common problem is how to achieve 
intergenerational succession. They both struggle to recruit younger members. This is also true in 
most grassroots chapters within Hiroshima as well as in other local areas. Whenever I visited any 
chapter of the Article 9 Association, grassroots or network, the problem of recruiting younger 
members was always on the list of discussion topics. This was also true in the national exchange 
meetings hosted by the headquarters. Such a discussion is always an open-ended one, and offers 
no specific solution. When I attended the meeting of the Hiroshima Network chapter, the reports 
made during the meeting were mostly about the fact that there are only older members, which 
was identified as the main reason for their grassroots chapter being unable to hold an “enjoyable” 
event as it might otherwise. They were all very concerned about their movement being hardly 
recognized by younger people, and many were losing confidence because of this reality. As we 
will also discuss in the case of Okinawa, just being a city with very strong memory of the war 
does not create an environment where everyone cares about peace or participates in social 
movements. 
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The Miyagi Network 
Major groups and organizations in a local civil society tend to provide the locus of the 
formation of the Article 9 Association chapter. In the case of Miyagi, the two pillars of the 
Miyagi Constitution Article 9 Association (hereafter the “Miyagi Network”) are Seikyō (The 
Japanese Consumers’ Co-operative Union, hereafter “JCCU”) and local educators.  
In Miyagi prefecture, JCCU enjoys a very high membership—sixty percent of the 
households in the prefecture are members of it. JCCU is one of the earliest consumers’ 
organizations formed by Japanese citizens who wished to improve their quality of life (LeBlanc 
1999). The organization’s primary activity evolves around providing the members with a support 
system for different needs such as food safety and co-operative health insurance. Since its 
purpose is protection of consumers’ benefit as opposed to benefiting corporations, JCCU may be 
considered a form of social movement organization. In fact, JCCU operates its own think tank 
called the Citizen Sector Policy Organization, which publishes a quarterly titled Social 
Movements that deal with wide variety of issues essential to life and social justice, with more 
emphasis on food safety and consumption. As the earliest consumers’ co-op in the country, 
JCCU also has a large network of local branches and their membership, which potentially 
becomes a strong organizational foundation for nationwide movement mobilization. Nonetheless, 
this Miyagi Network was the only one of the six clearinghouse chapters of the Article 9 
Association I observed where JCCU played the central role (see Nishikido (2008) on the case of 
alternative energy projects that started in Hokkaidō). In fact, the office of the Miyagi Network is 
located inside the local JCCU office in Sendai city, and the person who is in charge of this JCCU 
office also played a central role as vice-chief of the chapter secretariat. 
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Including JCCU, several preexisting groups were the foundation of the Miyagi Network. 
A professor emeritus of agricultural policy at Tohoku University, who served as the chief 
secretary of the Miyagi Network, spoke about its prehistory: 
 
It was before the Iraq War, when the New Guideline (related to the US-Japan 
Security Treaty) was an issue. At that time there were three different groups that 
were working on the problem in Miyagi. First is the Miyagi Network Against War 
Policy, for which I was one of the four representatives. This was a group 
composed of about fifty-five or fifty-six groups, centering labor unions. This 
group did not appeal too widely, so they approached the groups supporting the 
constitution in the prefecture, such as Kenpō Kaigi, Miyagi Peace Center for the 
Constitution, and a lawyers’ group called the Citizen’s Committee to Protect the 
Constitution, as well as JCCU Miyagi whose purpose is “to protect peace and 
people’s living.” However, these groups were divided into smaller groups due to 
their association with different political parties. So, we tried to create a new, a 
“Five Group Network” in December 2003 with five representatives. We then tried 
to make it even more inclusive in order to establish this Miyagi Constitution 
Article 9 Association in December 2004, with 21 sponsors. By now we have more 
than 160 sponsors…the unique color of Miyagi Network is that it is a group of 
individuals who came together exclusively to protect Article 9. (Kawano 2012) 
 
Thus, the founding members of the Miyagi Network paid very careful attention to avoid 
introducing the relationship to political parties when they created the list of sponsors. When they 
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created this list, the occupational status of sponsors was noted with special care so that there 
would be no indication of particular political affiliation. Moreover, they did not include union 
leaders in the list. The chief secretary commented on this point: 
 
We had gotten some criticism that this way of doing things is following the logic 
of exclusion. But we had to appeal to 1,950,000 voters. We thought such a 
criticism would disappear once the movement spread. (Kawano 2012) 
 
Local educators and citizens who are particularly interested in educational problems in 
their prefecture also take a central role in this chapter. An interviewee has been working locally 
on educational issues since the campaign against the revision of the Fundamental Law of 
Education, which concluded in 2006 (Wang 2008). Besides the Miyagi Prefecture Article 9 
Association, this individual also participates in citizen groups such as the Miyagi Citizens for 
Democratic Education, Izumi Park Town Article 9 Association, the Miyagi Women’s Article 9 
Association, Miyagi Research Center for Education and Culture, and the Citizens Network for 
Protecting Children from the Harm of Radiation and the Transformation from Nuclear Plants to 
Natural Energy. Through these various activities, she has been cooperating with Komori Yōichi, 
who was a core organizer of the movement against changing the Fundamental Law of Education 
when they were fighting the issue in the early 2000s. This suggests that the history of 
collaborations between these citizen groups that compose the Miyagi Network and the organizers 
of the Article 9 Association go back further than, or at least were concurrent with, the Article 9 
Association’s formation in June 2004.  
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Just as the case of the individual above exemplifies, all the members of the Article 9 
Association whom I interviewed, including the three from Miyagi, were members of more than 
one Article 9 Association chapter or other related citizen groups. As mentioned earlier, a 
clearinghouse chapter of the Article 9 Association is often composed of several groups or 
organizations. Moreover, each of these organizations could involve several more subgroups. 
When Miyagi JCCU took the initiative to form the Miyagi Network, the leaders of the union first 
had preparatory discussions among the JCCU Liaison Conference, the University Co-op, the 
School Co-op, the Ai Co-op (a local consumers’ co-op in Sendai city, which is now a member of 
JCCU), and the Medical Co-op. The Miyagi Network also involves other established civil 
society organizations including the Public Workers’ Union and the Miyagi Peace Center for the 
Constitution, as well as groups of women, shopkeepers, and schoolteachers.  
Thus, under the name of the Miyagi Network, JCCU, various civil society organizations, 
and local intellectuals and citizens who decided to act against the threats to democratic education 
and peace came together. This clearinghouse chapter emphasizes particularly its “non-sect” 
policy in order for these groups with a variety of orientations to cooperate. Nonetheless, the case 
of the Miyagi Network also demonstrates that the Article 9 Association as a whole is a network 
of multiple social movement organizations and groups of concerned citizens that have existed 
previously, and these groups decided at one point to turn themselves into chapters of the Article 
9 Association by reformulating their network ties.  
The Miyagi Network is not an exception, however, in terms of the lack of direct 
successors. The core membership is also mostly in their sixties and seventies. My interviewees 
did tell me, however, that a new member in her thirties who has been doing some social activities 
previously, just joined the committee. They commented that it is most important to attract 
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younger people to their movement, but younger people do not seem to know or even care about 
the problem of constitutional revision. This younger person also told one of my interviewees that 
she knows many young people who care about the issue and social problems in general, but they 
are interested in NPO and NGO types of activities rather than so-called “citizens movements.” 
Nonetheless, the Miyagi Network presented a case where many citizens groups and movement 
organizations collaborate in the local activities of the Article 9 Association, with some 
developing ties to younger generation. 
 
The Kyoto Network 
 So far we have examined three networking chapters, each of them trying to overcome 
previously created conflicts in Japanese social movements: In Kanagawa, the main gap being 
dealt with was the one between the communists and socialists. In Hiroshima, it was the gap 
between political party affiliated activists and so-called citizen activists, as well as the one 
between supporters of different political organizations including a group with a tie to a New Left 
group. In Miyagi, political identities of participants were underplayed in order not only to reach 
out to more general audience, but also for different citizens groups to work together under the 
name of the Article 9 Association. In the case of Kyoto, we observe the effort to go beyond all 
these gaps, and to overcome another most easily overlooked source of conflict, which exists 
between individual participants and group participants. 
The Kyoto Association for the Constitution Article 9 (hereafter the “Kyoto Network”) is 
a clearinghouse chapter in which at least sixty-one grassroots chapters take part. The committee 
was composed of several representatives from various types of grassroots chapters, as well as the 
secretariat of the clearinghouse chapter composed of a few full-time volunteers. It held monthly 
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meetings to discuss organizational matters, such as holding events and collecting reports from 
recent activities of their membership. They also discussed recent and future activities of 
grassroots chapters where they took leadership. Concerns and problems were shared so that they 
could look for solutions collectively.
 Some of the grassroots chapters in this clearinghouse chapter were based on labor unions 
and local cells of political parties, while others were based on citizens groups with common 
interests such as film. There was also an individual who took part only when the chapter held 
poster design competition. In other words, working together in this network were people with 
different backgrounds with rather conflicting preferences in activity styles: they were retired 
members of various labor unions that were formally rivals, as well as former union leaders who 
believed in the strength of organizations in mobilization; and citizens movement activists who 
disliked “dōin gata” (“membership-based mobilization” as opposed to “voluntary participation”) 
and preferred to act as individuals.   
 The secretary-general of the Kyoto Network, who was also a lawyer and a member of 
Japan Lawyers Association for Freedom, explained the latter difference, which was between the 
two types of activism: 
 
For instance…you were there when someone used the word “dōin-gata” last 
night, weren’t you? People who mostly work in citizens movements are very 
critical of organizations that decide their policy collectively and mobilize their 
membership. They think that individuals’ voluntary will is the most important 
thing to really expand citizens movements and a movement would never develop 
without prioritizing this. This is correct from one aspect. But then there are people 
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who do things with groups such as labor unions, discussing among members, and 
only if the group reaches a consensus that this particular issue is significant, will 
this be communicated to the membership and a movement mounted. (Ogiwara 
2012) 
 
Ogiwara also explained how he and his colleagues have been working to bridge this gap within 
Kyoto’s social movement sector ever since he first started as a lawyer more than two decades 
ago. Especially in relation to the above statement, Ogiwara pointed out the importance of 
“organizational ways of making movements” that were often criticized by citizen movement 
activists for being too “organizational” and sometimes even “lacking individual will”: 
 
The organizational style of participation is actually very important, too. Isn’t it 
quite typical for a citizen movement to be very active at one moment, like the 
anti-nuclear movement? This is indeed very important, too, but still on the other 
hand, each organization discusses democratically and reaches a consensus that it 
is an important issue, and then makes a move…individual participants tend to be 
aware of things, but also have to have conditions…for example, you need to be 
able to attend a meeting at a particular time. As for an organization, they first 
position the issue, and if it were considered important, someone would be 
assigned to this particular task. But for citizen movement participants, they can 
come anytime and be gone anytime. So [if you want to be part of a movement as 
an individual] you need to make quite an effort to just attend a meeting. How long 
can this really last? It is not easy. (Ogiwara 2012) 
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 Based on the efforts of many social movement participants who worked to bridge the 
various gaps and differences between the respective methods and styles of social movement 
organizations and participants, the Kyoto Network began to take its present shape. Two 
organizations became the basis of the Kyoto Network: The organization started as Kenpō 50 
Forum and then continued as the Kyoto Netto (Ogiwara 2012). Through managing these 
organizations sequentially, the organizers worked out their methods of participation. In Kenpō 50 
Forum, the unit of those who were invited to participate was an individual but not a group. This 
was a device to encourage more participation from individuals who do not have any 
organizational and group affiliation. These organizers found previously that there were conflicts 
amongst movement participants that were caused by their methods of participation, specifically 
due to the differences between individual-based and group-based participation. Both Kenpō 50 
and Kyoto Netto were first open only to individual-based participation. However, based on the 
trust built through their activities, they were able to open it gradually to both individual and 
group participation. Thus, the Kyoto Network that is open to all types of participants was built on 
the previous achievements through detailed adjustment of methods, such as participatory 
methods (individual or group) and styles of events that they mount. In this way, even an 
individual participant who takes part only in one event where she takes leadership in a poster 
design competition can find her place in the Article 9 Association movement. Similarly, a 
participant from the local cell of a political party can attend the monthly committee meeting as a 
party representative. Together, they can appeal to more general audiences. 
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The Okinawa Network 
With its unique post-World War II history, it is not surprising that Okinawa’s Article 9 
Association had its basis in their strong peace movement organizations. In Okinawa, the 
organization equivalent to the other prefectures’ clearinghouse chapter is built on the Okinawa 
Council for the Spread of the Constitution, or Kenpō fukyū kyōgi-kai in Japanese (hereafter “the 
OCSC”), that has been active since before the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. Believing 
that the Japanese Constitution had not yet been realized for the people of Okinawa during the 
American Occupation from 1945 to 1972, their activity involved campaigning for enlightenment 
about the Japanese Constitution. For activists in Okinawa, therefore, an activity like the Article 9 
Association was not totally a new thing. Rather, advocating for Article 9 was a major part of 
their activity even before the reversion. 
Due to this unique history, Okinawa also has a different composition of political parties 
from most other prefectures. It has a local political party called the Okinawa People’s Party and 
the divisions between major national political parties observed in the main islands are not as 
strong in the Okinawa’s local context. This structure served as the foundation in the making of 
the “All Okinawa” coalition that was realized in the three successive elections in 2015: the Nago 
City mayoral election, Okinawa governor’s election, and the national election for the House of 
Representatives, in which the All Okinawa candidates defeated the LDP candidates. 
In terms of organizational composition, the Okinawa Network has a lot in common with 
others. The secretariat is run by a full-time official and several lawyers who are members of 
Japan Lawyer’s Association for Freedom. The experience of reversion in the 1970s may be why 
the participants of the Article 9 Association in Okinawa is about ten years younger in average as 
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compared with the counterpart in the Japanese main islands. Even in Okinawa where two-thirds 
of the land is occupied by the US military bases, social movements struggle to find successors. It 
is also true in the case of Okinawa that most successors of the social movement come through 
schools and workplaces—namely the University of Ryukyus and the Japan Lawyers Association 
for Freedom. Several young people who are currently involved in the Article 9 Association and 
the OCSC’s activities in Okinawa are students and former students of Takara Tetsumi, a 
professor at the University of Ryukyus Graduate School of Law, who is also the present chair of 
the OCSC secretariat. According to my interviewees who were attending Professor Takara’s 
seminar at the time of our interviews, however, they were not particularly interested in issues 
surrounding the constitution before they started to attend the seminar, although they have heard 
from their grandparents about their wartime experiences. One interviewee from Futenma, where 
a US base is located, remembered that she believed that her school had air conditioners in 
classrooms thanks to the US bases, and did not wonder why they had two layers of windows, yet 
she sometimes could not hear lectures because of the noise of aircraft that fly over their school 
(Higa 2012). 
At the center of the effort to organize these different aspects of the Okinawa Network, 
there is a full-time staff member of the secretariat. Originally from Kanagawa prefecture, she had 
worked at the secretariat of the well-known case of the “Ienaga textbook trial,” in which Ienaga 
Saburō, an author of a Japanese history textbook, sued the state of Japan, claiming that the 
screening of school textbooks by the Ministry of Education was unconstitutional. After the 
conclusion of the Ienaga trial, she married and moved to Okinawa, and started working for the 
OCSC. During my visit in Naha, the capital city of Okinawa prefecture, she took me to an 
Izakaya (small Japanese style bar) where we had more casual conversations about our personal 
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backgrounds and my study. When the topic touched on the locations I visited for research and I 
mentioned that Hiroshima was one of them, she suddenly asked if I met Sasaki, the citizen 
activist I interviewed in the city. To my surprise, they were old acquaintances, and she expressed 
her high opinion of Sasaki by saying, “she is good, you know?” She also knew and had a high 
opinion about the only fulltime staff member of the headquarters from her previous involvement 
in different movements in the main island. Similarly, moreover, some lawyers who work in the 
secretariat of the Okinawa Network moved to Okinawa from other prefectures for various 
reasons. Besides Takara, core members of the Okinawa Network also included natives of 
Okinawa who have been active since the reversion movement. Thus, in the Okinawa Network, 
actors from Okinawa and the Japanese main island cooperate, making the chapter a tie between 
these often disconnected parts of the country.  
One of my interviewees from Okinawa pointed out a difference between the characters of 
activists from Okinawa and the main island of Japan: When Okinawans make a movement, “they 
don’t get too intense like the people from the main island.” And he continued, with a grin, 
“When we want to get rid of the US bases that existed on the island for sixty years, we are 
prepared to fight for another sixty years. So it can’t last if we get too enthusiastic” (Takayoshi 
2012). Even though Okinawa and Japan are so different not only historically and politically, but 
also culturally, Article 9 is a common ideal, for its realization they could work together. 
 
The Fukushima Network 
The network of the Article 9 Association in Fukushima was also based on previously 
established networks in the local communities, namely the network of citizens’ organizations 
dealing with issues such as peace and social welfare, labor unions in various industries, and the 
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local cells of the JCP. In this sense, the Article 9 Association activity in the prefecture had been 
similar to many other local areas otherwise.  
After the triple disaster in March 2011, however, the character and the role of the Article 
9 Association in Fukushima were forced to change. While dealing with their own losses of 
membership after the disaster, the Fukushima Prefecture Article 9 Association (hereafter the 
“Fukushima Network”) edited a book called “Appeals from Fukushima (Fukushima wa 
uttaeru),” which is a collection of journals written by the members of grassroots chapters in 
Fukushima about their personal experiences and difficulties they faced after the disaster. The 
Fukushima Network had a booth to sell this book at the Article 9 Association’s national 
exchange meeting (see Chapter V) in 2012, where the vice chief secretary of the Fukushima 
Network was also invited to give a talk in the main program.  
Through the headquarter secretariat’s arrangement, I was assigned to help the Fukushima 
Network booth to sell the book Appeals from Fukushima. While working at the booth, I was 
introduced to the core members of the chapter and their friends who came to buy the book. The 
chief and vice chief of the secretariat are both retired professors of the University of Fukushima, 
and some other members also had ties to the university. I asked the vice chair if they would be 
available for an interview, and if it would be possible for me to visit him in Fukushima. He 
looked at me, paused for the moment, and responded that “well, I would of course welcome you 
to visit me otherwise, but you seem to be rather young. I am from Tokyo originally, and come 
back often to see my son’s family here” (Makita 2012). It was clear from the context of our 
conversation that he was concerned that the radiation level in Fukushima was too high for a 
relatively young woman to visit the city, and suggested to meet in Tokyo instead. 
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The members of the Fukushima Network secretariat, the vice chief in particular who was 
most mobile and suited for the role of an advocate, became very busy afterwards being invited to 
events organized by grassroots chapters in different local areas. So our interview did not happen, 
but I was able to invite him as a speaker to an event of a local Article 9 Association in my 
neighborhood, and personally conversed about the Fukushima Network as well as about the 
situation in Fukushima more generally. Many grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association at 
that time were also engaging in the question of how to understand and deal with the nuclear plant 
problem in relation to the constitution. Chapter V discusses in more detail how in this process the 
Article 9 Association expanded its scope, and at the same time developed a new framing that 
connected itself to the anti-nuclear movements. 
More broadly, the nationwide network of the Article 9 Association contributed to help the 
disaster-affected members in unexpected ways. For instance, the networks that have been created 
through the activity of the Article 9 Association helped the members and their families who had 
been evacuated to other parts of Japan reconnect with one another (see Chapter V). In another 
place, an evacuee from Fukushima who was active in her own area was supported in the new 
location by grassroots chapters in that area (see Chapter III). The continuous activity of a 
grassroots chapter in Fukushima also helped various types of anti-nuclear movements in the 
prefecture after the disaster, and this exchange later developed a group that brought the demands 
of the disaster-affected people into court. 
 
This section presented six prefectural level clearinghouse chapters and demonstrated that 
each chapter presents a unique pattern of how the local Article 9 Association could be organized. 
This underscores that the Article 9 Association could take many different forms as a voluntary 
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participatory activity. Yet it also demonstrated that there is a pattern common to all these 
clearinghouse chapters: From these cases, it is clear that the present achievement is built on the 
accumulation and the history of social movement activities in the respective prefectures. Indeed, 
creating such an extensive network in such a brief period of time was possible only through the 
mobilization of existing social groups and their networks.  
Clearly, the organizational structure of the Article 9 Association reflects the forms of 
network ties that existed among various movement actors in Japan prior to the association’s 
formation. Every part of the association’s operations also requires extensive knowhow and 
organizational skills from the participants, and especially from the leadership at all levels, from 
national to grassroots. Only professional citizenry with ample experiences in socio-political 
activities, in both organizational and citizens movements, would be able to lead such an ordered 
form of mobilization. This cohort of activists, facing the repeated schisms between two political 
camps that occurred during the period when they were in charge of labor unions and citizen 
groups, have been attempting to build a bridge between the different political affiliations, namely 
between socialist and communist camps. Another gap this cohort has been trying to bridge, 
especially since the significant decline of labor in the late 1980s, was between labor and citizens 
movements. And more recently, as discussed above with the case of Kyoto, the gap between 
groups and individual participation styles have been dealt with. To overcome these major 
conflicts, participants of the Article 9 Association movements needed to become conscious of 
these conflicts at one point. They then needed to find out what were the gaps to be filled and 
worked on, which often required them to be more supportive of the ‘weaker’ side and prioritize 
their preferences. Through working together, they may find out about misunderstandings to be 
talked over, or differences that would better be accepted as is. Based on such a foundation, 
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common goals and purposes would be confirmed, helping different actors to work together on 
areas of agreement. Sometimes, as discussed in the case of Kyoto, letting differences play an 
active role rather than underplaying them brings a positive solution for different actors to utilize 
their strength to achieve a common goal. Thus, the Article 9 Association served as an important 
platform for all these efforts to play out, helping the 1960s generation of activists to overcome 
existing conflicts that were created in their own past movements. Diagram 4 captures a partial 
picture of what this network looks like: 
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Diagram 4. The network of the Article 9 Association described in Chapter IV and V 
*Node colors show types of chapters: Light blue is the headquarters; Green is local-based 
chapters; Blue is workplace/occupation-based chapters; Yellow is university chapters; and Pink 
is hobby-based chapters. (Small nodes are grassroots, and large are clearinghouse chapters.) 
**Purple nodes are external organizations with ties to respective chapters. 
**Edge colors show types of ties: Light blue is ties between the headquarters and chapters 
created via membership to the Article 9 Association; Yellow, Purple, Green, Pink are ties 
through events; Blue, Gray, and Light green are ties through membership overlap.  
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Nonetheless, the generation gap remains: For the younger generation, even for those who 
are inside of these traditional movements, the older movements seemed to have become too 
“professional”—that is, inaccessible and outmoded. Thus, the major gap for this new generation 
to overcome exists between these “professionals” and others who are “amateur” to social 
movements (Matsuda 2012). In this field of struggle, the “professionals” often means the left 
party and associated activists, and the “amateurs” includes various types who are neither 
affiliates of particular political factions nor constituencies of pre-existing citizen groups (thus 
“independent” individuals). This third field of struggle is important to explore in order to 
understand the intergenerational disconnection in social movements. Having said that, the 
development in the 2010s sheds a new light on the question of continuity in social movements. 
The following chapters discuss this point by looking at the processes through which the Article 9 
Association transcends its original generation, as it merges with the new and broader coalition. 
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CHAPTER VI.  
THE HEADQUARTERS 
 
When we nine started as the founders, what was clear was that we just wanted to 
express our will as persons who are concerned about the present and future of the 
constitution and democracy. I said at the inaugural press conference, however, if 
many people contribute their voice toward the constitution and democracy from 
their respective places in response to our voice, at the place where these voices 
meet, we would like to set our initial Article 9 Association and direct traffic. (The 
Article 9 Association 2006:12) 
 
Ōe Kenzaburō thus made his point on the role of the headquarters of the Article 9 Association. 
Since then, an unexpectedly large number of voices have been contributed from all over the 
country (and even from overseas). These voices were quickly concentrated in many different 
forms of grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association. The initial Article 9 Association soon 
became the center of a large network of the Article 9 Associations at many levels, and started to 
“direct traffic,” as Ōe expected.  
This chapter discusses below how it “directs traffic,” mainly by providing lecturers and 
organizing the national exchange meetings, and by making public appeals when they meet 
critical situations. Through these means, moreover, the headquarters functions as a symbolic and 
charismatic leadership, but also as the intelligence of the movement: It provides the movement 
slogans and goals, as well as current information and analytical tools to make sense of ongoing 
! 112!
changes in politics in relation to their activities. Thus, it keeps grassroots participants motivated 
and encouraged, while representing the entire network at the national level.
 
Promoting Constitutional Literacy 
Providing Lecturers 
One of the main roles of the headquarters in the Article 9 Association movement is to 
provide lectures. In order to promote constitutional literacy among the general public, the 
headquarters has been holding a series of lecture meetings and publishing transcriptions of these 
meetings in booklet format. It has also prepared a list of lecturers and made them available for 
grassroots chapters that want to hold their own lecture and study meetings. Most of those listed 
have volunteered to give lectures on the constitution and current events. Grassroots chapters can 
of course find a lecturer for their meetings who is not on the list, but the initial list must have 
been useful for those chapters to find someone readily available to meet their needs.  
 
Lecture Meetings and The Article 9 Association’s Constitutional Seminar Series 
The headquarters has also been hosting its own series of lectures  (Kōen-kai). The 
inaugural lecture was held on July 24, 2004 when a thousand people attended. A year later, 
95,000 people attended the 2005 meeting in Ariake Coliseum. The headquarters then initiated the 
Article 9 Association’s Constitutional Seminar series, which held ten lectures from 2006 to 2010. 
While the first two lectures established the original purpose of the Article 9 Association to mount 
a movement to protect Article 9, the seminar series provided an extended scope for the Article 9 
Association and its constitutional movement. 
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The Article 9 Association’s Constitutional Seminar was a series of lectures that discussed 
the significance of the 1946 Constitution of Japan from many different angles. At each event, 
one of the nine founders of the Article 9 Association and an expert from a different field, such as 
literature, mass media, religion, university, or civic movements gave speeches, which were 
transcribed and published in a booklet format. Clearly, this seminar series was designed to attract 
not only members of the grassroots chapters of the Article 9 Association, but also the general 
public. Among the guest speakers were Arima Raitei (the chief priest of the Ginkaku-ji and 
Kinkaku-ji Temples in Kyoto), Ikeda Kayoko (a well-known translator of German literature), 
Myōchin Miki (newspaper reporter), Teruoka Yoshiko (university professor), Yuasa Makoto 
(civic activist who organized the “Haken-mura” in 2008), Arthur Binard (writer), Katō Taichi 
(writer of children’s books), Hiraoka Takashi (former Mayor of Hiroshima city), and Takatō 
Naoko (humanitarian activist specializes in Iraq). The guest speakers were invited to present 
their activities and how they are deeply related to the constitution, especially to Article 9, but 
also to other articles such as Article 13 (the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) and 
Article 25 (the right to maintain standards of wholesome and cultured living). These speeches 
and the booklets educate listeners and readers about how the Japanese constitution protects our 
everyday life, and also how the ideal represented in Article 9 is shaping the peaceful image of 
Japan not only domestically but also internationally. 
 
Creating and Maintaining the Movement Network 
Besides promoting constitutional literacy among the general public, the headquarters has 
also been publishing regular newsletters and organizing national exchange meetings in order to 
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connect the movement participants (including the initial sponsors and secretariat members) and 
help them learn from each other. 
 
The Newsletters and Mail News 
Publication of the newsletters was one of the first activities the secretariat of the Article 9 
Association headquarters undertook. Together with the national exchange meetings, it has been 
an important tool for the headquarters to communicate its ideas with the grassroots chapters. 
Later the secretariat also began to publish an online magazine. While the newsletters literally 
carry “news” and “letters” from the headquarters addressed to the movement community, the 
digital mail magazine is more focused on advertising upcoming events hosted by the 
headquarters and its publications. Grassroots chapters can also announce their upcoming events 
through both media. In this sense, these two media are interactive communications. This is a 
mechanism through which grassroots chapters stay informed of other chapters’ activities on a 
regular basis, and the network of the Article 9 Association is maintained.  
The newsletters and digital mail magazine also carry analyses of the current political 
situation surrounding Article 9 and the constitution. When there is an important issue of concern 
to the entire Article 9 Association movement and actions are necessary, concrete suggestions for 
tackling the issue are included. Issues considered urgent for the entire Article 9 Association 
community are first highlighted in newsletters, and then discussed in the programs of the 
national exchange meetings.  
For instance, the suggestion to create grassroots chapters in school district units appeared 
some times in the newsletters, and the topic has always been given special attention in the 
discussions in the exchange meetings. This project was deemed important for the purpose of the 
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Article 9 Association, which aimed to create a movement truly rooted in the Japanese society and 
thus strived to create grassroots chapters in ‘every corner of the society.’ To make it more easily 
understandable in Japanese social context, the Association promoted the phrase “to create a 
chapter in every ‘school district’.” In fact, there is a grassroots chapter named “West Gifu 
Middle School District Article 9 Association,” whose activity was introduced in newsletter No. 
220 (Article 9 Association 2015). Except such an obvious case, however, it is difficult to know 
whether a particular grassroots chapter was created based on school district because titles of 
grassroots chapters rarely say it. Nevertheless, many grassroots chapters have been created in 
social communities with considerable face-to-face interactions among members.  
Besides such projects the headquarters promoted as a goal of the movement, the 
newsletters also communicated its directions in special circumstances. The newsletters published 
in the months after the triple disaster in March 2011 constantly carried articles on grassroots 
chapter activities to help the disaster-affected areas. The newsletter published on July 20, 2011, 
moreover, introduced an appeal published by the Fukushima Network on July 11, 2011. In the 
article titled “In facing the ‘massive man-made disaster’ at the Fukushima Daiini Nuclear 
Reactor,” the Fukushima Network stated: 
 
We as the Fukushima Prefecture Article 9 Association express our sincere 
condolences for the victims of the East Kantō Great Earthquake, and also like to 
express our sympathy for those who have been put in difficult situations due to 
the earthquake, Tsunami, and the nuclear accident.  
Especially regarding the ‘massive man-made disaster’ of the nuclear 
reactor, there is no way we could dismiss this as a matter outside the purpose of 
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establishing our prefectural chapter, as if we are bystanders. We have been close 
to those who have been evacuated due to the nuclear accident no Japanese had 
ever have experienced, whose daily lives were destroyed and thus living in a 
terrible condition, with feeling terrified about the harm of radiation to their lives 
and health day and night. Many members of the Article 9 Association in 
Fukushima are also affected. We as a local chapter cannot look away from this 
tragic reality. 
This is not all. There is something in common between the ravages of a 
war and the ‘massive man-made disaster’ of the nuclear plant at the very 
fundamental level, as they both encroach the “right to a peaceful existence,” that 
is, the “right to live in peace, away from fear and deficiency,” which is the basis 
of the Japanese Constitution Article 9. Moreover, the communities of those who 
benefit from nuclear plants who dashed for the nuclear plant line promoting the 
“safety myth” and those revisionists who scheme to make Japan once again “a 
country which can go to war” are connected by a thick subterranean stem, rooting 
in the same soil. For now, based on these situations, we the Fukushima Article 9 
Association are determined to do everything for realizing the following demands.  
One, To avoid crisis to the lives and living of the citizen of our prefecture 
and to recover the violated human rights and their daily lives without a moment’s 
delay. Especially, to carry out an immediate action to protect the lives and health 
of those who are vulnerable to radiation exposure such as children. One, An 
immediate and complete compensation for the damages suffered by the citizen of 
our prefecture, which were caused by the TEPCO and the state. One, To adhere 
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and materialize the basic principle suggested by the Prefectural Study Committee 
for Reconstruction Vision, “For making a safe, secure, and continuously 
developable society without depending on the nuclear power.” One, An objective 
examination of the historical processes that led to the nuclear accident, and a 
thorough investigation of where the social responsibility lay. The Fukushima 
Article 9 Association, sticking to the basic of our activities to protect and activate 
Article 9, would also like to take action in cooperation with those groups inside 
and outside the prefecture who share the same will, in order to achieve above 
aims. We expect that the Article 9 Associations in the prefecture also develop 
close relations with one another, and organize inventive activities, in order to 
realize these aims. Lastly, we desire that return of those affected to their 
homeland, and reconstruction of the affected Article 9 Associations will be 
realized as soon as possible. (The Article 9 Association 2011)
 
Carrying this entire article in the newsletter shows that the headquarters not only respected but 
also was willing to mobilize the entire network of the Article 9 Association in dealing with the 
nuclear plant problem. As will be discussed in the following chapters, the Association thus began 
to broaden its scope while still focused on Article 9. The contents of the national exchange 
meetings show the development. 
 
The National Exchange Meetings 
The direction shown in the newsletters are then confirmed in the national exchange 
meetings. If the newsletters are the devices for daily communication for the participants of the 
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Article 9 Association movement, the national exchange meetings are the once-in-a-while event 
for them to exchange their experiences and renew their motivations to continue their daily 
activities. It is also an opportunity for them to confirm the significance of their movement but 
also to gain new insights to place their everyday efforts in the broader social and political 
context. 
The headquarters hosted the first national exchange meeting of the Article 9 Association 
two years after its inauguration in June 10, 2006, at Nippon Seinenkan. By that time there were 
5,174 grassroots chapters of the Association across Japan, from which 1,550 people from 832 
grassroots chapters attended the conference. The oldest participant was 91 years old, and the 
youngest was 14 (The Article 9 Association 2006:116). Since this year, the headquarters 
continued to host the national exchange meeting annually to the third meeting in 2008. It then 
stopped for a few years until 2011.  
The 2006 national exchange meeting was organized in the following way: the first half 
presented eight out of the nine founders of the Article 9 Association, as well as a few reports 
from grassroots participants. Each person made a short speech. From the founders, Katō Shūichi 
pinpointed the purpose of the meeting: 
 
Japan is coming to the crossroads, where Article 9 is at the center. In short, one 
way leads to war, another leads to peace…If we take the [latter] way…we would 
be able to save human rights, and even to promote it…So we formed the Article 9 
Association two years ago. Since before, Japan had a situation with two 
characteristics. First…regarding Article 9…within the Diet, revisionists had the 
majority. But they did not outside the Diet…In any case, there has been a very big 
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gap between the Diet and the people. Second, what was going on the side of 
citizens, that is, among those people who want to protect Article 9... to begin with, 
Japan always had thriving citizens movements…but their weak point was that 
they did not have horizontal connections. Before we started the Article 9 
Association, there were reminders of scattered, small and big citizens 
movements…so, in a sense, we announced the appeal to help making a horizontal 
connection that is not a centralized power. Now we have it…then what should be 
done? Let us strengthen the horizontal connections. It is necessary for those who 
share the same purpose to know what the neighboring village is doing. It is the 
purpose of today’s meeting. (The Article 9 Association 2006:6-7) 
 
Clearly, the headquarters held the national exchange meeting in order to strengthen the 
connections between grassroots chapters that were quickly expanding at that time, by proving the 
opportunity for the participants to share their experiences. Katō’s speech also reconfirmed that 
the purpose of the Article 9 Association is to protect Article 9. In Kato’s speech, it was also 
evident that the Article 9 Association was formed to “provide a horizontal connections without 
centralized power.” The second half of the program embodied this spirit of the movement: 
For the second half the participants were divided into eleven groups, to fit the size and 
number of rooms available at the meeting place, and are small enough so that most participants 
can briefly introduce their activities in order to exchange their experiences. In these groups there 
were participants from different types and levels of chapters: Different kinds of grassroots 
chapters mingled together without being differentiated according to types or levels of their 
chapters. Hundreds of participants reported their activities in these small group sessions. In a 
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group session, for instance, a participant reported how he started his Article 9 Association 
chapter with just one other person, and now his chapter has four members (The Article 9 
Association 2006: 94). In another group a report was made on a chapter in Asakusa, a traditional 
shopping and entertainment district of Tokyo. The group that created this chapter has a long 
history that goes back to the prewar period, which called itself “Tengu-kō” (It literally means 
“the long-nosed goblin’s lecture”—the Tengu appears as an object of mountain worship in the 
Japanese legends) (The Article 9 Association 2006:103). These contrasting cases demonstrate 
that the Article 9 Association can be joined by anyone and can take any form, and they are 
treated equally. The first national exchange meeting was experimental, as much as they were 
significant for concentrating the energy of this quickly developing movement network. 
As a nationwide network with participants with a variety of professional expertise, 
moreover, the Article 9 Association is resourceful in conducting large-scale activities such as 
film production: Around the time when the third meeting was held in 2008, the Film People’s 
Article 9 Association had created the film titled “the Blue Sky of Japan,” on the life of 
constitutional scholar Suzuki Yasuzō and his journey in drafting the 1946 Japanese Constitution. 
This is partly an effort to refute a typical revisionist view of the Japanese Constitution as an 
American imposition. Through the exchange in the group sessions in the 2008 meeting, it 
became clear that many grassroots chapters were working in their respective places on the 
screening of this film. This is an example that even a large project like making of a film is 
possible for the members of the Article 9 Association because there is the professional 
filmmakers’ chapter, but also that such a non-profit film made by volunteers in a chapter can be 
screened and watched by the thousands of grassroots chapters and their members. Through 
working on such a project, neighboring grassroots chapters are able to cooperate and create and 
! 121!
strengthen their ties. In turn, the experiences can be shared in the national exchange meetings, 
and stimulate those chapters who also want to try the screening project in their areas as well. 
As participants in the national meetings exchanged their unique stories, they seemed to 
develop shared purposes to advance their movement. Speech presentations in the program often 
related to themes that the headquarters regards as important in order to advance their movement. 
In the forth meeting held in 2011, for instance, the problem of nuclear plants was certainly the 
central issue. Besides, the experiences shared in the meeting included: how to expand the impact 
of their actions on the larger population, how to win the approval from the majority for the 
petition supporting the constitution, and how to advance their tactics to create a grassroots 
chapter in each middle school district and then eventually in each primary school district. The 
program was also introducing such long-standing issues as Okinawa’s continuing struggle under 
the presence of the U.S. military bases and how to cooperate as the Article 9 Association in this 
problem. In theoretical terms, this is the event-level dynamics of networks, which is a “multiple, 
cross-cutting sets of relations sustained by conversational dynamics within social settings” 
(Mische 2003:259). In this formulation, participants of the Article 9 Association went beyond the 
local boundaries to “break the limit of densely knit groups and relate to much broader sets of 
prospective allies” (Diani 2003:17). 
 
The Regional Exchange Meetings
The headquarters has also been encouraging the grassroots chapters to hold the “block 
exchange meetings.” In general, blocks are regions of Japan that combine several prefectures, 
such as Tōhoku (North East), Hokuetsu (North West), Kantō (Central East), Kinki (Central 
West), Chūgoku (Middle West), Kyūshū, and Shikoku. Hokkaidō and Okinawa are often 
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considered separate regions because of their size and geographic isolation, but Okinawa 
sometimes is included in the Kyūshu region. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the 
networking chapters promote ties among grassroots chapters within a prefecture. Likewise, 
working together to hold regional exchange meetings promotes ties among the chapters within 
the same area. This shows that the headquarters is a furious promoter of networking: it 
encourages grassroots chapters to create and strengthen ties at all levels of the movement 
network. The network of the Article 9 Association is thus expanded and extended, and ties are 
strengthened in all possible levels and units of the Japanese society.  

Having looked at the major activities of the headquarters, it is noticeable that the Article 
9 Association’s activities are essentially experimental. The national exchange meetings and the 
constitutional seminar series seem to be held when possible but not regularly. The newsletters 
and the digital mail news have been published frequently but not exactly at regular intervals. 
Each activity seems to be organized when necessary with available resources. Grassroots chapter 
activities also show the same character.  
Nonetheless, each of the headquarters’ activities has clear objectives: Through promoting 
constitutional literacy by hosting the constitutional seminars and other lecture series open to the 
general public, the headquarters strives to enlighten the public with the significance of Article 9. 
At the same time, it works to expand and maintain the growing network of grassroots chapters 
through constant publications of the newsletters and digital mail news. Through the national 
exchange meetings, it provides the participants the opportunity to strengthen their horizontal 
connections. Thus, the headquarters functions as a symbolic and charismatic leadership, and is 
the intelligence of the movement: It provides the movement slogans and goals, as well as current 
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information and analytical tools to make sense of ongoing changes in politics in relation to their 
activities. It keeps grassroots participants motivated and encouraged, while representing the 
entire network at the national level. It also responds quickly to salient issues that arise 
occasionally and keep the movement relevant to the changing circumstances, each time through 
serious reflection on its roles and purposes in relation to the social reality.  
In these first few years of its activity, the Article 9 Association dealt with a critical 
sociopolitical juncture for the Japanese society. As Kato explained in his speech at the 2006 
national exchange meeting, Japan at that time was at the crossroad, where Article 9 was at the 
center—One way leads to war, and another leads to peace. Meanwhile, the number of grassroots 
chapters increased constantly: It counted 3,026 in 2005, 5,174 in 2006, and then 6,734 in 2007. 
What did the expansion of the Article 9 Association’s network produce? We will see in the 
following chapter the significant outcome of the everyday activities of these several thousands of 
grassroots chapters as well as of the headquarters.  
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CHAPTER VII. 
THE FIRST WATERSHED, AND THE NEW THREAT 
 
Reversal of Public Opinion on Article 9, Abe’s Resignation, and Regime Change 
The year 2007 marked the first watershed in the movement of the Article 9 Association. 
Two months prior to the second national exchange meeting held in November 24, 2007, Abe 
Shinzō had resigned Prime Minister, saying that he was seriously ill. At the opening of the 
meeting, Komori Yōichi made a victorious speech, with a new suggestion for their thriving 
movement: 
 
On September 12, all of the sudden, former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō resigned. 
On November 2, suddenly, Prime Minister Fukuda and Chairman Ozawa from the 
DPJ held a conference and made a bold statement that they would make a great 
coalition. Then on November 4, Chairman Ozawa resigned for its failure… 
dwelling in every one of these events, indeed, is the great power of accumulation 
of your grassroots activities since the establishment of the Article 9 Association 
three years ago…All the opinion polls conducted by the newspapers and other 
media published on May 3 this year, which was the 60th anniversary of the 
enactment of the constitution, reported that those who thought it is better not to 
change Article 9 was the majority. This is one of the powers that made Abe 
Shinzō’s government to fall. However, at this point, the opinion is only to keep 
Article 9. We need to make one more step forward, so that the opinion will say it 
must not be changed, and utilize Article 9, really make use of it, so that the 
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persuasion for the possibility of concrete realization of peace will begin from this 
country. We steering committee members prepared for today’s meeting to set it as 
a starting point of such a new movement. (The Article 9 Association 2007:4) 

As of 2007, there were 6,734 grassroots chapters across Japan, and participants gathered 
from all 47 prefectures of the country. The speeches of the founders in this meeting also show 
that they were enjoying the first fruit of their movement, and shared their personal reflections on 
the past three years since the association’s formation, and how to proceed to the next stage. 
Okudaira Yasuhiro, while reflecting on his own learning experiences through participating in the 
Article 9 Association, suggested that their movement should stay focused to crush the revision 
attempt: 
 
As Mr. Komori has just mentioned, the essence of the Article 9 Association is to 
protect and utilize Article 9, but it is also inevitable to meet an unexpected event 
like change of the government sometimes, as the issue of constitutional revision is 
located in the context of shifting political circumstances…it may influence our 
directions and preparation for the future. Nevertheless, the political change this 
time comes mainly from the side of ruling classes, and we could set our position 
regardless of whatever the ruling classes’ situation is…moreover, we could also 
understand that this political change would not cause any big change to the 
conservative system’s general direction toward constitutional revision, even if it 
might influence their timeline…so let’s say, we go our way…we can only do our 
best to knock down that gross outrage called constitutional revision, by staying on 
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our original line, with our reasons, by our force, to put it forward with conviction. 
(The Article 9 Association 2007:5) 
 
Katō Shūichi reflected on the difference between “to protect” and “to utilize” the 
constitution, and suggested that their movement also “utilize” the constitution in addition to 
“protect” it. Ōe Kenzaburō shared his recent experience in court where he was a defendant—he 
was sued by the bereaved family of a commander who took charge of the Japanese Imperial 
Army in the battle in Okinawa because of his book Okinawa Note, in which he described how 
the people in Okinawa were forced to commit suicide by the Army at the end of the land fighting 
in Okinawa during the Asia-Pacific War—and pointed to the significance of Article 13 (which 
secures the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) of the Japanese Constitution along 
with Article 9. Sawachi Hisae and Tsurumi Shunsuke shared their memories of Oda Makoto who 
passed away in July of the year, making the point to carry on his goal (The Article 9 Association 
2007:8-17). 
In 2008, the movement of the Article 9 Association was still on the rise: the number of 
grassroots chapters reached 7,294, and this was an increase of 493 from a year earlier. 
Meanwhile, public opinion toward amendment of Article 9 was reversing: on April 8, 2008, the 
Yomiuri Shinbun, a right leaning national newspaper, reported that the result of its national 
opinion poll showed that the number of those who think “it is better not to revise the 
constitution” exceeded the number of those who think that “it is better to reform the constitution” 
for the first time in fifteen years, although the difference was just one percent (42 for and 43 
against revision). The same newspaper had also reported a year earlier, on April 6, 2007, that its 
opinion poll found that the number of those who think that “it is better not to revise the 
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constitution” had been increasing three years in a row since 2005, while the number of those who 
think that “it is better to reform the constitution” had been decreasing. Komori Yōichi reported 
this news in his opening speech for the 2008 meeting, emphasizing that this change in public 
opinion coincided with the process of the formation and expansion of the network of the Article 
9 Association and their daily efforts to influence public opinion (the Article 9 Association 2008: 
4).  
On the other hand, the opinion polls conducted by another national newspaper Asahi 
Shinbun showed that the number of those who think Japan should keep Article 9 had decreasing 
steadily from 2001-2006, while those who think Japan should amend Article 9 was increasing. 
Then, this current stopped in 2006, and reversed course, showing a drastic shift in public opinion 
on Article 9 as shown in Table 2: 
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Table 2. The change in public opinion on Article 9 (Source: Asahi Shinbun Kikuzō II Visual 
2001-2016) 
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The percentage of those who want to keep Article 9 recovered to 66% by 2008, coinciding with 
the Yomiuri Shinbun’s report on the reversal of public opinion on constitutional revision. The 
table also shows that the opinion to keep Article 9 dipped again in 2012, and then went back up. 
I will explain in the next section why there was this second dip. 
Yamada and Kim (2016) found that opinion poll results on collective self-defense issue 
differ depending on how many options are offered as answers to questionnaires. They compared 
two questionnaires, one presenting two options of ‘approve’ and ‘disapprove’ and the other with 
three options, splitting the option of ‘approve’ into two answers presenting different means of 
approving the use of the right to collective self-defense. As a result, more respondents chose 
‘approve’ when the option was split into two. This result shows that option-splitting expands the 
respondents’ range of perception and psychological availability, which in turn raises the 
selection rate.  
There seems no bias in the result presented above that was caused by this “option-
splitting effects,” as both Yomiuri and Asahi Shinbuns provided equal number of options for 
answers to their questionnaires about revisions of constitution and Article 9. In fact, these 
questionnaires reveal that those who support constitutional amendment do not necessarily want 
to revise Article 9. Rather, some respondents were open to constitutional amendments for 
reasons other than to change Article 9, and see the need for more rights to be stipulated into the 
constitution. These series of opinion polls conducted by these two national newspapers basically 
suggest that Japanese people are open to discussion for constitutional amendment as long as it is 
to improve their rights, and they would like to keep Article 9. If an amendment must involve 
changing Article 9, however, they would rather not to touch the constitution. 
! 130!
The result could be analyzed that support for the constitution increases when the central 
government tries to force an amendment, as Abe Shinzō and his cabinet did in their first term 
(2006-2007). This suggests that the Japanese people attach great importance to democratic 
processes and do not wish an amendment without consensus. This then implies the opinion poll 
could have shown a milder change if the central government was less forceful and Abe did not 
assert so overtly his wish to change Article 9, even if the Article 9 Association did not exist. To 
begin with, however, the Article 9 Association was formed in reaction to the central 
government’s overt attempt to launch an offensive against the constitution and Article 9 through 
the establishment of the Research Commission on the Constitution in 2000. If the attitude of the 
government was the central cause to change the public opinion, support for the constitution and 
Article 9 should increase soon after 2000, without waiting the emergence of the Article 9 
Association in 2004. On the contrary, however, Table 2 shows that support for Article 9 was 
decreasing since 2001, and it is only after 2007 this trend had reversed. As stated in Komori’s 
report on 2007 Yomiuri Shinbun opinion poll, moreover, support for the constitution started to 
increase since 2005. Thus, it is more precise to understand that the opinion poll could have 
shown a milder change if the Article 9 Association movement did not emerge, even when the 
government acted in the same way. All the timings of events and factual progress presented here, 
however, suggests rather strongly that it is the emergence and expansion of the Article 9 
Association that brought about these changes in the public opinion. 
Thus, the Article 9 Association did impact public opinion: it contributed to stop the sharp 
drop in the number of those who wanted to keep Article 9 which continued in the early 2000s, 
and succeeded in recovering the support for Article 9 almost to the level it enjoyed prior to 2001. 
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Clearly, this change in the public opinion led to the 2007 resignation of Prime Minister Abe who 
had made a pledge to revise the constitution in his term.  
As public support for Article 9 sharply increased in the following years, moreover, the 
Liberal Democratic Party fell from power and the Democratic Party of Japan formed the 
government in 2009. As this new government was cautious in its dealing with the issue of 
constitutional amendment, the threat to Article 9 had been temporarily removed. The Article 9 
Association was practically dormant for a few years since, until the triple disaster in the spring of 
2011 marked the beginning of a new stage in the Article 9 Association movement.  
 
Responding to the 3.11 Triple Disaster: Expansion of the Movement Scope 
On March 11, 2011, an earthquake of magnitude 9 with massive tsunami hit the coast of 
northeastern Japan. An explosion of the nuclear power station in a small coastal town in 
Fukushima prefecture followed the already catastrophic natural disaster. This triple disaster 
shook Japan to its core. The earthquake and Tsunami took tens of thousands of lives. More lost 
their families and homes. The nuclear accident also forced tens of thousands of people to 
evacuate their home area, without knowing when they could ever return. Evacuated farmers had 
to leave their livestock and pets to go wild (some were even ordered to kill their cattle). 
Fishermen were unable to catch fish because of the loss of the marine facilities, but also because 
the ocean was contaminated with radioactive substances. Such a terrible destruction of livelihood 
caused many otherwise unnecessary deaths including suicides. The DPJ-led coalition 
government, under Prime Minister Kan Naoto who had taken over Hatoyama Yukio who was 
forced to resign after his bold declaration to remove the US bases from Okinawa, had to deal 
with this unprecedented scale of disaster, while struggling to maintain its position in the Diet. In 
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the face of the major catastrophe, and the fear of nuclear contamination spreading across the 
country in particular, the government and the Tokyo Electronic Power Company (TEPCO) that 
runs the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station were unable to satisfy the needs of those 
affected.  
This situation brought about a significant change in public opinion on Article 9: In 2011, 
the support for Article 9 dropped from 67% to 59% since year before, and then to 43% in the 
following year (see Table 2). Since the triple disaster, the central issue temporarily shifted from 
constitutional revision to national recuperation. Amid the massive relief and support efforts of 
the whole country, rescue operation of the SDF was perceived as helpful and this promoted the 
image of the SDF as a necessary system for national safety. This was an important factor for the 
change in public opinion, as attempts to revise Article 9 always involve promotion of the SDF. In 
fact, a similar phenomenon was observed after the Great Hanshin Earthquake. It can also be read 
as a reflection of the declining support for the DPJ government, and the recovery of the LDP 
paradigm, which promotes the SDF as a military force.
Thus, the 3.11 disaster caused a major shift in the political and social context of Japanese 
society that in turn created a new political threat/opportunity within which new social 
mobilization arose. For the first month after the disaster, a depressively silent atmosphere 
surrounded Japanese society as though the people had lost their sense of direction, while rescue 
efforts by the SDF and local firemen were broadcast continuously to promote national unity 
toward a quick recovery. Gradually, however, those who felt such a situation was incongruous 
started to express their discontent. The first demonstration suddenly appeared in a local area 
called Kōenji in Tokyo in April 10, 2011. Surprisingly to many, the demonstration was 
organized by a group of people in their late thirties to early forties, instead of sixties and 
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seventies. Moreover, the demonstration staged rock bands on a big truck, leading the queue of 
more than a thousand of people throughout the course. This “Stop the Nuclear Power 
Station!!!!!” demonstration hosted by now famous Shirōto no ran (Amateur’s Riot) was followed 
by numerous anti-nuclear demonstrations that were organized by different groups of the younger 
generation. Among these groups, there were people who later organized the Metropolitan 
Coalition Against Nukes, or Hangenren, that has been holding the weekly rally in front of the 
Prime Minister’s official residence continuously since March 2012 (see also Chapter VIII). 
The triple disaster also struck many members of the grassroots chapters in Fukushima, 
Miyagi, and other affected areas. This called for the reactivation of the Article 9 Association and 
its fourth national exchange meeting. The disaster made the participants of the Article 9 
Association movement rethink their position, especially the adequacy of their “one issue joint 
struggle” under the slogan of protecting Article 9. Participants of the Article 9 Association 
movement tackled difficult questions personally as well as collectively: How does the nuclear 
plant problem relate to Article 9 and the Constitution? How should the Article 9 Association deal 
with the problem? Is it right to deal with this problem as the Article 9 Association at all? A large 
part of the fourth meeting, which was held on November 19, 2011, was spent on these new 
questions.  
The program had many reports from the grassroots chapters that had been dealing with 
these issues, as well as from those who had been directly affected by the tsunami and nuclear 
accident. Naturally, speeches of the founders also addressed the event and how it is related to 
Article 9 and the constitution. Ōe spoke directly on this theme in a talk entitled “the Culture of 
the Constitution and ‘Fukushima’”: 
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Underlying [the culture of the constitution] are what the Japanese had done in 
Asia, experienced such a devastation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Tokyo was 
also burnt…Most importantly, the Japanese people became the first to experience 
the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the suffering of the 
survivors still continues today. This fact itself makes the unique character of our 
postwar culture, which we think should never repeat it…Today, however, a big 
question is posed to the essence of the culture. The question asks, whether we 
truly remember the principle which…made this constitution inevitable. The 
question comes from ‘Fukushima.’ It asks, there were ‘Hiroshima’ and then 
‘Nagasaki,’ and now there is ‘Fukushima’… ‘Fukushima’ was not caused by an 
atomic attack from a foreign country. But children in ‘Fukushima’ were forced to 
live with a broad and deep anxiety without knowing what would happen to them 
in twenty or thirty years, due to internal exposure to radiation. This is what the 
Japanese carried on our shoulders by having the nuclear plants coexist with the 
culture of the constitution. Facing this, based on our present culture of the 
constitution, how could the Japanese start over, to lead it to a fundamental 
change? We must examine this as the culture, which we ourselves created based 
on the present constitution, show it to the world, and, above all, reconsider it as 
something to pass on to our children’s generation. For this, we must do everything 
we can to keep the damage in Fukushima minimal, and to never repeat it in this 
country where are many nuclear plants. We must connect it practically to our 
clear attitude. And all of you, who live in many different places confirming this as 
a constitutional problem, would be reconfirming such thoughts together. I feel the 
! 135!
significance of this gathering more strongly than ever. (The Article 9 Association 
2011: 2-5)
 
The topic of the 3.11 disaster was discussed in virtually all group sessions. The report 
given by the chief secretary of the Miyagi Onagawa Article 9 Association shows the extent to 
which the disaster impacted the membership of the chapter: 830 out of 10,000 residents of 
Onagawa city had lost their lives on that day. Among them were more than 20 members of the 
reporter’s chapter, including the vice chair of the chapter (The Article 9 Association 2011:16). 
Many of the survivors, including the reporter himself, had lost their houses and were living in 
temporary housing. There also were many who took shelter with relatives in other prefectures.  
Under such a circumstance, the network created through the activities of the Article 9 
Association functioned unexpectedly as a safety net. A speaker from Sōma, one of the cities 
most severely affected by the nuclear accident in Fukushima prefecture, reported that the 
network built through the activities of the Article 9 Association helped the evacuees to recover 
contact with each other. The communication between the members of his chapter was lost at 
once, due to the forced evacuation after the explosion of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Reactor. 
By gathering personal contact information shared among the chapter members one by one after 
some months of the separation, they were finally able to find each other and resume contacts. 
This effort was started by one man who was a member of a local grassroots chapter called the 
Odaka Article 9 Association in Fukushima prefecture. Three months after settling in his shelter 
in Saitama prefecture, he and his wife started to call the phone numbers that were in their mobile 
phones. They collected their friends’ new addresses and made a newsletter with greetings, 
asking, “how are you folks from Kawafusa?” This mail encouraged the evacuees tremendously; 
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in turn those who received this newsletter by mail sent their digital photos and the contact 
information of their friends who are also from the town, some with stamps and money so that 
they could contribute to the publication of more newsletters. This touching story caught the mass 
media’s attention: It was picked up first with one newspaper, then a national TV station, and 
eventually introduced in the NHK world news to be broadcasted in 120 countries (The Article 9 
Association 2011:31-33). This case demonstrates the significance of these locally embedded and 
well-connected human networks—when disaster strikes our communities, these networks are 
most necessary for the people who are affected and in need of help and assistance. Where the 
communities are strong, people’s life chances are better (Aldrich and Meyer 2014). 
Undoubtedly, the 2011 national exchange meeting set the tone that the problem of 
nuclear power stations is closely related to the constitution and that the Article 9 Association 
should deal with the issue as their own problem. In fact, Ōe and Sawachi from the headquarters 
were already active in the new anti-nuclear movement at this point. Many grassroots chapters 
were also starting to hold anti-nuclear events in their own areas. Thus, the Article 9 Association 
had started to expand the scope of its movement while still focused on Article 9. 
 
Collaborating with the Revisionists against the New National Security Bills 
As public opinion on Article 9 foretold, the year 2011 became the last year of the short-
lived DPJ government. Clearly, the Japanese people were not satisfied with the government’s 
dealing with the 3.11 triple disaster, and it fell from power in the 2012 national election. Instead, 
however, the LDP came back in power to form the second Abe cabinet. A change of the 
government happened, once again, when public opinion on Article 9 was reversed: in 2012, 44% 
thought Article 9 should be amended, while 43% wanted to keep it (see Table 2). 
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This meant the new challenge for the Article 9 Association, as the formation of the 
second Abe cabinet revived the issue of constitutional revision. The Article 9 Association was 
facing the renewed effort to revise the constitution with fewer resources at the national level, 
despite its many chapters. Four out of the nine founders, including Katō Shūichi, Oda Makoto, 
Inoue Hisashi, and Miki Mutsuko had passed away by that time and Tsurumi Shunsuke was 
seriously ill. The four remaining founders, Ōe Kenzaburō, Sawachi Hisae, Okudaira Yasuhiro, 
and Umebara Takeshi, were also getting older, although they were still active and Ōe and 
Sawachi had been playing central roles in the new anti-nuclear movement. The participants in 
many grassroots chapters were also aging. The headquarters had to concentrate all its efforts to 
mobilize new resources outside the original network in order to advance its movement to prevent 
revision of the constitution. 
Showing the initiatives to deal with the new circumstances, the headquarters held a press 
conference and announced a new appeal titled “Let us voice our opposition to create ‘the war-
waging country’ by exercising the right to collective defense” on October 7, 2013. The 
newsletter carried it on the following day: 
 
The Japanese constitution is now facing a great trial. This is because 
Prime Minister Abe, while persisting on constitutional revision by calling it his 
“historical mission,” has started a runaway move toward ‘the war-waging 
country’ by changing the constitutional interpretation of the exercise of the right 
to collective defense, which has been perceived as “unacceptable” under 
successive cabinets.  
Clearly, exercising the right to collective defense, which allows Japan to 
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participate in wars abroad together with the United States even when Japan was 
not a subject of an armed attack, is a great deviation from the interpretation of the 
successive government which limited “self defense” to the “minimum and 
necessary scope.” Moreover, it regards the US-Japan Security Treaty as “a public 
property for the stability and prosperity of the whole world” (Ministry of Defense, 
The Interim Report on the Examination of the Ways Defense Capacity Ought To 
Be). This is not to create a system to defend Japan or the United States, but to 
make armed interventions in any region and country in the world possible.  
This is an attempt to make it possible to revise the constitution which 
ought to be approved by the super majority in the both Houses in the Diet and 
majority of the national referendum just by a cabinet decision. For this purpose, 
the government has even replaced the Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation 
Bureau, who has long been supporting the interpretation of the constitution that 
regarded exercise of the right to collective defense as unconstitutional. This is 
nothing but the modus operandi Vice Prime Minister Asō admired and wanted to 
learn from: the way in which the Nazis stopped the Weimar Constitution. This 
pulls down constitutionalism from its basis, which we never are able to accept.  
This is not all. The Abe cabinet is intensifying its aggressive character to 
change the Self-Defense Force into military to fight in wars, by removing all the 
restrictions to use of force abroad, and by revising the National Defense Program 
Guidelines to include “the function of the Marines” and “the capability to attack 
enemy’s strategic bases.” 
It is also setting foot on its plan to create ‘the war-waging country.’ The 
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Abe cabinet has already been planning to submit new bills, such as “the Secret 
Protection Act” (officially the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated 
Secrets) which conceals information related to defense and diplomacy from the 
people and concentrate great authority to the Prime Minister, and establishment of 
the Japanese version of the National Safety Council and other related bills, to the 
extraordinary session of the Diet. The LDP’s “A Basic Law on National Security” 
not only aims to prioritize these national security policies in “the fields of 
education, scientific technology, transportation, communication, and other areas 
of internal affairs” in order to “preserve and cultivate” munitions industry, but 
also requires cooperation to these policies as an “obligation of the nation.” If we 
accept this, the contents of the revision of Article 9 in “The Draft for an 
Amendment of the Japanese Constitution” published by the LDP in last April will 
mostly be realized without touching the text of the constitution.  
Moreover, the current situation is piled with other problems such as the 
nuclear accident in Fukushima, irresponsibility and abandonment of people who 
were affected by the accident, and exporting of nuclear plants.  
In the prewar period, the Japanese people had the bitter experience to be 
gradually dragged into the quagmire of aggressive wars, being deprived of all 
means for resistance. However, today the Japanese people are the sovereign who 
has the highest power to deal with the national policy, but also has the Japanese 
Constitution with Article 9 to boast to the world, which was created based on the 
lessons learned from the aggressive war. Now, let us hold hands on the single 
point to protect the Japanese Constitution and stand up for the action to surround 
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the Abe Cabinet who walks away from the lessons of history with the public 
opinion from the grassroots level, and prevent its runaway. (The Article 9 
Association 2013, the Newsletter No. 176) 
 
Just as this appeal had warned, the bills to establish a National Security Council passed 
the House of Representatives on November 7, 2013, and the discussion moved on to the House 
of Councillors. On the same day, the Secrets Protection Act (commonly known in English as the 
State Secrets Act) was also submitted to the House of Representatives. At the end of the year, the 
latter bill was forcefully passed into law. Building on the analysis of the current situation as 
published in the appeal above, the fifth national exchange meeting held on November 16, 2013, 
tackled this problem squarely. The program of the meeting also showed that the struggle of the 
Article 9 Association had entered a new phase. At the opening speech of the meeting, Komori 
Yōichi explained the purpose of the new national security bills submitted by the Abe cabinet: 
 
To establish the National Security Council means more than just a creation of a 
new council. This council is in fact a national organ that enables the Prime 
Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Defense Minister, and the Foreign 
Minister alone to decide about Japan’s national policy on foreign and security 
issues. In short, it is an organ that decides on everything about military actions. 
Naturally, it will share military information with the United States. In their logic, 
this is the reason why the Secrets Protection Act is necessary. Once this bill is 
passed, there will be more bills with much more complete picture regarding the 
national security. Then, once they’ve gotten all together, by the cabinet decision 
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alone, the Self-Defense Force will be enabled to use military force abroad, and we 
will be heading straight to a “the war-waging country.” This is what is meant by 
“tolerating to exercise the right of collective self defense”…now, everything 
depends on whether we would be able to accurately understand what is going on 
day by day, and turn it into words based on the appeal of the Article 9 Association 
published on October 7th, 2013, and to communicate this word of the Article 9 
Association to as many Japanese people as possible (The Article 9 Association 
2013:4)
 
Komori thus explained the situation for the participants of the meeting, calling for prompt 
and accurate communicative actions at the grassroots level of the Article 9 Association in order 
to repel the situation. In their speeches, three of the remaining founders, Ōe Kenzaburō, Sawachi 
Hisae, and Okudaira Yasuhiro, also discussed the urgency of the current political circumstances. 
Okudaira pinpointed: 
 
The Secrets Protection Act…basically, we should never pass it. Passing it will 
invite a disaster. If we pass it, from the viewpoint of the constitutional revision, it 
would mean that the inner moat is filled. This is the purpose of the bill…So this is 
not a kind of problem to fix here or there, but it has a symbolic meaning…We 
must stand firm here, and bury it. We can only concentrate much more on this 
[bill]…let’s fight against it! (The Article 9 Association 2013:5-8) 
 
Following Okudaira, Sawachi also criticized the Secrets Protection Act: 
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I have read the entire articles of the Secrets Protection Act. It did not make sense 
after many times of reading. It says “for special use,” but nothing is specified. The 
penalty for someone who committed in any way to a leak of secret information 
would be ten years or five years’ imprisonment, or ten million or five million yen. 
I’ve never heard of such an unlimited law that can do anything…The essence of 
this bill is that, Japan volunteers to take the role which the United States wants 
Japan to do.  

Sawachi also discussed the government attempt to revise the Article 96: 
 
How can the constitution be amended? The constitution requires the super 
majority of the both Houses of Representatives and Councilors’ agreement, in 
order to proceed to a national referendum. This is Article 96. And the national 
referendum requires a majority vote [to amend the constitution]. A national 
referendum has never been called even once, in the 68 years since the end of 
World War II. So they’ve come up with this idea of changing Article 96…The 
government wants to ignore the Japanese people’s attachment to Article 9. They 
want to make the procedure to change the constitution easier. But they’ve seen the 
spread of something seems to be citizens movement and noticed that it is not so 
easy. So the government thought that it could go around the constitution by 
watering it down…And now, when I think of what the government is trying to do 
by creating such a law as the Secrets Protection Act, I think it is only reasonable 
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to fight against this reactionary government. (The Article 9 Association 2013:9-
10) 
 
In her speech, Sawachi also made connections between the current crisis of constitution and the 
government’s irresponsible handling of problems of American military bases in Okinawa and the 
nuclear plants in Fukushima. Throughout her speech, she made a point that her firsthand 
experience as a fourteen years old patriotic girl whose entire family was abandoned in Manchuria 
by the imperial Japan made her totally distrustful of the state. She met the moment when “the 
state, military, and everything related to them disappeared completely.” (2013:12) Since then, 
she believes that a nation can only exist with the people who compose it, and that the rights of 
individuals are most significant.
  Following Sawachi, Ōe made a speech about “the most fundamental morals” we must 
protect: 
 
I would like to speak of two French words. First is “libre examen,” which means 
to examine freely. This is the most important word of French renaissance…the 
cultural core of the human attitude in the sixteenth century…was this spirit of free 
examination. My teacher, Kazuo Watanabe, once spoke of it… “If you thought 
that the state of the particular era, and the ways of the particular country and 
society were inhumane, you should examine them thoroughly and change them. 
This is the most humane way of living. This is the fundamental essence to live as 
a human.” I agreed completely… Another French expression I would like to 
show…an expression used by a writer called Milan Kundera… “What we must 
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do. There is only one thing those who are currently alive must do…that is, to pass 
on this world we currently live in to the next generation without destroying it. 
That is our fundamental moral”… in French used by Kundera, “la moral de 
l’essentiel.” We must protect this fundamental moral. To turn this world into a 
place where next generation cannot live in with radioactive substances is against 
the fundamental moral as a human being. How do we protect our constitution 
now? In the tension felt in today’s international situation, how do we protect our 
future using the current constitution? That is what we have reconfirmed today in 
our meeting. (The Article 9 Association 2013:13-15) 
 
In his speech, Ōe also made connections between the problems of the constitutional revision and 
nuclear plants, pointing out that revising Article 9 and maintaining nuclear plants are both 
against the fundamental human morality. Thus, Komori and three remaining founders of the 
Article 9 Association made a strong point on why the Article 9 Association must tackle the 
Secrets Protection Act and other new national security bills. 
These discussions were followed by a symposium on the “right to collective defense and 
the constitution” chaired by Watanabe Osamu, professor emeritus of political science at 
Hitotsubashi University and a member of the Article 9 Association secretariat. The other invited 
participants were Urata Ichirō, professor of constitutional law at Meiji University, and 
Yanagisawa Kyōji, former Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary. Urata is a constitutional scholar 
who opposes constitutional revision, and Yanagisawa is a former elite officer in the Defense 
Ministry who took charge of dispatching the SDF to Iraq in the 2000s. This shows a new 
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important direction for the movement of the Article 9 Association: cooperation with those who 
takes different positions regarding the constitution and Article 9.  
As this symposium has shown, both supporters of the constitution and advocates of 
revision found the forceful approach of the government unacceptable. Especially the 
government’s attempt to skip the legal processes for revising the constitution by rewriting Article 
96, which requires an approval of the super majority of the both houses of the National Diet and 
majority of a national referendum to amend the constitution, angered even those who believed in 
the necessity of constitutional reform. The Abe Cabinet revealed this plan as soon as it had won 
more than two-third of the seats in the National Diet with the LDP and CGP together in 2012 
House of Representative election. To their surprise, however, gainst this move of the 
government, thirty-six academics in the fields of law and politics, including Kobayashi Setsu, a 
professor of law at Keiō University and a well-known revisionist, formed The Article ‘96’ 
Association on May 8, 2013. With Higuchi Yōichi, a professor of constitutional law at Tokyo 
University as the representative, the thirty-six founders of this new organization included those 
who are also participants of the Article 9 Association movement such as Yamaguchi Jirō, a 
professor of political science at the Hōsei University, who formed a chapter in Hokkaidō 
University before he moved to Hōsei, but also Okudaira Yasuhiro, Komori Yōichi, and 
Watanabe Osamu from the headquarters. From the title of this new organization, moreover, it is 
clear that the Article 9 Association was an inspiration for its formation. Both revisionists and 
supporters of the constitution understood the current political circumstances as “the crisis of the 
rule of law,” and began to take a positive attitude toward collaborations under this new 
realization. The founding appeal of the Article 96 Association stated:
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 Revision of the Constitution Article 96, by which the procedure of a 
constitutional amendment is stipulated, is going to be an issue of this coming 
House of Councilor election in summer.  
 It is required to gain the support of the super majority of both houses of 
the Diet to propose a constitutional amendment, but the government wants to 
change it so that only majority is required. It is clear that this move of the LDP 
and its surroundings is for making an amendment of the fundamental principle of 
the constitution, such as the preamble which holds up the government by “the 
people’s solemn trust” as an “universal principle of human race”; Article 9 which 
lays down pacifism; as well as Article 13 which shows the foundation of human 
rights by stipulating the value of individual, easier.  
 Especially, whether we would be able to protect Article 96 is not only the 
matter of technical procedure, but is a serious problem that directly relates to the 
constitutionalism, which makes a constitution that restricts power. Prime Minister 
Abe and his friends say that, loosening the necessary condition for constitutional 
amendment will allow more frequent national referendum and thus this is a 
reform to strengthen people’s power. But this is a trick. To enable less people to 
touch the constitution will only unjustly strengthen the power of politicians…To 
loosen the restriction for constitutional amendment provided by Article 96 by 
using Article 96 itself means a challenge against the very reason of the existence 
of constitution.  
 We understand that the logic used for an amendment of Article 96 is a 
runaway of those who won, only by chance, the majority in the last national 
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election [which was ruled unconstitutional], which ignores the reason of the 
existence of constitution, and to interfere the people’s rightful use of their right to 
amend the constitution, and therefore we call for an opposition movement against 
it. Toward the coming House of Councilors election, we broadly call for your 
participation in this voice against a revision of Article 96. 
 
The thirty-six founders of The Article 96 Association signed this appeal published on May 23, 
2013. The current of broader collaboration has been continuing to grow under the third Abe 
Cabinet that finally brought the right of collective defense on the table of discussion at the 
National Diet. 
 
The “Coup d’état” and the Article 9 Association 
As the Abe Cabinet pressed the national security bills to enable the country’s 
participation in wars abroad, a more collaborative atmosphere to protect the constitution has been 
forming. The government’s attempt in 2013 to revise Article 96 had come to a deadlock due to 
the unexpectedly powerful counterattack from the newly formed Article 96 Association that held 
up the cause of “constitutionalism.” On July 1, 2014, however, a cabinet decision was made to 
permit exercising the right of collective defense. Most constitutional scholars pointed out that 
this was a violation of the constitution, and a group called the Save Constitutional Democracy 
Japan (hereafter “the SCDJ”) was formed in opposition to the cabinet decision. Sixty-seven 
academics are co-founders of this group, and as of August 2016, it has 2,250 sponsors with 
various occupations, varying from musician to university professors. Many also claimed this 
action was a “coup d’état” by the government from a legal viewpoint. Against such “non-
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constitutional” (Ishikawa 2015:58-69) actions of the government, more previously silent 
segments of the society started to act. A students’ group called SEALDs (Students Emergency 
Act for Liberal Democracy) and a mothers’ group called “Mama no kai” (or “Mothers Against 
Wars,” hereafter “the MAW”) under the slogan “We will not let anyone’s child get killed” 
attracted the most media attention. Scholars also formed another group called Association of 
Scholars Opposed to the Security-related Laws (hereafter “the ASOSL”), with overlapping 
membership with the Article 96 Association and the SCDJ. As of August 2016, it has 14,297 
academics and 32,246 citizens sponsors.
To join forces with these growing movements, traditionally separated movement 
organizations and political parties on the left finally came together. Watanabe Osamu from the 
headquarters revealed how this could be realized in his lecture at the Kamakura Article 9 
Association in Kanagawa prefecture, on November 21, 2015: 
 
For the first time in fifty-five years since the struggle against the US-Japan 
Security Treaty, cooperation between movement organizations was realized as the 
United Steering Committee (Sougakari kōdō jikkō iinkai, hereafter “Sougakari”). 
How is this so epoch-making? Whatever effort was made, the DPJ and JCP could 
not cooperate. The SDP and JCP could not, either. Not to mention labor unions 
such as Rengō, Zenrōren, and Zenrōkyō. So, this time, since those sweetened 
bean pastes seemed unable to come together, it wrapped them all together with a 
big manjū skin (manjū is a kind of Japanese-style bun usually stuffed with 
sweetened bean paste). This is Sougakari. First, there is a steering committee 
called “Anti-War Committee of 1000.” Mr. Fukuyama, one of the co-
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representatives of the Rengō Peace Forum, is a member of this group. There is 
also “Cooperative Center for Protecting and Utilizing the Constitution.” Zenrōren 
and the JCP are official members of this center. Finally, there is “Steering 
Committee Against Destruction of the Constitution Article 9 through 
Interpretations,” of which more than hundred citizens groups are members. These 
three groups work together as one steering committee. In this activity, by the 
strong initiative of the [Rengō] Peace Forum, the DPJ came out to fight against 
the war bill. The JCP was already in. The SDP acted within this steering 
committee. Thus, the SDP, JCP, and DPJ were able to cooperate for the first time. 
This was indeed the fruit of much effort. (Kamakura Article 9 Association 
2016:5-6)
 
The five groups, the SCDJ, SEALDs, MAW, ASOSL, and Sougakari, eventually formed Civil 
Alliance for Peace and Democracy (hereafter “the CAPD”), in order to unite the forces that 
demand abolition of the national security laws and restoration of constitutionalism. 
These developments in the mid-2010s surrounding the constitution are once again urging 
the Article 9 Association to get back to the basics of their movement. The headquarters has 
welcomed Ozawa Ryūichi, a professor of law at the Jikei Medical College, as an addition to the 
secretariat, in order to strengthen the actual working unit. While holding several press 
conferences at the National Diet, the headquarters published an appeal on November 13, 2015, 
calling for a focused campaign: 
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Many have stood up for various actions to fight against the war bill [the national 
security bills]…Facing the problem to abolish the war bill which is a violation of 
Article 9, let us resume our campaigns and study sessions targeting all the people 
in all places. Let us also hold out for putting forward our effort to expand our 
movement in each local area and field, utilizing the collaborative circle we have 
cultivated through our campaign against the war bill. It is also important to 
support each other and exchange with the neighboring chapters so that your 
activities will be revitalized. Let us actively take part in movements that are 
important for the purpose of protecting Article 9, such as the petition campaign to 
abolish the war bill and the movement against building the new U.S. base in 
Okinawa. Let us participate as the Article 9 Association in rallies on these issues 
that will be held in various local areas. (The Article 9 Association 2015) 
 
This, together with the discussions in 2013 national exchange meeting, shows that the Article 9 
Association has been expanding to related issues in this new situation while still squarely 
focused on the threat to Article 9 and mobilizing their huge audience for the broader fight. 
Grassroots chapters acted in cooperation with this appeal and began mounting new activities 
tackling squarely the security bills, noting that this is a decisive point in their struggle to protect 
the constitution and Article 9. In the newsletter published on November 1st, 2013, for instance, 
the Nerima Article 9 Association in Tokyo reported that eight new grassroots chapters were 
formed in their area, and that these new chapters held film screening of The Blue Sky of Japan, 
in which more than 120 people participated (The Article 9 Association 2015, Newsletter 
No.220). Some grassroots chapters organized public lectures on the issue of national security, 
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inviting experts such as Magosaki Ukeru, a former chief of the Foreign Ministry Intelligence and 
Analysis Service. Others organized smaller gatherings to listen to members’ personal wartime 
experiences and to discuss about the security bills. As such, countless grassroots activities were 
conducted nationwide as a part of the broader fight against the new national security bill. With 
Sawachi Hisae’s leadership, moreover, participants of the Article 9 Association and also others 
who support the cause started a new demonstration to hold up a placard that says “We will not 
tolerate Abe politics,” calligraphy of which was done by Kaneko Tōta, a famous haiku poet, on 
the third of every month. The first of these demonstrations was held on November 2015, in 
numerous locations across the country. Some activities of the Article 9 Association are thus 
intertwined with various related activities, and making distinction is becoming more difficult as 
the issue of constitutional revision grows into the concern of the broader citizens and their 
coalition movement (Diagram 5): 
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Diagram 5. Development of new coalition network surrounding the headquarters 2011-2015 
*The dark green node represents the new anti-nuclear movement since 2011, with numerous 
group and individual participants; the purple node represents the network of Article 96 
Association with 36 founders and other supporters since 2013; the olive green node represents 
the Save Constitutional Democracy Japan since 2014; the violet node represents SEALDs 
(Students emergency Action for Liberal Democracy); the pink node represents the Mothers 
Against Wars; the light green node represents the Association of Scholars Opposed to the 
Security-related Laws; the light blue node represents Sougakari; and the yellow node represents 
Civil Alliance for Peace and Democracy since 2015. 
**The blue edges are ties between members of the headquarters; the dark green edges are ties 
created through anti-nuclear events since 2011; the pink edges are ties through shared 
membership; the purple edges are ties created through membership to the Article 96 Association 
since 2013; the olive green edge shows Komori’s membership to the SCDJ since 2014; the light 
green edges show Komori and Watanabe’s membership to the ASOSL; the orange edges are ties 
created through events against the National Security Bills; the light blue edge shows Takada’s 
personal involvement in Sougakari steering committee; and the red ties show alliance among the 
SCDJ, SEALDs, MAW, ASOSL, and Sougakari since 2015. 
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Coinciding with these expanded activities of the Article 9 Association since 2011, 
moreover, public opinion on Article 9 have once again recovered from 43% in 2012 to 68% in 
2016 (see Table 2). According to the opinion poll conducted by the Kyōdō News in 2016, 
moreover, 75% answered that Article 9 was the reason Japan did not use force abroad for 71 
years since the end of war, whereas only 22% answered that there was no correlation. Further, in 
the same survey, 55% were against constitutional revision under Abe and his government (Tokyo 
Shinbun October 29, 2016). It is clear in these numbers that most Japanese people have high 
confidence in the role of Article 9 to keep their country from participating in wars abroad, and 
that they wish to maintain the present state of their country.  
As it engages in these activities, the headquarters spontaneously began merging with the 
new and broader coalition, which is inseparable from movement spillover processes: 
 
…‘[S]ocial movement spillover’ can be understood as a problem of bounding 
networks and porous network boundaries. Meyer and Whittier (1994) define 
social movement spillover where movements’ boundaries become indistinct as 
they address themselves to overlapping policies and overlapping participants or 
potential participants. Krinsky (2007) suggests that cases of spillover and 
coalitions be understood together, on a continuum from uncoordinated to fully 
coordinated action, and from the kind of coalitions that develop through shared 
claim-making and those that develop through shared organizational, purposive 
activity. What counts is not just the presence of a tie, but its content and its 
patterns. (Krinsky and Crossley 2014:8) 
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Through such processes, the Article 9 Association, which was a coalition of some of the most 
connected leaders in Japanese social movements today, was able not only to adapt to the 
changing political situation, but also to claim a high centrality in the new coalition movement at 
its formative stage.  
Nonetheless, this was possible eventually as the result of the endless mediating efforts at 
all levels of the network, which have continued since decades before the formation of the Article 
9 Association in 2004. Each of these continuous efforts was accumulated and accelerated given 
the most suitable platform called the Article 9 Association. By concentrating their effort on 
overcoming the conflicts within the supporters of the constitution and Article 9, participants of 
the Article 9 Association movement laid the foundation for the new, broader coalition 
movements to develop in later years.  
 
 
 
 
 


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
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CHAPTER VIII. 
THE ARTICLE 9 ASSOCIATION IN THE NEW GENERATION 
 
Building on the network of the 1960s political generation, participants of the Article 9 
Association have created its vast network with real impact in politics. On the other hand, the 
movement has been missing younger participants (except those students with some ties to 
Minsei), although reaching the younger generation has always been a major objective for the 
Article 9 Association. Even though the triple disaster in March 2011 awakened activism in many 
of the younger generation, those who became active in the new anti-nuclear movements did not 
automatically connect to the Article 9 Association that deals with the constitution and Article 9.  
However, the situation has started to change in recent years. As these younger activists 
hang around the Diet building longer, and think more seriously about how to change politics, 
they began to take in other problems than the nuclear power, such as social security cutback and 
constitutional revision. It did not take too long for them to realize that issues they face now as 
their own problem are interrelated, and in fact derive from the same root cause: violation of the 
constitution by the government. Once the issue of national security became salient, these rallies 
to oppose their respective issues started to surround the Diet building with the sense that they are 
all dealing with constitutional problems. As they stood together for a shared purpose, moreover, 
the old and new generations started to develop mutual trust, and to collaborate in creating events 
and establishing new groups and organizations. 
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Emergence of the New Generation of Activists after March 2011 
To most observers of Japanese society, the new anti-nuclear movement that started after 
March 2011 was a sudden surge of social movement activity. Indeed, it was the largest of a few 
clearly ‘visible’ contentious movements in the last decades. This new anti-nuclear movement 
was able to attract younger participants from the start; rather, the movement was started and 
maintained by relatively younger people in thirties and forties, which is about the age of the 
children of the 1960s generation, who are now in their sixties and seventies. 
When I arrived in Japan for fieldwork in September 2011, the new anti-nuclear 
movement was quickly developing. There still was a sort of feverish atmosphere surrounding the 
issue, apart from the quietly ongoing political moves to change the constitution and Article 9. 
The government was still under the DPJ-led coalition at that time, and the political priority was 
also of course the national recuperation. Naturally, the new anti-nuclear movement developed 
into a single-issue struggle for some citizens groups.  
There were numerous activities against the nuclear plants and the dealing of the 
government with it. After a while, the Friday Protest, which was organized by the group called 
Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes, or Hangenren, which has been held every Friday night in 
front of the Prime Minister’s official residence continuously since March 2012, became the locus 
of the new movement, in which all generation of individuals could participate. Participants of the 
Article 9 Association also took part individually in these rallies. This Friday Protest, and some 
other major activities organized by the people around Hangenren, had a clearly different style 
from the older movements: most notably, they staged live music performance on a truck to lead 
demonstrations, followed by fashionably dressed participants holding eye-catching signs and 
placards (not flags), and instruments to make sounds. Young parents also took their children to 
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walk with them in these demonstrations. In short, they were much more stylish and approachable 
from the viewpoint of the younger generation as compared with conventional demonstrations. 
Even though it was for a short while, a series of these demonstrations were held in central Tokyo 
such as Shibuya and Shinjuku where young people like to stroll. Together with the salience of 
the issue itself, this changed the people’s perception of demonstrations and social movements, 
especially in the eyes of younger Japanese. 
Besides the Friday Protest and other demonstrations uniquely organized by the new 
generation, longstanding activists with some of the well-known leaders also organized large 
central rallies on the issue. Ōe Kenzaburō and Sawachi Hisae from the Article 9 Association 
headquarters were among them. At first, mostly traditional social movement groups and 
organizations participated in these events. As Hangenren grew into a large coalition organization 
with many citizens groups, its leadership started to collaborate with these more formal 
movements. Their largest rally attracted more than sixty thousand participants.  
Through these collaborations, the new generation of activists began to merge with the 
older generation. When the opposition campaign against restarting the Ōi Nuclear Reactor in 
Fukui prefecture was at its peak in July 2012, more than a few times I came across tweets posted 
by young people thanking the older people for rallying during the daytime when they are 
working or attending school, and saying that they will take their place starting from evening.
 
Political Process since the Return of the LDP Government 
As noted earlier, the LDP returned to power in 2012 and the second Abe cabinet was 
formed. While the opposition movement against the nuclear plants was in full swing and the 
issue was at a standstill, the government proceeded with its plan to introduce a radical change to 
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Japan. The ruling LDP, together with the CGP, then took the majority of both Houses by 
winning the House of Councilors elections in 2013, which allowed them to bring the new series 
of national security bills.  
The second Abe cabinet proposed the Secret Protection Act to the Security Council in 
October 2013 for its approval. The Article 9 Association held a press conference and announced 
an appeal to oppose these new attempts of to create “the war-waging country” even before this 
proposal and articulated the problems of these new national security bills and widely called for a 
prompt action to fight this attempt (see Chapter VII). Nevertheless, the bill was soon submitted 
to the Diet, and passed on December 6th in the same year. Despite its significance and strong 
resistance by the opposition parties in the Committee on Judicial Affairs in the Diet, the bill was 
passed very quickly and forcefully. On the other hand, reaction to oppose the bill outside the Diet 
came rather slowly, only mounting large rallies when the bill was about to pass.  
The year 2013 also introduced a new channel of political participation for the Japanese: 
the lifting of the ban on the usage of the Internet in electoral campaigns. This set up a new 
environment for the generation of so-called “digital natives.” As though announcing the 
beginning of a new era, the opposition actions did not stop even after the bill became a law, and 
a new students group called SASPL (Students Against Secrets Protection Law) was organized 
specifically to oppose and demand the abolition of the law. As the government continued to 
bring the series of national security bills, this students’ group was reorganized into SEALDs in 
2015, with its new, broader purpose focused on opposing the national security bills. This group 
then started to provide a platform for many different individuals and groups of people to 
cooperate, creating another locus of activism. Their style partly followed Hangenren, in its use 
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of music in demonstrations and the weekly rally in front of the National Diet building, where 
participants can make free speeches.  
While many participants of the new anti-nuclear movements explicitly differentiated 
themselves from older activists and their movements, SEALDs was open to more general 
cooperation: In its rallies, many prominent scholars who founded the Article 96 Association, 
ASOSL, and SCDJ also participated and made speeches, which was said to be like “a weekly 
lecture series in front of the Diet building.” The scholars’ groups such as the ASOSL also 
published supportive comments on SEALDs in mass media. As this new movement against the 
national security bills developed a single voice that called for cooperation among the opposition 
parties to remove the LDP-CGP government under Abe cabinet from power, Diet members of 
opposition parties also started to participate in these rallies. Some have claimed that this was the 
first movement in Japanese history where students and scholars collaborated on one issue to 
create a united front. Concurrently, SEALDs Kansai, Tōkai, Tōhoku, and Ryūkyū were formed 
and actively pursued cooperation among different movement groups in their respective local 
areas, while emphasizing the importance of using their own words in expressing opinions on the 
issue. 
Before dawn on the morning of September 19, 2015, the national security bills passed the 
Diet. In the afternoon of the same day, the JCP published an announcement to propose a 
formation of the “people’s coalition government,” calling for general cooperation in the 
upcoming national election among the opposition parties. This surprised most observers of 
Japanese politics, since the JCP had previously been rather persistent in fielding its own 
candidates wherever possible. At the same time, the proposal encouraged many of those who 
were disappointed by the passing of the national security bills despite their efforts, as well as 
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longstanding activists who always wanted to present a united front. This accelerated the 
discussion among the opposition parties, but also various social movement organizations, and 
eventually, an agreement was reached among four opposition parties including the JCP, SDP, the 
People’s Life Party and Taro Yamamoto and Friends (subsequently the Liberal Party), and the 
new Democratic Party that was formed by the former DPJ and the Japan Innovation Party, to 
cooperate for the House of Councillors’ election in July 2016. SEALDs and other citizens 
groups, Mothers Against War in particular, played a central role in publicizing this new project.  
Finally, coalition candidates were fielded in all thirty-two single seat districts in the 
election, and they won in eleven districts. This was an important achievement, since in the 
previous election there were only two victories of the opposition candidates in the single seat 
districts. Moreover, in five out of six single seat districts in the Tōhoku area where people 
suffered the 3.11 triple disaster and its aftermath, the coalition candidates defeated former LDP 
Diet members. Okinawa, where the people’s all-out fight against construction of the new U.S. 
base in Henoko has been ongoing, also elected the coalition candidate, thereby eliminating LDP 
candidates from all electoral districts in the prefecture. Moreover, the ones who lost in 
Fukushima and Okinawa were former members of the Abe cabinet. The general outcome of the 
election was yet another victory of the ruling LDP and CGP. Nevertheless, through presenting a 
united front, the people’s coalition has developed and expanded to an unprecedented scale, 
involving all generations of veteran and ‘amateur’ activists. 
 
The Article 9 Association in the New Generation 
The contribution of the Article 9 Association was essential to the growth of this new 
broader coalition that emerged in the 2010s: the Association’s effort to overcome the past 
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conflicts within the left, and later to connect to the liberals with different views on the 
constitutional amendment, laid a groundwork for the new development. Moreover, members of 
the headquarters were directly involved in the formation of both the new anti-nuclear movement 
(Ōe, Sawachi, and Takada) and the broader coalition movement for the constitutional 
government (Komori, Takada, Watanabe, and Okudaira). Komori and Takada have been 
especially indispensable brokers for the new coalition (see Diagram 5). The Article 9 Association 
was thus in the background throughout the recent mobilization processes. This provides strong 
evidence of high centrality of the Association in today’s social movement sector in Japan. 
This recent process has ended for the time being, with the partial success of the united 
front in the House of Councilors election in July 2016. The unfinished project must go on, 
however, as SEALDs stated upon its dissolution on August 15, 2016, the 71st anniversary of the 
end of the Asia-Pacific War. This apparently odd decision of SEALDs to disband is actually a 
conscious action and can be understood as a new tactic for Japanese social movements. To the 
new generation of activists, forming a new group for one particular issue and disbanding it upon 
the conclusion of its intended project is a way to avoid making the same mistake that their 
predecessors made. In their eyes, past social movements went on for too long and some groups 
expanded to unnecessarily large scale only to become inflexible organizations, which as the 
result prolonged the life of irresponsible government. Their critical reflection upon the past 
movements made the younger generation try not only to keep their activity flexible, but also to 
make it more diffused into the public space. In so doing, former members of SEALDs would also 
continue engaging with public issues as ‘individuals’—not as a member of a group—who think 
and act independently. The decision of SEALDs to disband at this timing should therefore be 
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understood as an effort to make Japanese society a more active and engaging in the public 
sphere, but also to keep their individual selves responsible to their own actions.  
To protect the constitution and Article 9, the Article 9 Association would continue its 
daily activity with even stronger conviction. Indeed, the association held the sixth national 
exchange meeting in September 2016, and announced that it has formed a new managing 
committee (sewanin-kai), in order to strengthen the actual working unit and to take over the roles 
played by the founders when necessary (and possible). The committee is composed of twelve 
members of a slightly younger cohort (in their fifties and sixties), who come from various fields 
(seven academics, an economic analyst, a journalist, a humanitarian activist, an interpreter, and a 
lawyer), and have been actively involved in the Article 9 Association movement (the Article 9 
Association 2016, the Newsletter No. 251). It is still unlikely for the association to recruit too 
many younger members. Even so, the network created by the association has already become the 
basis of the new movements. Moreover, the purpose of the Article 9 Association has become the 
purpose of the new coalition, and of the young activists who gathered under the name of 
SEALDs as well as the mothers with small children who formed the MAW. The parting music 
video message of SEALDs, matched to rap music, embodied the continuation of the Article 9 
Association’s constitutional movement in the new generation: 
 
In prayers, on 8.15 
I put hands together, at Chidorigafuchi* 
I am in my thought, in the glaring darkness 
The death of the predecessors of this land 
Cannot see the determined look just yet 
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Looking in front, started walking, since then 
Different scenes, experienced, and thanked 
The worrier who searched for the unfulfilled 
Must have wished, spoken, and fought, 
For the life and peace in front of him 
 
It has reached here 
Like a glacier that could break down if left alone,
Fragile yet firm, his will has been taken over 
The value that stood for as long as 71 years 
“No War” the two words inscribed on the grave post 
Gave birth to the modern Samurai who strides in battlefields unarmed 
The name is Article 9 
 
We are still in the dream 
Living in the dream, like praying, like praying 
Always doing the right thing 
Looking in front, back straight, like the predecessors 
 
We are still in the dream 
Living in the dream, like praying, like praying 
Always doing the right thing 
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Looking in front, back straight, like the predecessors 
 
Rising up, we are SEALDs 
Mass with no name, on the street 
Standing alone 
To reconstruct the basement of the rotten nation 
Individuals’ words, thoughts, embodiment of the constitution 
 
We don’t want ABE’s revision 
This is not a Re-Action, but Action 
Just to succeed the drama since the end of war 
Affirmation of life, simple and pure 
We won’t end as awakened students’ riot 
We will preserve, overcoming the feeling of living in another age 
Rather than a strategy or plan, 
It’s more like drawing a dream like Martin Luther King 
We will live in the continuation of the dream of the dead 
And I have a dream 
Only solid future in front of my eyes 
Possibility for children, on this island 
Finished? Then we just start, once again 
 
We are still in the dream 
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Living in the dream, like praying, like praying 
Always doing the right thing 
Looking in front, back straight, like the predecessors 
 
We are still in the dream 
Living in the dream, like praying, like praying 
Always doing the right thing 
Looking in front, back straight, like the predecessors 
 
Yo, attention at once 
71 years since the war 
From present to future 
Nothing changes 
Human beings dream 
That comes true after their death 
 
We are SEALDs 
 
(* Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery is a memorial for unidentified war dead of the 
Second World War, located near the Imperial Palace and Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo.)
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The ASOSL published a statement on the achievement of SEALDs, on August 8, 2016, 
entitled “The Seven Fruits of SEALDs that We Succeed.” In summary, the ASOSL pointed out 
that: (1) SEALDs activated a citizens movement based on the “consciousness as the sovereign,” 
and in so doing, it reformed democracy in Japan; (2) Its activity, in building solidarity between 
individuals who respect one another, embodied the constitutionalism. This was the result of the 
intelligence, sensibility, and courage of the members who “think, judge, and act in solitary”; (3) 
Pacifism was revitalized as what is based on reflection on the past, present efforts, and hope for 
the future through speeches in which they spin their thoughts of peace into their own words; (4) 
It has built communicative relationship between citizens and the opposition parties, and thus 
realized a joint struggle among the opposition parties in the last House of Councillors election, 
which was deemed impossible previously; (5) It showed that a joint struggle could make a good 
game if it was supported by citizens, even in the single seat districts; (6) It started cooperation 
between students and scholars across Japan, as SEALDs was active nationwide and cooperated 
with other local students and citizens groups; (7) It not only protected constitutionalism, but also 
showed a guiding principle to develop it.  
The ASOSL then concluded that they would continue the action based on the respect for 
different characters of one another, in order to realize the politics that defend the dignity of 
individuals. Thus, the collaboration between students and scholars has developed through the 
joint struggle, and as the result, some of the core members of SEALDs and the ASOSL have 
formed a think tank called Re-DEMOS in order to make policy proposals. The opposition parties 
also agreed to continue on their joint struggle in the upcoming House of Representative election. 
These are a few clear indications that this new project will continue. Clearly, furthermore, 
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another important purpose of the Article 9 Association, to create a horizontal network of various 
social movement actors in Japan, has been succeeded by the new generation.
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CHAPTER IX.
 CONCLUSIONS
 
The present dissertation began with a sociological puzzle that stems from the seventy 
years of contest over the 1946 Constitution of Japan and its “peace clause” Article 9. The 
Japanese constitution famous for this special peace clause has remained contested ever since its 
establishment, but resisted challenges in the National Diet and in the courts for seventy years. 
After the massive protest cycles of the 1960s to early 1970s, protest activity in Japan declined, 
and there was no major protest mobilization over this issue for several decades. Suddenly in 
2004, however, a new movement called the Article 9 Association (Kyūjō no kai) emerged, and 
grew very rapidly to encompass over 7,500 chapters across Japan and abroad. What led to this 
new social movement and how and why did it grow so rapidly after such a long period of 
quiescence? The dissertation was set to solve these puzzles by using contemporary social 
movement theories and concepts. Namely, it drew on the literature about political process, 
protest cycles, and social networks, and explored the development of the Article 9 Association as 
a social movement network. The frame alignment theory was also utilized in order to explain the 
dynamic aspect of social psychology of participation. 
It accepted as its foundation the political process approach to social movements 
(McAdam 1982), which views social movements as arising out of longstanding grievances that 
only come to the fore when changing social, economic, and political conditions present a new 
political opportunity or threat that in turn becomes the basis for social movement mobilization: 
In the early 2000s, the nine founders of the Article 9 Association responded to the political threat 
posed by the establishment of the Research Commission on the Constitution in both houses of 
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the National Diet, by publishing the 2004 appeal that in turn produced the massive social 
movement network within very short period of time. Within the first three years of the activity, 
the number of the association’s grassroots chapters grew constantly by thousands of increase 
every year, and reached 6,734 by 2007. Through their activities in these years, moreover, the 
movement succeeded in reversing the public attitude on Article 9. This eventually led to the 
resignation of Abe Shinzō, who aimed specifically to revise Article 9, and his first cabinet in 
2007. After this first watershed, the Article 9 Association continued to thrive, increasing the 
number of grassroots chapters to 7,443 by 2009. Meanwhile, the public opinion for keeping 
Article 9 recovered the majority and to almost the level prior to the establishment of the 
Research Commission on the Constitution. These changes contributed to the falling of the LDP 
government in 2009 for the first time since 1993, which marked an important accomplishment of 
the Article 9 Association as a social movement. Since the new DPJ government and its biggest 
supporter the labor federation Rengō were less interested in changing the constitution and Article 
9, the initial threat to the movement had gone.  
On March 11, 2011, the earthquake of magnitude 9 hit the coast of northeastern Japan, 
and massive tsunami and the nuclear explosion in Fukushima followed it. This shook Japan to its 
core, and destabilized the entire society. While national recuperation was the highest priority and 
the SDF’s rescue efforts were welcomed, the approval rate of the DPJ government was dropping 
sharply. This eventually brought the LDP and Abe back to power in the 2012 election, posing a 
new political threat to the Article 9 Association. By that time, five out of nine founders of the 
association had passed away. It thus faced this new threat with less resource at the national level, 
despite its many chapters. As the 3.11 triple disaster destabilized the entire Japanese society, 
however, it also opened a political opportunity for new mobilizations to arise: In fact, new actors 
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emerged from the younger generations as the new anti-nuclear movements. The triple disaster 
also struck many members of the Article 9 Association’s grassroots chapters in Fukushima, 
Miyagi, and other affected areas. This called for the national exchange meeting for the first time 
since 2008, where the Article 9 Association collectively confirmed that the issue of nuclear 
power station is a constitutional problem, and to mobilize their massive network to deal with it. 
Thus, the Article 9 Association began to expand the scope of its movement, leading it further 
expanding its network in later years in fighting the new national security bills. 
While contextualizing the development of the Article 9 Association in the political 
process, the study also addressed the question of why the initial Article 9 Association appeal 
published by a particular group brought about an apparently sudden mobilization, and a very 
quick expansion of the network of a constitutional movement in the early 2000s; and how and by 
whom these several thousand grassroots chapters were created. To answer these questions, it 
adopted process-based approach, and closely investigated the social networks the Article 9 
Association is rooted in, and the ways in which these social networks created the present form of 
the Article 9 Association. 
The research then revealed that the network of the Article 9 Association is rooted in the 
1960 political generation, which emerged originally in the opposition movement against the US-
Japan Security Treaty. Since the end of the ‘political season’ in the 1970s, however, Japanese 
social movements have never been able to mount a large-scale movement with a real impact in 
politics. Chapter III explained the political process from the 1950s to early 2010s, and argued 
that the weakness of Japanese social movements was the result of the historical divisions within 
the left, which stemmed originally from the Cold War politics introduced to Japan in the 1950s, 
but then had become decisive through the destruction of the progressive alignment that started in 
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the late 1970s. It was necessary to understand this historical backdrop in order to appreciate the 
significance of the Article 9 Association.  
Given the context, Chapter IV explored how the vast, horizontal network of the Article 9 
Association became possible at all. The chapter found that many activists who have been active 
since the 1960s and their groups decided at one point to turn themselves into grassroots chapters 
of the Article 9 Association. The process was not, however, a simple remobilization of existing 
groups. Instead, the process was a multifold of active decisions and continuous mediating actions 
conducted by the movement participants, in order to overcome the past conflicts: in the process, 
they reworked their social ties and reformulated their groups with new purposes, and named 
these new groups as their own chapters of the Article 9 Association. This was the process that 
enabled the Article 9 Association to create such an extensive network within a short period of 
time. Then, the network of the Article 9 Association developed and further expanded through the 
ties that were already accumulated by the same generation of activists, much of it had been in 
abeyance prior to the political threat/opportunity emerged in the early 2000s. Later, the network 
expanded also through the ties created in their activities as a part of the Article 9 Association.  
By looking at the concrete processes through which grassroots chapters of the Article 9 
Association were created, organized, and maintained, the present study has shown that the 
movement participants’ continuous mediating efforts at all (individual, organizational, and event) 
levels made this vast network possible. Chapter IV showed this process at the grassroots level, 
and Chapter V showed it at the prefectural level, by examining the six clearinghouse chapters of 
Kanagawa, Hiroshima, Miyagi, Kyoto, Okinawa, and Fukushima Networks. 
Chapter V described each of these clearinghouse chapters strove to overcome a different 
type of the conflicts that afflicted the 1960 political generation: The Kanagawa Network dealt 
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with the gap between the communists and socialists. The Hiroshima Network dealt with the gap 
between political party affiliated activists and so-called citizen activists, as well as the one 
between supporters of different political organizations including a group with a tie to a New Left 
group. In the Miyagi Network, political identities of participants were underplayed, in order not 
only to reach out to more general audience, but also for different citizens groups to work together 
under the name of the Article 9 Association. The Kyoto Network made the effort to go beyond 
all these gaps, and to overcome another most easily overlooked source of conflict, which existed 
between individual participants and group participants. The objectives and activities of these 
clearinghouse chapters are embedded in unique histories, local social movement organizations, 
and other resources available in their respective local areas. Thus, the participants concentrated 
their energy to bridge the past gaps and expand their networks in their respective locations. 
Together, these six cases drew the framework of the network built by the 1960s political 
generation in Japan today. Moreover, this analysis contributed to theoretical and empirical 
understanding of the role of such clearinghouse groups, which are widely used in Japanese social 
movements and also occur in other countries but have rarely been studied in depth. 
By focusing its analysis on the ways in which each chapter overcomes these conflicts, 
Chapters IV and V underscored that participants in the Article 9 Association movement were 
consciously creating a massive new network beyond the existing groups by bridging the 
cleavages between them. To bridge these various cleavages, participants of the Article 9 
Association movements needed to become conscious of them at one point. They then needed to 
find out what were the gaps to be filled and worked on. Often, this required them to be more 
supportive of the ‘weaker’ side and prioritize their preferences. Through working together, they 
would find out about misunderstandings to be talked over, or differences that would better be 
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accepted as is. Based on such a foundation, common goals and purposes would be confirmed, 
helping different actors to work together on areas of agreement. As much as it was organizational 
efforts, it was also the participants’ personal efforts to go beyond their different backgrounds. 
Sometimes, as discussed in the case of Kyoto, letting differences play an active role rather than 
underplaying them brings a positive solution for different actors to utilize their strength to 
achieve a common goal. Thus, the Article 9 Association served as an important platform for all 
these efforts to play out, helping the 1960s generation of activists to overcome existing conflicts 
that were created in their own past movements. As George Herbert Mead put it, “The appearance 
of…different interests in the forum of reflection [leads to] the reconstruction of the social world, 
and the consequent appearance of the new self and that answers to the new object” (1964:149). 
The movements’ emphasis on local level, small scale activities made in possible. 
“Overcoming” conflicts, moreover, sometimes meant leaving differences as they are and 
finding one single point where people with differences could work together. To begin with, the 
Article 9 Association did not question participants’ views on anything else but Article 9. Small 
ideological differences were put aside consciously, while areas of agreement were emphasized 
and promoted in daily activities. Such positive flexibility was also a learned tactic for the 1960s 
political generation, and actually the key for the Article 9 Association to achieve its present form 
of a horizontal network: The initial appeal of the association that framed the issue very 
specifically focused on only Article 9, and emphasized the power of individual Japanese as the 
sovereign to personally adopt Article 9 produced this flexibility, and motivated general 
participation at every level of the society. This was also essential for the Article 9 Association to 
play a fundamental role in reactivating the entire sector of social movements of the country—in 
fact, the student movements in the 1960s was much criticized for some extreme cases in which 
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some participants used violence against their own members who were deemed disloyal to the 
group. Arguably, this was the result of excessive fear of disagreement that stemmed from 
inordinate demand for group cohesion. Indeed, “The rational resolution of problem-situations—a 
matter of action—requires capacities for prudential reasoning and practical judgment, which the 
pragmatists (beginning with Dewey) termed ‘intelligence’” (Emirbayer 1997:310). 
The new and younger activists who took part in the reactivation process in the mid-2010s 
spontaneously introduced further sophistication to the Japanese participatory politics, by 
upholding mutual respect to differences in their new constitutional movement. This attitude 
resonates very well with the spirit of the Article 9 Association’s initial appeal, and it eventually 
came through as the key to realize the historical coalition among the previously conflicting 
parties in opposition. The true driving forces of this coalition, moreover, are citizen and student 
groups that demanded opposition parties to form a united front. Given the different identities that 
separated these actors so deeply since the 1950s, the significance of the present development to 
the Japanese political history cannot be emphasized enough. 
Chapter V also dealt with two special cases of Okinawa and Fukushima: The case of 
Okinawa exhibited the historical difference between the island and Japanese main islands. In this 
context, the Okinawa Network may have been a platform itself, where the participants from two 
places work together, and, as the result, cast a bridge between them. For their co-existence, 
realization of the ideal of Article 9 may be the ultimate purpose. The triple disaster in March 
2011 made the Fukushima Network to play the role of another platform, where the activities of 
the Article 9 Association interacted with the anti-nuclear movement. Through the process, the 
Article 9 Association started to expand its scope to the related problems and to reframe its 
movement toward a broader fight, while still focusing squarely on Article 9. Each clearinghouse 
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chapter thus presented a unique pattern of how a local Article 9 Association could be organized 
and what activities it could conduct. Nevertheless, the chapter also made clear that each of these 
chapters achieved its present form based on the accumulation and the history of social movement 
activities in the respective local areas, which continued since before the formation of the Article 
9 Association.  
Chapter VI analyzed the major functions of the headquarters of the Article 9 Association 
in the first few years of its activity. The headquarters constitutes the symbolic and charismatic 
leadership, and is the intelligence of the movement. While representing the entire network of the 
Article 9 Association at the national level, the headquarters provided the movement slogans and 
goals, as well as latest information and analytical tools to make sense of ongoing changes in 
politics in relation to their activities. To encourage communications among grassroots chapters 
and strengthen their horizontal connections, the headquarters also hosted the national exchange 
meetings and published newsletters and digital mail magazines frequently. It also published 
booklets that recorded its constitutional seminar series to promote constitutional literacy among 
general public. As exemplified by its reaction to the triple disaster in March 2011, the 
headquarters also responded quickly to salient issues that arose occasionally and kept the 
movement relevant to the changing circumstances, each time through serious reflection on its 
roles and purposes in relation to the social reality. This character of the headquarters, as well as 
the adaptability of grassroots chapters that compose the network of the Article 9 Association, 
was essential for the movement to make new connections to create the broader coalition in later 
years. 
Chapter VII began with highlighting the first achievement of the Article 9 Association. 
Utilizing the political process framework, the chapter described how the development of the 
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Article 9 Association network coincided with the reversal of public opinion on Article 9, which 
led to the resignation of Abe and his cabinet in 2007, and to eventually the falling of the LDP 
government in 2009. The chapter then explained how the Article 9 Association dealt with the 
new political threat caused by the 3.11 triple disaster and resultant comeback of the LDP 
government under Abe who has been insisting on revising Article 9.  
The chapter also showed that the headquarters was a coalition of some of the most 
connected leaders: each of the nine founders possessed unique personal and professional 
backgrounds and the group did not necessarily share views on matters other than Article 9 and 
the constitution. The secretariat, moreover, was composed of not only socially and politically 
active university professors with different expertise, but also the leaders of two different social 
movement groups who had kept distance before joining the Article 9 Association. As much as its 
adaptability, this connected character of the headquarters was also essential in the Association’s 
development, not only for it to reactivate social movements in Japan, but also for it to claim high 
centrality within the broader movement in later years, thereby laying the foundation for its 
constitutional movement to continue beyond its original cycle of protest. 
Having described the political process in which the Article 9 Association produced 
significant differences that impacted public attitudes regarding Article 9 and the constitution, 
Chapter VIII turned the focus once again to the political process in the 2010s, to present the 
emergence of the new generation of activists in renewed appreciation. In so doing, the chapter 
dealt with a remaining question: ‘continuity’ of the Article 9 Association in the new generation. 
With the introduction of “the Internet election” as a new channel of political participation, the 
new macrocultural environment was set up for the rise of new social movement actors. Yet, the 
Article 9 Association has been missing younger participants, and it is still unlikely for the 
! 177!
Association to recruit too many younger members without fundamentally altering its character. 
Nevertheless, the chapter argued that the contribution of the Article 9 Association was essential 
to the new broader coalition that emerged in the mid-2010s. The Association’s efforts to 
overcome the past conflicts within the left, and later to connect to the liberals with different 
views on the constitutional amendment, laid the groundwork for the new development. As also 
discussed in Chapter VII, members of the headquarters were directly involved in the formation 
of both the new anti-nuclear movement and the broader coalition movement for constitutional 
government: In the formation of the new coalition, moreover, Komori and Takada from the 
headquarters were indispensable brokers. This provides strong evidence of high centrality of the 
Article 9 Association in today’s social movement sector in Japan. The network of the Article 9 
Association has already become a part of the new coalition movement. In turn, cooperation 
between the older and younger generations in the broader context helped the Association to 
deliver its purpose in the new generation. Eventually, and most significantly, the purpose of the 
Article 9 Association, to protect and promote Article 9 and the constitution, has become the 
purpose of the new movement for constitutional government. 
 
Theoretical Contributions 
Network Practice and Social Movement Continuity 
The present study used the political process approach (McAdam 1982) that focuses on 
why social movements emerge when they do to understand how this longstanding contentious 
issue re-emerged as a new social movement under new political and social conditions in the 
2000s. This was a movement that re-emerged after a long period of abeyance (Whittier 1997, 
Crossley and Taylor 2015). The key to understand its rapid rise under these new conditions of 
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political threat was to use the perspective that social movements are network structures (Diani 
and McAdam 2003), and to examine closely how the Article 9 Association re-mobilized old 
networks and created new ones.  
By examining the network processes of the Article 9 Association, the study has shown 
that the lives of social movements may continue beyond cycles of protest, from which a 
generation of social movements originates: In the Article 9 Association, the social networks of 
the 1960s political generation were remobilized after three decades of abeyance; through the 
process of remobilization, the existing social networks were transformed into a new movement. 
This new movement in turn provided a platform for the generation of activists to overcome its 
past problems. Furthermore, this process created for the movement a path to transcend the protest 
cycle it originated from, and to reclaim its life in the new generation. 
To understand social movement continuity in this new way required adopting a process-
based approach, and the viewpoints of social network analysis, as they helped to shift the study’s 
attention from continuity of a particular social movement as a group or organization: The 
traditional view of social movements assumed a movement to have fixed subjects who conduct 
the given movement, and focused analyses on cultural forms such as ‘identities’ and ‘frames’ 
instead of “how these forms are shaped, deployed, and reformulated in conversation” (Mische 
2003). This view of social movements assumed that continuity of social movements could hardly 
be maintained when the long-term committed members of a particular movement reached an 
advanced age and became incapable of carrying on their movement. As the result, it was 
presumed necessary for social movements to recruit new, younger members into given social 
movement groups or organizations. However, studies have also found that different political 
generations are unlikely to share the same collective identity due to their different socio-political 
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and historical experience, which means recruiting participants from a younger generation is even 
more difficult than recruitment within the same generation.  
Although McAdam’s concept of political process encouraged researchers to analyze “the 
entire process of movement development rather than a particular phase” (1982:36), the fixed 
view of social movements limited the scope of studies. In spite of the fact that the concept of 
“protest cycle” suggested cyclical lives of social movements, moreover, studies hardly looked 
beyond the processes after movement contraction and abeyance period (Taylor 1989). If this was 
not because of an unspoken presumption that it would be impossible for social movements to 
continue beyond their original protest cycles, it still was assumed that social movements would 
not continue without recruiting new members into those groups that maintain given movements. 
Only recently, research on the American feminist movement has presented evidence that social 
movements can continue over time due to expansion of their basic collective identity and its 
diffusion through abeyance structures (Crossley and Taylor 2015). The movement can thus 
continue to grow and change well into another generation. 
By closely investigating the Article 9 Association and its network processes in particular, 
this dissertation has also demonstrated that social movements may continue beyond cycles of 
protest, even without direct successors of given movement groups or organizations. By showing 
how the network structure of the Article 9 Association developed, moreover, this study also 
contributed to the basic sociological study of social organization and the creation of social 
institutions, which often begin as social movements and then may become more institutionalized. 
If the American feminist movement is the case of movement continuity through diffusion and 
spillover of collective identity where institutionalized “free spaces” serve as a system for ideas to 
be transmitted among similar groups, the Japanese constitutional movement is the case of 
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movement continuity through network practices, in which real persons struggle in their everyday 
lives, face to face, to make communication possible among those with different backgrounds.  
 
Relational Understanding of Movement Continuity 
The processes of network formation and expansion we have observed in the Article 9 
Association movement, moreover, contribute a more relational understanding to the theories of 
social movement continuity. It was clear in my observation that participants of the Article 9 
Association have been working hard to overcome the previous divisions. They had learned 
lessons from their past failures, that they competed over small differences, trying to dominate the 
already limited oppositional space, instead of expanding it by working together. In the present 
movement, they are doing exactly the opposite. At the ground level of their activities, 
participants of the Article 9 Association were freer to disagree in comparison to previous 
settings, as they operate as basically autonomous small groups of their own. These independent 
groups and individuals are nevertheless working together as one movement, and as part of the 
processes of new network formation. Throughout these processes, therefore, traits of the network 
(ties of network) were constantly changing. Consequently, traits of participants (nodes of 
network) were also changing to varying degree, given their autonomy in the movement, as their 
network expand and meet and involve new others in multiple settings.  
This study supports the views that conceptualize social movements as networks instead of 
groups, and that movements belong to connections between people rather than people. This does 
not necessarily suggest that networks can persist independent from people or that people are 
easily replaceable. It still matters who is in the network, because social networks are maintained 
by real persons with different priorities (although these actors also change for many reasons, 
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including their ties to others). At the ground level, people keep connections because they can 
work with each other. The Article 9 Association was able to involve all kinds of actors precisely 
because it was a network, which could provide a common ground where differences were 
respected. 
There was no guarantee that the past divisions would be overcome. Indeed (as the late 
Peter Manicas used to say in his graduate seminar on sociological theory at the University of 
Hawaii at Manoa), “it could have been different.” Often, when presented with a common enemy, 
groups will not unite. The 1960s political generation in Japan is the living witness of this truth. It 
is a common story that liberals and radicals distance themselves from each other in some kind of 
competition instead of uniting over commonalities. That is also understandable as “identity”—
liberals and radicals are just different—but again, it is more precise to be understood in relational 
terms: There is a limited space for opposition, and competitions drive them apart instead of 
together. Such fracturing happened in the 1960s Japan, but it did not happen in the 2000s. The 
present dissertation demonstrated why: Divisions in the Japanese left that used to be understood 
in terms of identities were overcome through a reorganization of networks. This was done, 
moreover, through the working of real people’s hard-earned “intelligence” (Dewey 1980). On 
that foundation, furthermore, new generations of social movements are developing.  
Thus, we understand now that the life of social movements as networks can transcend 
protest cycles. What was understood in the traditional sense as “continuity” through certain 
people’s endless efforts to maintain their vigor and resources (i.e. legacies, histories, know-how, 
lessons, collective identities, and network ties) may now be understood as infinite processes of 
network formation and reorganization of social movements-as-networks. Through such 
processes, united, social movements can increase impact and expand the oppositional space. 
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APPENDIX I.  
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Basic Questions: For all interviewees 
Part 1. Participants’ background 
a. How old were you when you first started to take part in the Article 9 Association? 
b. What were you doing before you got involved in the activities of the Article 9 
Association? (probe for additional demographic background information if it does not 
come out in this general inquiry) 
c. Tell me about your typical week before you joined the Association.  
 
Part 2. Routes of recruitment and patterns of involvement 
a. How did you begin to participate in the activities of the Article 9 Association? 
b. How did you decide to join this particular chapter? 
c. If you have been participating in more than one chapter, which chapters are they? 
What do you do with each chapter? 
d. If you hold any position or have any office in the chapter (or the Association), what 
do you do? How much time do you spend on it? 
e. How active have you been as a member of the Association and/or your chapter? What 
sorts of things have you done as a member of the Article 9 Association? How many 
hours do you spend a week for the Association/chapter activity? 
f. Where does your activity in this group fit into the rest of your life? Tell me about 
your work and leisure life. What do you do for a living? What do you do for leisure? 
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With whom do you maintain regular contact (e.g. neighbors, colleagues from work, 
people from hobby circles etc.)? Tell me about your typical week. 
 
Part 3. Participation in chapter activities 
a. What are regular meetings like? What are the purposes of regular meetings? How 
often do you have meetings? How are they organized?  
b. How do you stay in contact with other chapter members? How often do you talk to 
each other? What media do you use the most? 
c. What activities has your chapter done so far? 
d. What kinds of chapter activities do you like to attend, and which ones are you less 
likely to participate in? 
e. What was the last activity of your chapter? Did you attend the event? Tell me about 
the event you last attended. How many people attended to the event? Were they 
mostly the chapter members or were there any new people? About What was the 
general age range of the participants? About what proportion were men and women? 
f. If your chapter has ever held public events (e.g. lectures, film screening, study 
meetings etc.) Did anyone who was not a chapter member participate? Who were 
they? How did they come to the event? Did they say anything about the event? Did 
they come back for later events? 
 
Part 4. Participation in extra-chapter activities 
a. Have you participated in any demonstrations or larger scale meetings of the 
Association? If you have, which ones? 
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b. How many of such events have you attended in the past year? 
c. Tell me about the last occasion you participated in a larger scale event of the 
Association. Did you go as part of a group from the chapter? If not, did you go by 
yourself or did you take anyone with you? With whom did you go together? (prove 
for additional information depending on what event the interviewee participated) 
 
Part 5. Patterns of interaction between participants 
a. Think about the last time you came to the chapter office or a meeting. What did you 
do on that occasion? Was that typical? If not, think of a more typical occasion and tell 
me about that. 
b. Who did you talk to on that occasion? Were there other people there that you did not 
talk to?  Was that occasion typical? If not, think of a more typical occasion and tell 
me about that. 
c. Do you talk to your chapter members outside the chapter? If you do, think about the 
last time you did and tell me about that. Was that typical? If not, think of a more 
typical occasion and tell me about that. 
d. Do you interact with members of other chapters? In what kinds of occasion? Tell me 
about the last time you did that. 
 
Part 6. Experiences of recruiting 
a. Do you talk about the Article 9 Association outside your activity as a member of the 
Association or your chapter? With whom? What do you talk about? When was the 
last time you did that? Tell me about it. About how often do you do that? 
! 185!
b. Have you invited anyone to the activities related to the Article 9 Association? Who 
are they? What happened afterwards? When was the last time you did that? Tell me 
about it. 
c. About how often have you brought someone to an Article 9 Association activity? 
Have any of those people come back to other events or joined the group afterwards? 
 
 
Supplement Questions I: For interviewees who is older than age 60 and belong to a chapter 
most of whose membership is older than age 50 
Supplement to Part 3. Participation in chapter activities 
a. Are you or your chapter generally satisfied with the age and gender composition of 
the membership? If not, how would you like it to be? Has your chapter been thinking 
about this issue, and how have they thought about it? 
b. If your chapter has few younger (35 and under) members, can you remember if any 
young people have attended any of your activities? If they did, how did the young 
person happen to come to the event? How did you or others interact with the younger 
person? Did the person come to any subsequent events? 
c. If your chapter has a handful of younger members, when and how did they come to 
participate? Who brought them? How did your group encourage them to participate? 
What do you feel the younger people contribute to the group? Have you noticed any 
change in the organization after the younger members came in? 
 
Supplement to Part 5. Patterns of interaction between participants 
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a. Have you ever worked together with those who are much younger than yourself in 
any activity of the Article 9 Association? In what occasion? Tell me about last time 
you did that. What did you do? How did you feel about it? Did it have any impact on 
your activity? 
 
 
Supplement Questions II: For interviewee who is younger than age 35 and belongs to a 
chapter where most members are older than age 50 
Supplement to Part 5. Patterns of interaction between participants 
a. How do you relate to the older members of your chapter?  
b. Have you wanted to change anything? Have you actually tried to do that? If you have, 
what happened? 
 
 
Supplement Questions III: For interviewees younger than age 35 and belong to a chapter 
whose most membership is younger than age 35 
Supplement to Part 5. Patterns of interaction between participants 
b. Are you or your chapter generally satisfied with the age and gender composition of 
the membership? If not, how would you like it to be? Has your chapter been thinking 
about this issue, and how have they thought about it? 
c. Have you ever worked together with those who are much older than yourself in any 
activity of the Article 9 Association? In what occasion? Tell me about last time you 
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did that. What did you do? How did you feel about it? Did it have any impact on your 
activity? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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APPENDIX II. 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
December 16, 2011 at a meeting room on Tokyo University Hongo Campus 
December 19, 2011 at Tully’s Coffee near Yokohama Station 
December 20, 2011 at the interviewee’s house
December 22, 2011 at Kanagawa Social Welfare Center 
December 22, 2011 at the office of Kanagawa Network 
December 26, 2011 at Tully’s Coffee near Yokohama Station 
December 26, 2011 at Tully’s Coffee near Yokohama Station 
January 6, 2012 at Nishi-sakaemachi Church 
January 6, 2012 at Nishi-sakaemachi Church
January 6, 2012 at Nishi-sakaemachi Church 
January 6, 2012 at Nishi-sakaemachi Church 
January 7, 2012 at Nishi-sakaemachi Church 
January 13, 2012 at the interviewee’s house 
January 13, 2012 at the interviewee’s house 
January 13, 2012 at the interviewee’s house 
January 19, 2012 at a coffee shop near Tokyu Hiyoshi Station 
February 1, 2012 at the office of Kenpō Kaigi 
February 4, 2012 at Café Renoir near Ofuna Station 
February 10, 2012 at the interviewee’s house 
February 15, 2012 at a coffee shop near Kōenji Station 
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February 15, 2012 at Tully’s Coffee near Yokohama Station 
February 17, 2012 at the interviewee’s office on Chūō University Tama Campus 
February 20, 2012 at a coffee shop near Yūrakuchō Station 
February 24, 2012 at Conceal Café in Shibuya 
February 24, 2012 at a bar near Asagaya Station 
March 8, 2012 at a coffee shop near Kanda Station 
March 9, 2012 at a coffee shop near Toritsu-kasei Station 
March 9, 2012 at a coffee shop near Toritsu-kasei Station 
March 14, 2012 at Hekkorodani near Mutsuai Station 
March 17, 2012 at a café near Kōenji Station 
March 17, 2012 at a coffee shop near Shibuya Station 
March 23, 2012 at Tully’s Coffee near Yokohama Station 
March 27, 2012 at the office of Film and Theater Wokers’ Union 
March 27, 2012 at the office of Film and Theater Wokers’ Union 
April 5, 2012 at the office of interviewee 
April 6, 2012 at a coffee shop near Hiroshima Station 
April 6, 2012 at a coffee shop near Hiroshima Station 
April 9, 2012 at the office of Miyagi Network 
April 9, 2012 at the office of Miyagi Network 
April 9, 2012 at the office of Miyagi Network 
April 12, 2012 at the office of Kyoto Network 
April 12, 2012 at the office of Kyoto Network 
April 12, 2012 at the office of Kyoto Network 
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April 12, 2012 at the office of Kyoto Network 
April 13, 2012 at the Ritsumeikan University Peace Museum 
April 13, 2012 at the cafeteria on Bukkyo University Campus 
April 13, 2012 at the interviewee’s office 
April 14, 2012 at the meeting room in the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Hall in Kyoto 
April 18, 2012 at the interviewee’s office 
April 23, 2012 at Café Renoir near Ofuna Station 
May 3, 2012 at Café Renoir near Ofuna Station 
May 14, 2012 at a restaurant in Naha, Okinawa 
May 14, 2012 at a restaurant in Naha, Okinawa 
May 14, 2012 at a restaurant in Naha, Okinawa 
May 15, 2012 on the University of Ryukyus campus 
May 15, 2012 on the University of Ryukyus campus  
May 15, 2012 on the University of Ryukyus campus 
May 15, 2012 at the Haebaru Culture Center 
May 16, 2012 at the office of OCSC 
May 17, 2012 at a restaurant in a shopping center in Futenma 
May 18, 2012 at the interviewee’s office  
May 23, 2012 at a coffee shop in Shinjuku 
May 29, 2012 at Café Renoir near Ofuna Station 
May 29, 2012 at Café Renoir near Ofuna Station  
May 30, 2012 at Starbucks Coffee near Fujisawa Station 
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